

U.S.I. JOURNAL

INDIA'S OLDEST JOURNAL ON DEFENCE AFFAIRS

(Established : 1870)



PRINCIPAL CONTENTS

- | | |
|--|---|
| President's Report for the
Year 1992 | - Vice Admiral S P Govil,
PVSM, AVSM |
| The World Power Structure
in Transition - II | - Gen K Sundarji, PVSM,
(Retd) |
| The Disintegration of the Soviet
Union : Implications | - Chai Chengwen |
| Emerging International
Strategic Situation | - Prof Luo Renshi |
| Volatile World Situation | - Huang Zhengji |
| Value Added Defence | - Lt Col Rahul K Bhonsle,
SM |

JANUARY - MARCH 1993

Para Military Forces	
by Lt Gen ML Chibber, PVSM, AVSM	Price: Rs. 25.00
Defence Budgeting in India	
by Shri DS Nakra (Retd)	Price: Rs. 25.00
Possible Counter Measures against Satellite Reconnaissance	
by Air Marshal IW Sabhaney, AVSM	Price: Rs. 25.00
Higher Defence Organisation	
by Lt Gen SK Sinha, PVSM (Retd)	Price: Rs. 25.00
Leadership in the Indian Army During Eighties and Nineties	
by Lt Gen ML Chibber, PVSM, AVSM	Price: Rs. 25.00
China's Strategic Posture in the 1980's (Revised)	
by Lt Gen AM Vohra, PVSM	Price: Rs. 35.00
Intra-Regional Interventions in South Asia	
by Prof KR Singh	Price: Rs. 50.00

Report on Armoured Personnel Carriers	
Chairman Maj Gen D Som Dutt (Retd)	Price: Rs. 15.00
Report on the Imposition of a Manpower Ceiling on the Army	
Chairman Lt Gen ML Thapan, PVSM (Retd)	Price: Rs. 15.00
Report on Recruitment into the Officer Corps of the Armed Forces	
Chairman Maj Gen D Som Dutt (Retd)	Price: Rs. 15.00
Report on a Seminar on Cooperation in Defence	
Chairman Lt Gen ML Thapan, PVSM (Retd)	Price: Rs. 15.00
Report on a Seminar on Review of the Organisation Pattern of the Indian Army	
Chairman Lt Gen ML Thapan, PVSM (Retd)	Price: Rs. 25.00
Report on the Military Threat in the Nineteen Eighties	
Chairman Lt Gen AM Vohra, PVSM (Retd)	Price: Rs. 30.00
Report on Nuclear Shadow over the Sub-Continent	
Chairman Maj Gen DK Palit, Vrc	Price: Rs. 25.00
Relationship of Military Law and Discipline with the Judicial System of the Country	
Chairman Lt Gen ML Thapan, PVSM (Retd)	Price: Rs. 35.00
Naval Strategy in the Indian Ocean	
by Admiral S. Prakash	Price: Rs. 30.00
Report on Military and Society	
Chairman Lt Gen AM Vohra, PVSM (Retd)	Price: Rs. 50.00
Report on Foreign and Defence Policies for India in the 1990s	Price: Rs. 50.00

India's Problems of National Security in the Seventies	
by Gen JN Chaudhuri	Price: Rs. 50.00
India's Defence Policy and Organisation Since Independence	
by Shri PVR Rao, ICS (Retd)	Price: Rs. 50.00
Some Problems of India's Defence	
by Air Chief Marshal PC Lal, DFC (Retd)	Price: Rs. 50.00
Defence and Development by Shri HC Sarin, ICS (Retd)	Price: Rs. 50.00
The Indian Ocean & India's Maritime Security	
by Adm SN Kohli, PVSM (Retd)	Price: Rs. 50.00
Internal Threats and National Security by Shri Govind Narain, ICS (Retd)	Price: Rs. 50.00
National Security and Modern Technology	
by Dr Raja Ramanna	Price: Rs. 50.00
India, Pakistan and the USA by Shri S Nihal Singh	Price: Rs. 50.00
Higher Defence Organisation	
by Lt. Gen S K Sinha, PVSM	Price: Rs. 50.00

Contains informative and authoritative articles	Price: Rs. 50.00
	(Postage & Packing extra)

Ask for you copy from:

DIRECTOR, UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION OF INDIA
Kashmir House, Rajaji Marg, New Delhi-110011

ISSN 0041-770X

The
Journal
of the
United Service Institution
of
India

Published by Authority of the Council



(Established : 1870)

Postal Address :

KASHMIR HOUSE, RAJAJI MARG, NEW DELHI-110 011

Telephone No. 3015828

Vol CXXIII

January-March 1993

No. 511

USI Journal is published Quarterly in April, July, October and January.
Subscription per annum : In India Rs. 120.00 Foreign £18.00 or \$ 33.00 by Air
Mail £14.00 or \$ 26.00 by Sea Mail. Subscription should be sent to the
Director. It is supplied free to the members of the Institution. Articles,
Correspondence and Books for Review should be sent to the Editor.
Advertisement enquiries concerning space should be sent to the Director.

**UNITED
SERVICE
INSTITUTION
OF INDIA**

for

*the furtherance of
interest and know-
ledge in the art,
science, and literature
of National Security
in general and of the
Defence Services
in particular*

Director

**Maj Gen SC Sinha,
PVSM (Retd)**

Dy Director & Editor

**Air Cmde N B Singh,
MA, M.Phil, IAF (Retd)**

Dy Director (Admin)

**Brig G L Sachdeva
(Retd)**

Chief Instructor

Brig Y P Dev (Retd)

DS (Coord.)

Col V K Singh

Librarian

Mr O S Sachdeva

Accountant

Mr S L Bhalla

Patron

Dr. Shanker Dayal Sharma, Hon'ble President of India

Vice-Patron

**General S F Rodrigues, PVSM, VSM, ADC, Chief of the Army Staff and
Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee**

**Admiral L Ramdas, PVSM, AVSM, Vrc, VSM, ADC, Chief of the Naval
Staff**

Air Chief Marshal N C Suri, PVSM, AVSM, VM, ADC, Chief of the Air Staff

President - USI Council

Lt Gen Vijai Singh, PVSM, ADC Vice Chief of the Army Staff

Vice Presidents

**Vice Admiral V S Shekhawat, PVSM, AVSM, Vrc, Vice Chief of the Naval Staff
Air Marshal PJ Jayakumar, PVSM, AVSM, Vice Chief of the Air Staff**

Ex-Officio Members

**Shri NN Vohra, Secretary, Ministry of Defence
Lt Gen Ashok Joshi, PVSM, AVSM, Director General Military Training
Air Vice-Marshal AS Sethi, Director of Training Air HQ
Commodore Ravinder Singh, YSM, Director Naval Training**

Elected Members of the Council

**Lt Gen V P Airy, MVC
Lt Gen K Balaram, PVSM (Retd)
Air Vice Marshal M Banerji, MVC, VM (Retd)
Vice Admiral SC Chopra, PVSM, AVSM, NM (Retd)
Lt Gen IS Gill, PVSM, MC (Retd)
Vice Admiral SP Govil, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)
Brigadier NB Grant, AVSM (Retd)
Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, AVSM, Vrc, VM
Lt Gen SL Menezes, PVSM, SC (Retd)
Rear Admiral Satyindra Singh, AVSM (Retd)
General VN Sharma, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)
Lt Gen SK Sinha, PVSM (Retd)
Professor M L Sondhi
Lt Gen MA Zaki, PVSM, AVSM, Vrc (Retd)**

Co-opted Member

Lt Gen SN Sharma, PVSM

Executive Committee

**Lt Gen Ashok Joshi, PVSM, AVSM, Director General Military Training
Air Vice Marshal A S Sethi, Director Training, Air HQ
Commodore Ravinder Singh, YSM, Director Naval Training
Lt Gen K Balaram, PVSM (Retd)
Air Vice Marshal M Banerji, MVC, VM (Retd)
Lt Gen SL Menezes, PVSM, SC (Retd)
Rear Admiral Satyindra Singh, AVSM (Retd)
Lt Gen SN Sharma, PVSM (Retd)**

CONTENTS

Editorial

MAIN ARTICLES

President's Report for the Year 1992	
Vice Admiral S P Govil, PVSM, AVSM.....	1
The World Power Structure in Transition from a	
Quasi Unipolar to a Quasi Multipolar State and	
the Options of a Middle Power in this Milieu (Part - II)	
General K Sundarji, PVSM (Retd).....	6
The Disintegration of the Soviet Union and its Implications	
Chai Chengwen.....	21
Tremendous and Profound Changes and Complex Contradictions	
Professor Luo Renshi.....	33
Volatile World Situation	
Huang Zhengji.....	43
Value Added Defence	
Lt Col Rahul K Bhonsle SM.....	51
From Confrontation to Cooperation : A New Agenda for the Indian Navy	
Vice Admiral (Retd) Mihir K Roy, PVSM, AVSM.....	66
Security Issues in Central Asia	
Maj Gen D Banerjee, AVSM.....	76

REVIEW ARTICLES

History and Strategy	
by Air Marshal H K Oberai, PVSM, AVSM, VM (Retd).....	92
Pakistan - The Socio Economic Factors Involved in Emergence of	
Bhutto and Gen Zia-Ul-Haq as Political Leaders	
by Brig Subhash Kapila.....	95
Para Operations in the Burmese Campaign	
by Lt Gen S N Sharma, PVSM (Retd).....	98
Options in Kashmir	
by Maj Gen S C Sinha, PVSM (Retd).....	100
The Story of the Indian Army	
by Lt Gen A M Vohra, PVSM, IA (Retd).....	102
BOOK REVIEWS.....	108
Additions to the USI Library.....	138

NOTE

"The views expressed in the Journal are in no sense official and the opinions of contributors and the Editor in their published articles are not necessarily those of the Council of Institution".

Mandarin Musings

"The international system," says Paul Kennedy in his classic study of economic change and military conflict over five centuries,* "is subject to constant change caused not only by day-to-day action of statesmen and the ebb and flow of political and military events, but also by deeper transformations in the foundations of world power, which in time make their way through the surface."

In the twentieth century, in addition to the normal changes visualised by Paul Kennedy, three major events have caused revolutionary changes in the international system. The Great War of 1914-1918 engendered the first Russian Revolution and the new political doctrine of scientific socialism. Subsequently, the Second World War became the crucible for freedom from colonial rule, and its aftermath brought about the Chinese Communist Revolution of 1949; and thus Communism emerged as the main political ideology in Russia and China. Now the end of the Cold War has led to the second Russian Revolution, still in progress; a dialectic struggle between the two great ideological doctrines of this century : Communism and Capitalism.

The massive magnitude of the present transformation has shaken the foundations of the world power structure and has led to instability in the strategic environment. The Gulf War, the Civil War in Yugoslavia, and the growing conflict situation in parts of Africa do not present an optimistic picture.

The Chinese view on the emerging international order, is provided by Chai Chengwen, Vice-Chairman, China Institute for International Strategic Studies, Beijing, and his colleagues, Prof Luo Renshi and Huang Zhengji in their articles published in this issue of the Journal. With remarkable insight and wide historical perspective, the essays clearly define the challenges of the future and also prescribe our response to them. The profound wisdom of the Orient is apparent in the emphasis on 'Panchshila' or the five principles of peaceful coexistence, formulated by China and India in the early 1950s.

It would be of interest to observe the extent to which these five principles of international relations, evolved from syncretic wisdom of the eastern political philosophy, can provide a creative and firm foundation for peace and stability in the new international order.

* Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, (New York : Random House, 1987) p. 536.

President's Report for the Year 1992

VICE ADMIRAL S P GOVIL, PVSM, AVSM
FORMER VICE CHIEF OF THE NAVAL STAFF AND
PRESIDENT USI COUNCIL

Gentlemen, I welcome you all to this council meeting of our Institution for the Year.- 1992.

USI DELEGATION'S VISIT TO CHINA

I am happy to be able to report to you on a landmark event that took place this year -- the visit of a USI Delegation to China. This I believe is the first of its kind in the long history of the Institution. General Chai Chengwen, Vice Chairman of the Beijing Institute for International Strategic Studies had visited India on IDSA's invitation when he also visited the USI and gave a talk to our members in Nov 90. A sequel to this visit was an invitation extended to me as the President of the USI Council to visit the BIIS along with four other delegates. Accordingly, in Sep 92 I led this delegation consisting of Lt Gen ZC Bakshi, Vice Admiral KK Nayyar, Air Marshal J Zaheer and Maj Gen SC Sinha to China.

You will be glad to know that our delegation was very well and warmly received and it held useful and interesting discussions with the BIIS and with the faculty of the Chinese National Defence University covering wide ranging aspects of Sino-Indian relations. The delegation was taken around to visit several other places in China. The members of the delegation will give their impressions of their visit at a talk being arranged next month. On behalf of the Council, I would like to place on record our deep appreciation to Gen Xu Xin, Dy Chief of General Staff PLA and Chairman, General Chai Chengwen, Vice Chairman and the staff of BIIS and thank them for their kind invitation and for the very very warm welcome and generous hospitality extended to the delegation.

You will be glad to know that the Ministry of External Affairs met our international air fares and the three Service Headquarters helped out to defray the other incidental expenses. For this I wish to place on record our gratitude to Shri Mani Dixit, the Foreign Secretary and to the three Service Chiefs for their generous help.

Text of the President's speech delivered during the USI Council Meeting on October 29, 1992.

NEW BUILDING PROJECT

Before moving on to other matters I would like to apprise the Council about the present state of our building project. I am happy to inform you that all the preliminary work on the planning of the building has been completed. The AWHO has short-listed twelve well known contractors out of the forty two, who had shown interest in the USI project. Tenders were issued to these contractors on 1st Oct 92 and it is hoped to finalise the contract with one of them by the end of the year. You will be glad to know that with a great deal of effort on our part, the Hon'ble Prime Minister has very kindly sanctioned a grant of Rs 1.30 crores from the National Defence Fund to take care of the escalation in the cost of the Building Project. This money will be made available only after we have utilised Rs 3.2 crores in the Building Fund.

I will now move on to the other activities of the institution in which a steady progress continues to be made in all spheres.

MEMBERSHIP

Upto 09 Oct 92 we have enrolled 110 life members whose total number now stands at 3105. The total of ordinary members on 09 Oct 92 stands at 820 as against 1170 in December last year.

The total of subscriber members is 725 as against 662 we had last year. I find that not very many Naval and Air Force Units are subscribing to the USI Journal. An effort has to be continued with the two services to get more units to enrol as subscriber members for the USI Journal.

Last year we decided to enrol Associate Members but these were to be limited initially to 10 members. So far we have enrolled 3 Associate Members.

FINANCES

The audited balance sheets along with the revised budget for 1992-93 and the Budget Forecast for the year 1993-94 have been circulated to all members and I hope you have had the time to examine them. The Audit Report for 1991-92 has now been placed before you along with the reply to the points raised. These were not circulated earlier as no serious points or objections, deserving your attention, had been raised.

**THE INCOME AND EXPENDITURE POSITION OVER
THE LAST THREE YEARS IS AS FOLLOWS**

	<i>YEAR</i>	<i>INCOME</i>	<i>EXPENDITURE</i>	<i>SURPLUS/ DEFICIENCY</i>
(a)	1989-90	Rs 5,40,231.60	Rs 7,38,351.12	Def Rs 1,98,119.52
(b)	1990-91	Rs 6,24,749.25	Rs 9,89,301.93	Def Rs 3,64,552.68
(c)	1991-92	Rs 7,15,760.68	Rs 10,55,647.60	Def Rs 3,39,886.92

The above income and expenditure statement does not take into account the following income from the interest that accrued from the following investments:-

(a) **USI Corpus Fund**

(i)	Public Sector Undertaking	Rs 1,10,29,000.00
(ii)	Nationalised Banks	Rs 22,64,000.00
(iii)	U T I	Rs 2,06,000.00

(b) **Building Fund**

Public Sector Undertakings	Rs 2,76,04,000.00
----------------------------	-------------------

The interest accrued during the Financial Year 1991-92 is Rs. 19,85,902.00 in the USI Corpus Fund and Rs. 36,51,239.00 in the Building Fund. The interest earned in the USI Corpus covers the Annual deficit and leaves a substantial amount for re-investment.

THE USI JOURNAL

The quality of the Journal has been well maintained. Due to the spiralling cost of paper and printing the increase made only last year in the price of the Journal has already been neutralised. Inspite of the appeal made by my predecessor, Lt Gen VK Sood, we have not been getting adequate number of advertisements. I will appeal to all Council members to please do their bit in trying to obtain advertisements for the Journal. You will be happy to know that we have been receiving many more books for review and this year the value of these books comes to over Rs 3 Lakhs.

CORRESPONDENCE COURSES

A total of 1681 Officers took our various Correspondence Courses in 1991-92. This year the largest number took the Army Part 'D' Promotion Examination Course, for which 723 Officers enrolled. We are expecting to enroll larger numbers during 1992-93.

GOLD MEDAL ESSAY COMPETITION

This year we did not receive adequate number of entries for the Gold Medal Essay Competition and so the last date for submission of essays was extended to 30 Sep 92. During the tea break we will be presenting the prizes to the award winners for last year. Unfortunately out of this lot none had been recommended for the award of the Gold Medal. They will receive only the cash award.

MACGREGOR MEDAL

In spite of all our efforts we have not received any recommendations from the Joint Planning Committee of the three services for the award of the Macgregor Medal. I will request my colleagues the VCOAS and VCAS to please go into this matter and see why no recommendations for this award is forthcoming. I cannot believe that our people are not undertaking adventure and reconnaissance activities worthy of this award. It seems to me most strange that though our officers have gone to the south pole and have sailed round the world, none of these persons were recommended for the award of the Macgregor Medal. I personally feel that these cases ought to be re-examined by the JPC and considered for a delayed award since no cases have been received for several years now.

SEMINARS AND LECTURES

This year National Security Lecture was delivered by General K Sundarji on 24th and 25th Sep. The function was presided over by Shri KC Pant, Chairman of the Finance Commission and former Defence Minister. The lecture was well attended and very well received. The USI Seminar is scheduled to be held on 2nd and 3rd Dec 92. The USI have organised a large number of lectures and discussions which continue to be well attended and very well received.

ELECTIONS FOR THE 1993-1995 COUNCIL

I am happy to inform you that the elections to the Council for the period of 1993-1995 have been completed and the results promulgated. The new USI Council will take over from 01 Jan 93 and, therefore, this will be the present Council's last meeting. I would like to place on record the good work done by its members and express my grateful thanks to them for all the help and cooperation, I have always received. There were, however, a couple of absentee outstation members, whom, unfortunately and to my great regret, I never got to meet as they were unable to attend any of our Council meetings.

I wish my successor better luck. I do hope all of you will continue to take an active interest in the affairs of the USI even though you may not be on the Council.

CONCLUSION

At the end of this month I will be saying my farewell to arms, and therefore, propose to hand over my responsibilities to a successor to be chosen by you at this meeting. Looking back on the period during which I have had the honour of presiding over the Council, I am more than satisfied with the working of the Institution. The USI Delegation's visit to China was certainly a landmark in the Institution's history and I hope that such visits will be more frequent in the future. I am happy that work will soon begin on our new Building Project. I will end by thanking you all for being here this morning.

USI GOLD MEDAL ESSAY COMPETITION - 1992

On the recommendations of the Evaluation Committee, the USI Council during its meeting on 25 February 1993, selected the following officers for the award of prizes in the USI Gold Medal Essay Competition - 1992 :

Group 'A' - "CREDIBLE DEFENCE WITH REDUCED EXPENDITURE"

Lt Col Rahul K Bhonsle HQ 18 Inf Div	First Prize	Rs. 2,000/-
Major B A Prasad 8 BIHAR	Second Prize	Rs. 1,000/-

Group 'B' - "GROWING DEPLOYMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES IN AID TO CIVIL POWER"

Lt J Ajit Kumar, IN INS VIKRANT	First Prize	Rs. 2,000/-
Major Akshaya Handa 7 PARA	Second Prize	Rs. 1,000/-

The World Power Structure in Transition from a Quasi Unipolar to a Quasi Multipolar State and the Options of a Middle Power in this Milieu

(Part - II)

GENERAL K SUNDARJI, PVSM (RETD)

THE VIEW FROM BEIJING⁷

China's formal position continues to be that there should be no discrimination between big and small powers, or the strong and the weak in the world and that China will never aspire to be a super power. However, when questioned whether this means that there should be no permanent members of the UN Security Council and the veto should be scrapped; and whether they would set an example by giving up these privileges, pragmatism surfaces and they say no, without any embarrassment. One is told that it is the ideal situation but would take a long time before this becomes a practicable proposition. In the meantime, they believe, hegemonies and power-politics will continue.

The compelling need for strength and national power for survival in such a world is articulated clearly and emphatically by China with no trace of the pseudo-moralistic inhibitions, the euphemistic language or the apologetic approach that characterise the discussions on these subjects in India. They believe that unless one is strong politically, economically and militarily, it is difficult to uphold principles and the big powers will not respect one. Similarly, the need for strength for any worthwhile progress towards an equitable world economic and technological order is emphasised clearly.

There is a general appreciation of the fact that the United Nations Organisation has become more important latterly and is indeed indispensable. China also expects to support the Organisation in playing a bigger role in

The second part of the text of the USI National Security Lecture 1992 delivered by General K. Sundarji, PVSM, former Chief of the Army Staff on September 24, 1992 at the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library Auditorium, New Delhi.

world affairs. Nevertheless, it is very touchy about erosion of national sovereignty on grounds of human rights or minority rights.

Similarly, there is appreciation of the need for opening out to the world in economic, trade and technological terms. There is also appreciation of the vital need for attracting foreign capital into China and for joint enterprises, if China's modernisation and the improvement of the people's standards of living are to be rapid enough. But, there is deep suspicion of the theories of the 'global village' or the need for integration and globalisation of trade and the reduction of national barriers. These are seen as theories propagated by the North to maintain its inequitable advantages over the South. China's prescription is for nations of the South to settle their differences and unite to wrest an equitable order from the North. In this context also, the Chinese say, it is imperative that the Third World be as strong as possible.

In the period up to 2015 AD, China is not sure what exact form multipolarity would take in the world, or which the poles would be. But China pledges never to seek super power status, but will work towards an honoured place in the international community as an equal partner. It is in this context says China, that she needs to maintain nuclear deterrence vis-à-vis the USA and Russia. China believes that she cannot afford to have a large arsenal like the USA, but must have sufficient to deter. I was told, "Like you, General, we also believe in a nuclear minimum deterrent." The Chinese were categorical that in the next twenty-five years military power of all types would be required and could not be neglected. "Along with military power, we must also develop total national power in its full range. Reality cannot be wished away by idealistic thinking", I was told. The change in the world power structure from bipolar to multipolar, further makes it essential for nation states to maintain national power, says China, as the constraining factors on the USA are less now than before, and more bullying can be anticipated.

China's view of South Asia and India, has undergone various changes in the past four decades. These changes have been dictated by her perception of the geopolitical situation in the world, India's guesstimated aims and interests and her own aims and interests. As these underwent changes, so did her policies towards the states of this region including India. Not unnaturally, these policy changes do not occur immediately after the perception of the milieu changes, but only after some time lag. This time lag or sluggishness-quotient, if you will, depends upon how responsive the policy making apparatus is and how conservative or progressive the policy makers themselves are. A judgement will also have to be made as to for how long new policies are likely to hold. This would be primarily a function of how ephemeral or enduring the milieu changes are likely to be. So, for evaluating the present

Chinese attitude towards India and South Asia, we must crank all these variables into the equation.

In analysing current Chinese attitudes therefore, the following back-drop will play a deciding role:-

*China no longer sees Russia as its greatest threat. In fact, as time goes on and the new Russia takes shape, this threat perception may further decrease. India that was earlier seen, rightly or wrongly as ganging up with the Soviet Union against China, is no longer seen in that light. This, coupled with the fact that India has explicitly accepted Chinese sovereignty over Tibet, is likely to place India in the category of potential friend and supporter than in that of potential adversary. This perception has the necessary ingredients to make it endure and is unlikely to change for quite a few decades; unless of course, inexplicably India adopts a blatantly anti Chinese posture in matters that are of vital interest to China.

*The Sino-US honeymoon of the Seventies and the Eighties is over. The importance of the US in modernising the Chinese economy is not underrated but, it is not acceptable to the Chinese at the cost of what is seen as unwarranted US interference in the internal affairs of China. Be it in the 'human rights' sphere, or in trade policies. The unexpectedly petulant Chinese response to the recent American sale of fighter aircraft to Taiwan, is an indicator. Europe is seen as a viable alternative for assistance in maintaining the pace of economic modernisation. Also, China believes that the US attitudes to 'North-South' questions have hardened and that the South will have to unite and wrest concessions from an unwilling North. In all this, the support of India is seen as invaluable.

*In Southeast and East Asia and in the Asia-Pacific region, the Chinese are quite concerned about the possible Japanese aims and the possible congruence of interests between the Japanese and the USA. Their ability to safeguard Chinese interests, irrespective of the permutations and combinations would be much greater if India's support can be assured.

It is against this background that China's attitude to India and South Asia has to be analysed. South Asia is seen as India's legitimate sphere of interest and the Chinese accept the primacy of these interests. They are very happy that there is peace in the region, and that there are signs of greater cooperation between the countries there. They stress that greater cooperation in the region would be in Chinese interest. Ideas of moving on to a loose confederation based on SAARC in the decades to come, which some of us have been writing about in the Indian media have caught their attention. Talking about this I was told that they would indeed be happy if this kind of

thing came about. There was no question of their being perturbed by any such move. On the contrary they would encourage it.

The strong impression that I gathered was that in the changed geopolitical situation in the world the compulsion for getting India to go along with them as an active and willing partner, in dealing with the North in general and the USA in particular is great. "India and China must make common cause...must speak in one voice...must be strong...otherwise we cannot get justice from the developed world...we must have peace and cooperation not only in South Asia, but also in all Asia...otherwise the big powers will intervene and keep us from making common cause on getting a more equitable world economic and technological order." These words still ring in my ears. I heard them so many times from so many people in authority in China!

Such a visualisation of policy compulsions is bound to have changed Chinese attitudes to supporting insurgencies in the Indian North-East, the playing up of the Indian bogey in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal or Bhutan; or playing up Pakistan against India. None of these are worth anything to China, the moment India is not seen as a potential adversary but as a potential ally.

Of course this does not mean that the Chinese would contemplate with equanimity Indian aggression against any of its neighbours. Not because of high-mindedness, but because it would not suit Chinese interests to have the boat rocked either in South Asia or for that matter, anywhere in Asia. Nonetheless, it also does not mean that it is going to pander to any of India's neighbours in South Asia. Many of them have got used to the playing of the 'China Card', in dealing with India, and would reluctantly give this up. The supply of arms and armaments by China to our South Asian neighbours, especially Pakistan should not automatically raise our hackles. Most of China's exports of arms these days are commercially oriented and not at *friendship prices* for ideological reasons. The crux of the matter should be whether such sales upset the strategic balance in the region. This must be honestly judged and not by reflex reaction for propaganda purposes. India and Pakistan have been doing just that for so long now, that restraint in this regard will have to be consciously sought.

THE VIEW FROM ISLAMABAD⁸

When I visited Pakistan in May 92, I outlined my personal views on certain issues of national security in the Indo-Pak context as a basis for discussion. I shall briefly mention these before giving you an idea of the Pakistani reaction. I said that Pakistan as a sovereign nation had every right

to develop a nuclear deterrent if it feels that it is vital for its defence and not for first use. The USA had no business to question this. Was this questioning on a racist basis? Why the soft-peddalling of programmes of Israel and till recently of white South Africa? China has apparently been granted the status of an 'honorary White', due to its size, population, potential and acknowledged nuclear weapon capability. India, reserves the right of going in for nuclear deterrence for itself and refuses to sign the NPT on the grounds that it is discriminatory. Yet it is critical of Pakistan for its nuclear quest. I do not support this approach. India, at least after realising that the USA was not serious in its efforts against a 'front line state', should have made common cause with Pakistan and opposed the practice of nuclear discrimination by the USA.

Pakistan and India are only talking of minimum nuclear deterrence; not of impractical theories of mutually assured destruction or suicidal theories of nuclear-fighting. In nuclear-fighting or in any fighting, more is always better. In nuclear deterrence, more is not better if less is adequate. What is adequate? The ability, having received a surprise first strike from an adversary, of hitting him back in a second strike and causing unacceptable damage; with unacceptable damage defined sensibly. The requirement therefore is finite and there need be no nuclear arms racing. It is possible for the two countries to agree mutually on the size of their respective nuclear arsenals. Much work will of course have to be done on transparency, verification and a building up of mutual trust and confidence, however gradual this process might be. Pakistan must accept that India in her own perceptions has security concerns regarding China. Therefore bilateral talks between India and Pakistan alone cannot be enough, but China must come in as an equal participant and not as a referee.

It is no longer a question of keeping South Asia nuclear weapon free, but nuclear weapon safe. With a declared nuclear weapon status, such safety can be more reliably ensured. It would be easier to prevent nuclear war through miscalculation. It would be easier to legislate to prevent the theft or unauthorised use of nukes. It would also be possible for India and Pakistan to declare a no first use policy. In my view, a tripartite conference with China, India and Pakistan attending as full participants for limiting nuclear arsenals, agreeing on no first use, verifications, transparency and confidence building measures is overdue. In such an exercise, the benign presence of the USA as an honest broker would help in giving credibility to verification and transparency, by the availability of its sophisticated satellite, electronic and other means of surveillance.

In the meantime, if the five members of the nuclear weapon club, led

by the USA demonstrate in practical terms their agreement to total prohibition of nuclear weapons by the early part of the next century; reduce their arsenals drastically from now on; accept the comprehensive test ban treaty and accept UN constraints on the use or threat of use of their nuclear forces, it would be a totally new situation. Then I could visualise threshold countries like India and Pakistan agreeing willingly to nuclear abstinence.

My discussions in Pakistan, at the non-official level and with those in authority, led me to believe that there was substantial agreement between us in this approach to the nuclear weapon issue. In fact a statement was made by a Pakistani generally perceived as a hawk, that it would not be difficult for 'honest hawks' on both sides of the border to do business!

I suggested that given that nuclear deterrence is in place, it should not be difficult for India and Pakistan to agree on mutual conventional force reductions. With the historic distrust of each other, it would be very difficult to negotiate totally different ratios of forces between the two. Say the ratio today is 5:4 with 25 and 20 divisions apiece. What should be possible with patience, is to gradually reduce to 20 and 16 divisions retaining the old ratio. Such a step in moderation will not upset the strategic balance. Their counter suggestion was an agreed and progressive, reduction in our respective defence budgets. However, I pointed out that both sides are convinced that the other is fudging defence budget figures. This is difficult to disprove. There would therefore be endless disputes about compliance. So, if we are really honest about mutual force reductions, why not fix these limits on the end product, the division? These are easier verified. This was reluctantly agreed to. I realised that we would meet resistance to force reductions from the military establishments on both sides of the border. This subconscious fear of redundancy has to be addressed if such proposals are to succeed.

In the Pakistani perception, the Indian self-confidence in turning around the Kashmir situation had been shaken and they perhaps sensed that the Indians could be stampeded into accepting their solutions. The solutions being suggested informally covered a wide spectrum. A plebiscite on the lines of the old UN resolutions, without of course a Pakistani troop withdrawal was at one end. In the middle was the suggestion that a plebiscite be confined only to the Kashmir Valley and Moslem majority segments of Jammu and Ladakh; the choices were to be restricted to accession to Pakistan or India. The rest of Jammu and Ladakh were to stay with India with no options; the so called Northern Areas, comprising Gilgit, Baltistan etc were to stay with Pakistan with no options. A modification of this last solution, suggested that there could be a delay in the holding of this plebiscite for a few years, but that in the meantime both India and Pakistan should withdraw from the

Valley which would be administered by the UN. At the other end of the spectrum was a suggestion of a three-way choice to the Kashmiris that included independence from both India and Pakistan; also after a spell of UN administration; a variant to this would include the whole of J&K and not confine it to the Valley only. Needless to add that this last is a minority view in Pakistan; that it is being voiced at all, and articles on these lines have appeared in their print media is however indicative of some flexibility in their thinking.

In Pakistan and India, there are broadly three schools of thought concerning mutual relations. The first believes, the worst; that the other country's ruling elite and people are devious and untrustworthy besides being unreconciled to the very existence of the other. Hence, attempting to find peaceful and lasting solutions will be impossible; the only possible course will be to remain in a wary adversarial stand-off or to balkanise or undo the other country. Many of the people in this group are misguided by propaganda or prejudice, with some cynically committed to this line because of the vested interest of staying in power. It is this kind of thinking that produced the three rounds of war between the two countries. Such wars in the past, in pursuit of policy might have been affordable in the calculation of some. But today with the near certainty that both countries have nuclear weapons, such wars have the potential of devastating India, and totally destroying Pakistan as a viable state. This group should have a sober rethink!

The second group consists of those who sincerely believe that the bulk of the population of both the countries consist of good people in whom the milk of human kindness gushes. That if only we can side-line the wicked ruling elites, and enable large scale contacts between the two peoples, our countries can kiss and make up tomorrow morning! This group is larger in India than in Pakistan. It contains true idealists who abhor all wars and loathe nuclear weapons but tend to rely more on emotions than reason; some who are soft in the head; and a few who exploit this line cynically for their own purposes. In Pakistan, this approach excites enormous fear in the belief that it would lead to the loss of the very reason of Pakistan's separate existence. This Indian group only strengthens the hands of the hard liners in Pakistan by confusing the issue.

The third group is just about forming in India and Pakistan. It consists of realists, who are knowledgeable about war and peace; who have studied nuclear doctrine as enunciated by the big powers, and have arrived at a doctrine which will be workable in the Third World context. This group does not share the despair or cynicism of the first group and believes that a fair, honourable and peaceful solution of all problems between the two countries is possible. It believes that: war that might lead to nuclear weapon use, is no

longer an option that can be lightly chosen by decision makers; nuclear weapon use would impose horrendous losses on both countries, though it might be more in the case of Pakistan; minimum nuclear deterrence in the interim will add to stability and peace; but the only salvation is for both countries to follow policies of cooperation and not confrontation; however, history suggests that the honesty of purpose of both sides will have to be carefully monitored. Our endeavours ought to concentrate on converting the bulk of the misguided from the first group to this line of thinking.

INDIA'S NATIONAL AIMS

India's national aims and vital interests have never been articulated by the Government of India, though this is a vital first step in threat evaluation. Without a threat evaluation we cannot consider national strategy options. This has been one of the causes of ad hoc strategy formulation in the past. So, before I attempt an analysis of the external threat during the period 1992-2015, I have to assume certain national aims for this period. However in doing so, it is necessary to bring into sharper focus our possible choices of national aims. After I have done this, I will assume those parts of the aims that impinge directly on defence before I outline military threat perceptions.

What should our national aims be regarding the so called North-South problems and the new international economic order? Does this problem really exist or is it merely a hangover from colonialism and the ideological battles of the Cold War, which has no relevance in today's global village with integrated world trade? If India decides that there is a problem and the developing countries do need to get a better deal from the developed ones, how altruistic is she prepared to be in struggling for it even if it hurts her national self-interest in the process? Will she modulate her championing of the third world cause up to a point where it does not hurt her too much? If her domestic economic reforms work out as expected and she closes up to the 'haves' in the first decade of the twenty-first century what would her choice be? Total altruism for Third World causes? Enlightened self interest and total support for regional well-being? Narrow, foolish self interest? These are questions that have to be analysed and answers found from time to time. These answers make a very big difference; there may be a major threat to the country during a certain period or there might be none, depending upon how we answer these questions and what line we take. I rather suspect that regional interests will reign paramount during this period.

What should the national attitude be to what might be construed as interference in our sovereign right to take domestic economic decisions? Assume that all imposed conditions are bad or motivated and that we should have the sovereign right to perpetuate poverty as long as it is indigenously

created? Do we go to the other extreme and in our eagerness to change and to please, throw out the good with the trash? Decisions on these issues will also make major variations to our economic threat assessments.

In an interesting analysis Achin Vanaik writes,⁹ "There is a widespread, if rather naive view that...for India...to pursue an independent foreign policy....(for) resisting external pressure...it must become economically strong....But as the historical record shows...foreign policy dependence on the US...is both the precondition to and consequence of high levels of capitalist prosperity...." He goes on to question whether it would be worthwhile then, to abandon the quest for independence and become a permanent ally of the US and the OECD bloc, if that would assure Indian transition to becoming part of the economically and politically strong First World? He says "But here lies the rub: India cannot make such a transition. There will be too many poor Indians...the relations between the metropolitan capital and the country will not resemble intra-OECD economic relations...because of fundamental disparities in economic, ecological and political status." He concludes "Neither an opponent of the US/OECD bloc, nor its full-fledged and honourable ally, India is most likely to remain a...ditherer...desperate to escape Southern 'ir-relevancy', yet unable to do so in a...World...more dominated by the North than ever before."

We have not been attuned to deciding policy issues by applying the touch-stone of enlightened self interest to each case. We have had the crutch of non-alignment that generally supplied us with policy guidelines without the effort of thinking. The immunity that the cold war gave us from uninhibited superpower bullying, permitted us to take the moral high ground without reference to our national interests. Whether we agree with Vanaik's conclusions or not, evidently we have to play a new and more difficult game. With the end of the cold war, we must not only learn to do so, but also create the institutional under-pinning required for doing contingency planning without the assistance of ready made templates.

The external security environment may be seen in two different international security scenarios. The first would be a generally benign one, and could come about if the USA chose either the first or second options discussed earlier, the ones where the accepted nuclear weapon powers make a sharp reduction in their stockpiles, reducing them to about ten percent of the present levels, and sign a new treaty banning the production and testing of fissile materials and weapons. In such a regime, one could assume that in the period under discussion, chemical and biological weapons would have been banned; deployment of weapons in space proscribed; progress made in conventional arms control, globally regionally and bilaterally in some cases;

and the UN strengthened adequately to enforce many of these agreements including the eradication of subversion and terrorism. In this kind of scenario, India would not perceive any nuclear threat to it from any of the nuclear weapon powers, even though China would have some nuclear weapons left. All other threshold nuclear powers or clandestine nuclear weapon countries would have destroyed any weapons or fissile material that they might have stockpiled.

If the USA chooses the third option of retaining a fairly large nuclear stockpile, and retaining the right to make a first strike; excludes herself and the other accepted nuclear weapon powers from the ban regarding manufacture of weapons, testing etc; denies access for effective international inspection and verification in the case of the nuclear club; and lets proliferation continue in the republics of the erstwhile Soviet Union; then, India would face a serious nuclear threat from many quarters, and cannot but opt for a minimum or proportionate nuclear deterrent if she is to live with security and honour.

India cannot be sanguine about the USA adopting a wise and statesman-like policy in this regard. A few samples of US strategic thought during the period when the Soviet Union was alive and well, but the Gorbachevian thrust towards denuclearisation was already visible will strengthen this conclusion: In response to Gorbachev's proposals of 15 January 1986 for the abolition of all nuclear weapons, "Are these serious ideas? No, as they concern abolition. In a world of nations that have renounced nuclear weapons, the man with one bomb would be King....If he were Qaddafi, Libya would be a superpower."¹⁰ "It cannot be in the interest of democracies to keep avowing objectives more sentimental than realistic and to stigmatize the weapons on which the defence of the West...must be based."¹¹ Though the USSR has disappeared, these strategic concepts in the USA are likely to take considerable time to fade away. Raja Mohan argues that, "Russia and America are shifting from massive nuclear arsenals to a posture of minimum nuclear deterrence....India must...argue for the abolition of nuclear weapons. But it cannot afford to base its nuclear policy on the assumption that they will be eliminated soon"¹².

In either case, there would be a possibility of a conventional threat. The probability would be higher when there is no Indian nuclear deterrent in place, and to that extent the strength of the conventional deterrent required would be higher.

I will make the following assumptions regarding national aims and international conditions that would have a direct bearing on military threat perceptions:

* India does not intend to liberate the areas of its territory that it considers wrongly occupied by China; it will decide to settle the question by a process of 'give and take'.

* India does not intend to liberate so called 'Azad Kashmir', currently occupied by Pakistan.

* India does not rule out solutions of the Kashmir problem that accept its independence as part of a South Asian Confederation.

* India believes that a loose South Asian Confederation of at least Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka is a viable entity by 2015.

* India believes that there is no way by which a populous and poor Third World country as China, India or Pakistan can cope with the First World perpetuating the statusquo, except by cooperating with each other. It does not mean that cooperation involves ganging up against the First World on principle.

* The USA is unlikely to go to a regime of drastic reduction of its nuclear weapon capability, as exemplified in Scenarios 1 and 2 earlier in this Paper, but is likely to maintain a posture that may not conform exactly to Scenario 3, but would be essentially of that genre. This is the assumption based on which I intend to analyse the threat and Indian response in the succeeding paragraphs, as this would be the worst case scenario from the Indian point of view.

INDO-US RELATIONS

THE ASSUMED US APPROACH

Not much thought or study seem to have gone into the USA's understanding of what makes India tick. Perhaps this was due to a combination of reasons: the enormity of its size, diversity and problems; or because in US eyes it was a Soviet satellite; because it irritated the USA to see India's posturing in the Third World and whatever else. The United States dealings with India over the past four decades suggest that she tended to see India as a stereotype. Though a new relationship is now being worked out between the two countries, some of the ill effects of this past are bound to influence the immediate future. There is a live danger that the USA's perception of Indian aims, objectives and policies will be coloured by past prejudices. One example is the way the USA equates the Indian and Pakistani nuclear

programmes. Manoj Joshi writes, "...the US began to look at the two programmes in a symmetrical fashion, notwithstanding substantial difference. In the case of Pakistan they knew what was going on, in the case of India they just assumed it."¹³ However, the good news is that recently they are making a special effort officially and academically to understand India, the results of which might surprise some of the confirmed pessimists in both countries!

Notwithstanding all this, the USA is likely to adopt a somewhat overbearing approach, using a mix of inducement and threat, with threat dominating the blend! First, she might attempt to force India to sign the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty in its present form or with cosmetic modifications. Second, she might try to make India give up the quest for developing frontier technology that the USA construes as having military applications. That this would in effect eliminate a possible future competitor to the developed world would be gleefully accepted as a spin off benefit, but would be officially decried as untrue; the suggestion being made that it is the figment of Third World paranoia. The third, might be to open up the Indian market to unrestricted foreign trade. The fourth, would be not permitting a change in the world's present economic rule book that is in favour of the First World. Fifth, would be a threat of a nuclear first strike if there is any possibility of Indian interference, even non-nuclear, with US deployments or military activities in the region. Not all of this need occur; only some might. Many of such irritants could coexist with attempts at genuinely building a better relationship between the two countries.

SUGGESTED INDIAN APPROACH

If these are the lines on which US policy unfolds, what should the Indian approach be? I would suggest that it should not be one of confrontation with the USA. It should be a cooperative one, not by 'Poodle-isation', but on the basis of India being a potential nuisance that better be... "inside the tent peeing out, than outside the tent peeing in" to quote Lyndon Johnson out of context! Towards this, we ought to strengthen regional cooperation, with SAARC in general and with Pakistan in particular. Step up cooperation with China. Go in for a declared policy of minimum nuclear deterrence; I do not foresee any enduring or insuperable *punishment* that the world would impose on us for such a decision notwithstanding the exaggerated fears of some of our 'Uncle Toms' in the establishment. We should then go on to make a "No First Use" declaration; open negotiations with China and Pakistan for mutual limitations of nuclear force levels and deployments and other confidence building measures. Eventually we should also negotiate mutual reductions of deployable conventional forces. The technological thrust should

be to ensure that the global protection system against missile attack that the USA is developing never attains an exceedingly high assurance level statistically against counter measures that could be devised by India. The experts that I have consulted tell me that this is not impossible.

Even with a minimum nuclear deterrent in place, we ought to have sufficient conventional forces to make it very expensive in casualties for any country including the USA or any coalition led by the USA, to secure ports, airfields, beachheads or air heads on Indian territory. This requirement as far as the army and the tactical air force are concerned will be below our present force levels, and will not be a great burden. The force structure and force levels of the navy ought to be separately worked out, as these forces would have to raise the casualty threshold of any hostile attempt at massive large conventional forces in our region before a Desert Storm like operation targeting India. I am not foolishly suggesting a navy that can take on the US Navy, but one that can cause it sufficient damage to make such a venture not worthwhile except in extreme cases. I would rather suspect that the force structure of such a navy cannot be scaled down version of a big power navy. David could not expect to beat Goliath, employing Goliath's tactics. The best tactics he could employ against Goliath demanded the devising of a suitable tool. I would therefore conjecture that an Indian Navy that is designed to have the best potential to raise the threshold of costs to the US or any other big power navy from hostile intervention in the region must be structured in a tailor-made fashion. The resultant marine animal may not be a *balanced* beastie, that a naval purist might desire, but would be an effective one. However, this does not mean that a balanced navy would not be required for defence against the navy of a hostile regional power. Having said which, I must also add that the two requirements will have common components, and need not add up to unbearable costs.

As and when a South Asian Confederation is set up, the force level requirements that I have discussed thus far, would pertain to regional requirements for thwarting the unwelcome attention of outside powers. The forces would be found cooperatively, by the regional powers, with Pakistan and India contributing the major share.

There is no major clash of vital national interests between India and China. There is no cause big enough for the threat or the actual use of nuclear weapons by China especially if India has a minimum nuclear deterrent in place. The border dispute does not fall into this category and can be resolved in time, by give and take. We ought to cooperate with China in resisting US arrogance without painting ourselves firmly in the Chinese corner. As already discussed, there is scope for agreement on mutual limitation of

nuclear stockpiles and conventional force reductions in terms of forces deployable against each other.

In the short haul, there would be a fairly considerable threat from Pakistan. This is due to the exaggerated expectations entertained in that country, of the moral impact of her acquisition of nuclear weapons; and the resultant exuberance in fostering and supporting terrorism and insurgency in Kashmir and the Punjab. As they think the nuclear equation through, and as the unusability of nukes in a proactive situation becomes evident, there is bound to be a toning down of this exuberance. That a mutual nuclear deterrent situation does not mean that India loses all options of conventional reaction *in response to rising levels of Pakistan inspired insurgency and terrorism in Kashmir and the Punjab*, will also sink in with time. This would further cool ambitions. Admittedly, the impact of any benign changes in Indian policy will be slow in making an impression on Pakistan, given the high level of historical mutual distrust. However hard headed self interest on the part of each, will have a positive impact on mutual relations in the long run. As already discussed, in the interim, there is considerable scope for Indo-Pak agreements on the mutual restriction of the size of nuclear arsenals; once a minimum nuclear deterrent is in place, there is scope for conventional force reductions.

We must work towards a loose South Asian Federation based on SAARC by 2015. We must carry Pakistan along as a major and honoured partner in the enterprise. We must whole heartedly support Pakistan's right to develop and deploy a minimum nuclear deterrent. If the West is arrogant enough to impose any sanctions, India and Pakistan must share nuclear and missile technology and cooperate in all other spheres, to lessen the impact of such (racist?!) measures.

At the domestic political level, the first need I think is for the Government to invite all major political parties for a non partisan, *in camera* meeting on the nuclear issue; take them into confidence on the status of India's nuclear weapon preparedness, and attempt to arrive at a consensus. I am convinced that this would not be difficult at all. Next, initiate a public debate on all aspects of this issue, and generate a national consensus. In the final analysis, this staunch public support will be the bulwark on which any ill-conceived US plans of pressuring or bullying India or the region, will founder. We must stop being defensive about our not signing the NPT and stop repeating old arguments. In the meantime, we must step up our offensive to persuade the USA to adopt a safe, sensible and statesmanlike course like adopting something similar to Scenarios 1 or 2. If she does that, we can go ahead and sign the NPT and yet ensure that we live in security and honour.

CONCLUSION

I have a very simple conclusion. If the *Powers That Be* in Delhi decide that George Tanham is right and the refrain of the Government of India is going to be *Que Sera Sera*, let our political masters tell us so now, and we will relax. If not, let us get organised to make policy in an institutionalised manner. Let us not *poodle-fake*. Is that asking for too much?

(Concluded)

NOTES

7. The part of the Paper dealing with China is largely based on the author's visit to that country in 1991, and the extensive interaction with officials, academics and others.
8. The author was in Pakistan for two weeks in May 1992. The analyses of Pakistan's likely views, aims and policies in this part of the Paper take into account the fairly extensive discussions that he had with officials and non-officials including politicians, academics and retired senior officers.
9. Achin Vanaik, "India's Foreign Policy - No Option But to Remain Non-Committal" in *Indian Express*, 30 June 1992.
10. *New York Times*, 19 January 1986.
11. Henry Kissinger, "A New Era for NATO", *News week*, 12 October 1987, pp. 31-32.
12. C. Raja Mohan, "India's Nuclear Non-Sequitur", *The Hindu*, 3 July 1992.
13. Manoj Joshi "Nuclear Asymmetry Between India and Pakistan" in *Trishul Vol V No 1 July 1992* (Defence Services Staff College, Wellington, India) p.34.

The Disintegration of the Soviet Union and its Implications

CHAI CHENGWEN

The national flag of the Soviet Union was hauled down from the dome of the Kremlin on 25 December 1991. Thereupon the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics founded 74 years ago ceased to exist. People are widely divided in their comments on the Soviet disintegration and its implications.

Some say that the break-up of the Soviet Union marks the bankruptcy of socialism because it believed in Marxism and practised the socialist system. Others say that this is due to the implementation of reform in socialist countries and that without reform it would not have come to such an end.

As for the implications of the Soviet breakup, some argue that it is the victory of the capitalist system and that the whole world will be unified under capitalism. Others assert that it is the victory of the strategy of peaceful evolution pursued by the West, a strategy which is simply irresistible.

Naturally, every country has special features of its own, and it is difficult for a foreigner to be impartial in commenting on these issues. But they are raised from an international angle and have to be answered by students of international strategy. In my view, the above opinions are not well founded and the logic underlying them is a bit overly simple and sometime confused. I would like to express my own views on these issues and discuss them with out friends from the academic circles.

- I. The decline and disintegration of the Soviet Union proceeded from gradual to sudden change. But it has nothing to do with the socialist system.**

As has been shown by historical facts, the socialist system is essentially

Mr. Chai Chengwen, Vice-Chairman of the China Institute for International Strategic Studies, is a former General of the People's Liberation Army. He joined the Eighth Route Army in 1937, and served successively as Instructor in the Anti-Japanese Military and Political Academy, Staff Officer of the General H.Q. of the Eighth Route Army, Division Chief in the H.Q. of the Second Field Army of the PLA. After the founding of the PRC, he worked successively as Counsellor of the Chinese Embassy in the DPRK, Representative of the Chinese People's Volunteers to the Armistice Negotiations in Korea, Member of the Military Armistice Commission in Korea, Minister Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Chinese Embassy in Denmark, Deputy Chief of Intelligence Department of the General Staff of the PLA and Director of Foreign Affairs Bureau of the Defence Ministry. He retired from active duty in 1982, joined CISS in 1987 and has been its Vice Chairman ever since.

superior to the capitalist system. After the establishment of the first socialist country in 1917 the people of the USSR, led by the Communist Party, smashed the desperate resistance put up by domestic reactionaries and defeated the frenzied attacks of 14 capitalist countries in the short space of three years. They succeeded in breaking the isolation and blockade imposed by the imperialists in the ensuing five years. In 1924 Britain, then the most powerful capitalist country, had to take the lead in extending diplomatic recognition to the USSR. In the late twenties and early thirties, while the capitalist countries were deep in economic crisis, the USSR fulfilled its first five-year plan and began its second one in big strides. By 1937, the year in which the second plan was accomplished, the Soviet industrial production was 428 per cent higher than that in 1929. The Soviet Union also completed the collectivization of its agriculture in the same period. On the other hand, by the summer of 1937 the economy of the capitalist countries had not recovered to its 1929 level. It was only due to the war of massive aggression unleashed by Hitler that the third five-year plan had to be suspended.

The blitz by Nazi Germany placed the USSR in great predicament. Nevertheless, led by the Soviet Communist Party the people of the USSR stood rock firm and united as one in the struggle against aggression. In terms of the production of the defence industry moved to the east alone, the output in last three years of the war averaged 40,000 planes, 120,000 heavy guns, 30,000 tanks and armed vehicles and 5,000,000 rifles and sub-machine guns per year. The planes and tanks turned out were over twice those of Germany's and the heavy guns were four times as many. The output of tanks and artillery pieces surpassed that of USA, which was far removed from the war zone and suffered none of its havoc. In the meantime, the collective farmers of the Soviet Union worked hard and selflessly to ensure the supply of grains and industrial raw materials. All this made it possible for the heroic Soviet armed forces to become the mainstay in the anti-Fascist war and win the high acclamation of the people all over the world. After the war, the Soviet Union was ahead of the capitalist countries in healing war wounds and bringing about economic recovery. In 1950, the year in which the fourth five-year plan was fulfilled, its gross industrial output was up 73 per cent from that in 1940 and its agricultural output also reached the pre-war level. The annual growth rate of the Soviet economy was quite high, at 8 per cent till 1975. As a result, the Soviet Union became one of the two superpowers in the world. In the face of these facts no one can reasonably conclude that the USSR collapsed because it adopted the socialist system. Incidentally, it should be pointed out here that the Soviet achievements were due in no small measures to Stalin. His successors also made their contribution in varying degrees. The total negation or affirmation of their role contradicts the principle of seeking truth from facts.

II. It is necessary for a socialist country to carry out structural reform.

The socialist system came into being after the proletariat and revolutionary people overthrew the reactionary rule of the oppressors. It is a combination of the basic economic system based on the public ownership of the means of production and the basic political system of proletarian dictatorship or the people's democratic dictatorship. Though a superior system, it is by no means perfect in every way. As a new social system, it has only a history of 70 years. Compared with the capitalist system which has existed more than 300 years, it is still in its youth and has to improve itself constantly through practice. As early as a hundred years ago, Engels said that the socialist society was not something immutable and that it would undergo changes and conduct reforms like any other systems.

The superiority of socialism consists of the following : under its basic economic and political system, the working people who constitute the vast majority of the population become the master of their country, thus ensuring genuine democratic rights for the people. The public ownership of the means of production and the principle of distribution according to work put an end to the exploitation of man by man and liberate the productive forces, thus ensuring basic freedoms for the broad masses. Besides, the state can make full use of manpower and material, financial and natural resources in a planned way, regulate economic activities on a national scale and avoid the anarchy prevailing in the capitalist economy and the consequent waste of manpower and natural resources. In this way it can bring the initiative and creativeness of the workers into play and promote the rapid growth of the productive forces.

The imperfection of socialism lies in the fact that any basic system must find expression in specific structures and that its economic and political structures can only be perfected and become mature through practice in the light of the reality in each country. The better the structures, the greater the superiority of the basic system. Reversely, if the structures are imperfect and even have serious weaknesses, the superiority of the basic system will be constrained and even undermined. It is therefore the task of the socialist countries to strengthen and develop its basic system by way of structural reform and to perfect its specific structures constantly so as to promote the growth of the productive forces. This is what we mean by the statement that reform is the self-perfection and self-development of the socialist system.

The Soviet political and economic structures took shape in the early years of the USSR. For many years it found itself in war, in isolation and blockade imposed from outside and in confrontation with the West after the

Second World War. More importantly, being the first socialist country with no previous experience to draw on, it considered its own model most advanced and had no desire to make further progress. Because of all this, the Soviet Union not only instituted no reform but regarded reform by others as heresy. The more the reform was delayed, the greater the malady and the more difficult the effort to get the reform started. Ideas for reform had been put forward by Khrushchev and others, but the attempt failed or stopped halfway because old malpractices were hard to remedy.

The malpractices in the USSR originated from the excessive centralization of political and economic power. The essential political superiority of the socialist system lies in the fact that the people are the master of the country. But prolonged and excessive centralization of power hampered the development of socialist democracy and the implementation of democratic centralism. It also hindered the development of the legal system and rendered the system of the people's supervision ineffective. What is worse, it fostered bureaucratism, personal arbitrariness, patriarchy, lifelong official tenure and all sorts of privileges and corruption. Except those who held office for a short time, all Soviet leaders from Stalin to Gorbachev concentrated powers in their own hands. When it is up to one person to decide on every domestic or foreign issue, it is just empty talk to say that the people are the master of the country.

The fundamental superiority of socialism in the economic field lies in the public ownership of the means of production and the principle of distribution according to work, which end the exploitation of man by man and liberate the productive forces. However, owing to the prolonged centralization of power, the prevalence of mandatory plans and the stress on the legal binding force of economic plans, it was hardly avoidable that the vigour of enterprises was sapped and economic activity stifled. The enterprises were forced to exert themselves to fulfil production quotas, paying little heed to the variety, quality, specifications and marketability of their products. All this made it impossible to meet the growing material and cultural needs of the people, dampened their enthusiasm and initiative and stymied the growth of the productive forces.

As for the question of commodity economy under socialism, it was a forbidden subject in the Soviet Union for quite a long time. True, both Marx and Engels held that commodity exchange was incompatible with socialism. But socialism was victorious not in developed capitalist countries as they envisaged, but in Russia where capitalist commodity production was not at all developed. Lenin died before he had time to tackle this problem. And it was a year prior to his death that Stalin realized that since there existed the ownership by the whole people and the collective ownership, the exchange of

the products between them could not but be commodity exchange. But he only regarded as commodity the means of consumption, and not the means of production. Facts have shown that whether in theory or in practice the question of planned commodity economy on the basis of public ownership of means of production was never solved in the Soviet Union where commodity economy was still considered totally incompatible with planned economy.

It follows from the above that there is the necessity for socialist countries to constantly carry out structural reform in the light of their own respective conditions. This is the way to overcome defects, bring the superiority of the socialist system into full play and help the steady development of the productive forces. The maladies in the economic and political structures of the Soviet Union were so serious that there could be no way out without reform. It is therefore untenable to hold that the Soviet Union would not have come to such a dismal end if it had not instituted reform. Then, what are the real causes for its disintegration?

III. The remote cause of the disintegration of the Soviet Union is the policy of hegemonism it pursued in both domestic and foreign affairs.

The Soviet Union was a big multinational state of over 130 ethnic groups. According to Lenin, a multinational state is a fact of historical progress viewed from the angle of social development, but all nationalities must be treated as equals and national chauvinism, especially Russia's big nation chauvinism, must be combated. It was under the guidance of this principle that the founding of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was proclaimed on 30 December 1922 at the First Soviet Congress. In the 70 years of union and cooperation all the nationalities in the Soviet Union played their part in resisting foreign aggression, building socialism and developing national economy and culture, and they had made great headway in the process. But the principle of complete equality was often disregarded. Lenin was fully aware of the ingrained Russian addiction to national chauvinism, which could not be changed overnight. That was why he stressed the necessity of the fight to eradicate national chauvinism.

From the very beginning when he proposed the setting up of the union, Stalin was not on guard against big-nation chauvinism. He put forward suggestion to incorporate various republics into Russia. When the union was established, he arbitrarily downgraded the self-governing status of the nationalities in Transcaucasia and Central Asia and suppressed their opposition. He relegated some union republics to autonomous republics against their will and incorporated them into Russia. In the course of the Second World War, on the ground that there were traitors among national minorities Stalin forced

millions of people of a dozen ethnic groups to migrate to Siberia, Central Asia and Khazakstan where life was relatively hard. This was in fact sending entire nationalities into exile. During Brezhnev's rule, large number of Russians were moved to areas of national minorities in order to bring about the so called national integration. All this ran counter to the Marxist policy towards nationalities. It was a policy of big-nation chauvinism, a policy of hegemonism in domestic affairs. The prolonged and intensive enforcement of this policy brought untold sufferings to the national minorities concerned and sowed seeds of estrangement and even hatred among various nationalities. Big-nation chauvinism gave rise to narrow nationalism and led to national divisiveness, which undermined the multi-national union and deprived it of its cohesion. Once conditions are ripe, the union is bound to disintegrate.

The prestige of the first socialist power and its outstanding contribution to the anti-Fascist war have won the Soviet Union the respect of the people of the whole world. But, styling themselves as leaders of the socialist countries, Stalin and Khrushchev wilfully interfered in the internal affairs of other countries and practised power politics in international affairs. And Brezhnev went a step further and pursued a policy of hegemonism by embarking on external aggression. He ordered the invasion of Czechoslovakia and kept East European countries under his thumb by trumpeting the "theory of limited sovereignty" and the "doctrine of international dictatorship". He squandered money on arms race. Flaunting the banner of "natural ally" and using "treaty of friendship and cooperation" as a means, he pursued a policy of expansion towards the Third World. By the early eighties he had secured 57 military bases and air and sea ports in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Inheriting the strategy of southward expansion from Tzarist Russia, he invaded Afghanistan and set up military bases in Cam Ranh Bay in addition to stationing troops in Mongolia and along the Sino-Soviet border. He tried to cut off the oil route linking the Indian and Pacific oceans and to encircle China. His hegemonic ambition was very great indeed. But it was precisely his indulgence in foreign expansion and arms race that brought about the steady decline of the Soviet economy. The annual growth rate of the Soviet economy dropped to 3.9 per cent during the tenth five-year plan of 1976-1980 and then to 3.1 per cent during the eleventh five-year plan of 1981-1985. In this way, the Soviet Union forfeited the respect of the world's people and its international prestige. Finally, it turned into its opposite and became the target of public censure. The Marxists have all along disapproved of the export of revolution. As for external expansion and hegemonism, they are diametrically opposed to the foreign policy of a socialist country. Naturally, they would corrupt the minds of the Soviet people and army and shake their confidence and trust in the Communist Party and socialism. The disintegration of the Soviet Union is the inevitable logical conclusion.

When an army which had defeated formidable enemies in the anti-Fascist war suffered grievous losses and had to admit failure and withdraw from Afghanistan and when a great power of high international standing was condemned by the people of the world for its acts of expansion and aggression and became increasingly isolated, it was difficult to expect the people, army and army dependents of that country not to lose confidence in their government, their leaders and the policies it implemented, thus undermining the foundation of its rule.

IV. The immediate and principal cause of the Soviet disintegration is the particular road of reform taken by Gorbachev.

As mentioned earlier, there were very serious maladies in the economic and political structures of the Soviet Union and it was essential to carry out reforms. The question was how and what reform guidelines to follow. Would it be economic and political structural reform under the leadership of the Marxist party by adhering to the basic system of socialism and giving full scope to its superiority? Or would it be a reform rejecting the leadership of the Communist Party, repudiating the socialist system and causing social retrogression and return to the system of exploitation of man by man? The former is what we mean by the self-perfection of the socialist system, while the latter is reversion to capitalism, however pleasant the epithet one may use to describe it.

True Communists are open and aboveboard. They are best able to make a correct appraisal of history and, drawing lessons from the past, rectify errors and adhere to truth. Even when the country faces grave danger as a result of mistaken policies, they are undaunted and know how to rely on the people, tide over the crisis and forge ahead with renewed vigour.

Gorbachev was in power for six years and nine months. To all appearances, this was a period of moulding public opinion for reform, a period of critical evaluation of the past and endless controversy. However, in essence, it was a period of struggle over the socialist orientation. He put forward the strategy of "accelerated development" in 1986 and formulated an "Overall Programme for the Restructuring of Economy" in 1987, scheduled for implementation in 1988. But in June 1987, in the face of mounting opposition he decided to put political reform on the agenda and mobilize the people in an effort to expose malpractices and criticize the past in the name of glasnost and democratization. It was necessary to review the past and draw appropriate lessons, but there was no scientific assessment of historical events, and people were at a loss what to choose between the total negation and the total affirmation of the bygone days. As a result, there was much confused think-

ing, social dregs came to the surface and the leadership became increasingly divided. Some influential people in the West asserted that what Gorbachev did undermined the confidence of the Soviet people in the superiority of their own system and the certain victory of socialism over capitalism, thereby rendering an invaluable help to the West.

In 1989 it was claimed that the Soviet Union would soon enter a stage of social development by putting concepts, plans and programmes into practice. But not long afterwards a major controversy broke out. The debate between an "adjustable market economy" and "500-day economic reform plan" ended in a stalemate. It did not have the effect of clarifying people's thinking, and the result was a "Basic Programme for Stabilizing National Economy and its Transition to Market Economy", a compromise programme which could not and was not expected to be implemented. The verbal fight came to a temporary halt.

Amid the turmoil of noisy demonstrations and ceaseless debates, reform in the Soviet Union took a significant turn in 1990. In the early years of reform Gorbachev repeatedly stated his intention to strengthen the leadership of the Soviet Communist Party, respect Lenin's teachings on the essence of socialism and follow Leninist style of thinking. He said he did not intend to change the Soviet system and would not depart from its basic principles. On many occasions he declared that he was in favour of developing various economic sectors on the basis of the public ownership of means of production. Yet in March 1990 the Communist Party of the Soviet Union gave up its leadership role and expressed its readiness to introduce the multiparty system and presidential government. In July a programmatic statement was adopted at the 28th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, calling for a "human and democratic socialism" at the expense of Marxist principles. In the meanwhile, the Soviet party broke up into various factions vying with each other for power. There was no end of ethnic conflicts, many republics proclaimed independence and the Union was plunged into deep crisis. Towards the end of 1990, a general concept for signing a union treaty was proposed in order to save the union.

Anyone with a minimum of Marxist understanding will realize that without the leadership of the proletarian political party and without the guidance of Marxism, socialist revolution and construction and structural reform for the self-perfection of socialism are all out of the question.

In the turbulent situation the Soviet economy registered a negative growth in 1990. National income, industrial output, labour efficiency and foreign trade were all on the decline. Domestic debts rose to 540 billion

roubles and foreign debts to 55 billion roubles. In 1991 production plummeted, currency was devalued, consumer goods and food were scarce, and the country found itself in deep political, economic, ethnic and social crises. In April 1991 it had to put forward an anti-crisis programme with main stress on seeking foreign aid.

There was no doubt that Gorbachev played a certain positive role in easing international tension and promoting detente. Confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union changed into dialogue, and arms race gave way to a break-through in disarmament. He gave up Soviet control over East European countries. He basically solved the question of "the three obstacles" and joined China in an effort to normalize Sino-Soviet relations. But he was deeply influenced by Khrushchev's doctrines of "the state of the whole people" and "the Party of the entire people", and his ideas of handling international issues, like those of handling domestic issues, were at variance with Marxist theories.

In 1991, the incident of 19 August marked an abrupt turn in the march of events. Gorbachev declared his resignation as the Secretary General of the Soviet Communist Party, called on the Central Committee of the Party to disband of its own accord and asked the Party organizations at all levels to decide their own fate. Finally, the central government was dissolved and the Union fell apart. Gorbachev's role was played out and he had to step down from the political stage.

V The external cause of the Soviet disintegration is the strategy of peaceful evolution carried out by the West over the years.

Peaceful evolution is a strategic concept formulated by monopoly capital to eliminate the socialist system after the failure of its direct military attacks and its tactic of "murder with a borrowed knife", "letting both adversaries fight and wear themselves out", etc. It originated in the speech Churchill delivered in Fulton on 5 March 1946, in which he called on countries in the West to unite in resisting "communist expansion". He said the West must never stop propagating forcefully the great principles of "freedom and human rights" and he urged the United States to undertake this task. The strategic concept of peaceful evolution took shape in the strategy of "containment" in April 1950 when Truman approved the Goal and Plan of National Security of the United States. The main contents of peaceful evolution can be summed up as follows:

-- The strategy must be backed by strength. An analysis of the current situation and thinking, the above document states, leads to the conclusion that the only way to frustrate the ambitions of the Kremlin, facilitate the

decline of the Soviet system and change the world situation is to make constructive use of the idea of freedom, display its superiority and use various means short of war to this end.

-- Aim and leadership role: It is on the strength of Western ideas and their appeal that will bring about a fundamental change in the Soviet system. Sooner or later all societies will become free societies and it is up to the United States to exercise leadership over this long evolutionary process. There is no reason to alter this strategic goal even with the outbreak of war.

-- Three-tiered tactics: 1. It is undoubtedly the most effective way with minimum cost if a radical change can be brought about by forces inside the Soviet society. 2. The task will definitely be easier and victory more certain if the Russian people become the allies of the West. 3. It is inadvisable to aim at the unconditional surrender of the Soviet Union, the subjugation of its people and the deprivation of its economic potential, because this will inevitably force the Russian people to rally around the rulers that enslave them.

This strategy is the precursor of Dulles' "policy of liberation", Rusk's "promoting change through contact", Nixon's "victory without war", Reagan's "push-back strategy" and strategy of "promoting democratization of the Communist countries", and so on.

When Bush became US president in 1989, after reviewing the international strategic situation he honoured George Kennan, the originator of the "containment" strategy, with a highclass medal for his strategic foresight. Soon afterwards he set forth a "beyond containment" strategy. In May the same year he stated that the aim of the beyond containment strategy went beyond what his predecessors had imagined. It was not just to contain Soviet expansion, but to bring the Soviet Union into the family of nations. He added that communism was fast collapsing and it was necessary to speed up the process.

By and large the United States has over the years employed the following four ways of implementing this strategy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

1. To wage an all-out propaganda war and carry out ideological infiltration. The main weapons are human rights, democracy and freedom, and especially human rights. Brzezinski said that to advocate human rights will have a tremendous and far-reaching impact and can hasten the decline of communism.
2. To apply the tactic of the carrot and stick by using economic and technical aid as a bait and attach political conditions to it to promote

liberalization of ideas, political pluralism and market economy. Nixon stressed the need for the United States to learn how to use foreign aid for strategic purposes.

3. To cultivate "anti-communists" through economic and cultural contacts.

4. To carry out subversive activities. Nixon said in March 1988 that it would be a fatal mistake if the United States declared its intention not to use covert action as a tool of foreign policy.

American politicians make no secret of the role played by US policy in the process of the Soviet disintegration. But it would be an exaggeration to overestimate the power of the strategy of "peaceful evolution". The mortal defects of this strategy are as follows:

1. It runs counter to the law of social development. That socialism is bound to replace capitalism is a law which operates independent of the will of any individual or political group.

2. Human rights, democracy and freedom, the weapons they rely on, are to a large extent hypocritical. As has been shown repeatedly by their deeds, they adopt a double standard towards human rights, democracy and freedom.

3. In pursuing this strategy the United States aims to dominate the world, which harms the interests not only of socialist countries but of other capitalist countries as well.

4. The fundamental defect is its inconsistency with the basic philosophical principle: "External causes are the condition of change and internal causes are the basis of change". Worms grow only when a thing gets rotten, as the Chinese saying goes. So long as the Party is firm in its stand, consistently upholds the principles of Marxism, unswervingly adheres to the socialist road and forges close ties with the people, a socialist country will be unconquerable.

VI. The assertion that with the disintegration of the Soviet Union the world will be unified under capitalism is without any rhyme or reason.

It is not the theme of the present article to portray the world in the aftermath of the Soviet disintegration. But a few words are called for to reply to the above assertion. True, the break-up of the Soviet Union proclaims the end of the bipolar structure of the post-war world. The existence of each of the two power blocs headed by the United States and the Soviet Union respectively is conditional on that of the other. When one bloc ceases to exist,

the other loses its *raison d'être* too. A military bloc without a threatening adversary cannot survive for long. Since 1989, and especially since the end of the Gulf War, it has been claimed that the United States remains the only pole in the world and the only country entitled to act the world gendarme. But people have sobered down, and they are now speaking in a different tone. In an international seminar last year I heard speeches by European and Japanese scholars who refuted the claim that the United States could dominate the world. Some prestigious US academics also admitted that there were two sequels to the break-up of the old world structure, namely, the outdated of the existing mechanism and the decline of US economy. Even a unity among the major capitalist powers is not possible, to say nothing of the unification of the world under capitalism in such a diversified world.

To put it bluntly, those who make this assertion have something else in mind. In other words, if socialism collapses in East Europe and the Soviet Union, how long can it survive in China? They do not necessarily raise the question with an evil intent. I was asked this question to my face not long ago. My reply was that they should study the history of the decade-long alliance, thirty years of confrontation and recent years of normalization of relations between China and the Soviet Union. I believe he will come to the right conclusion after the study if he guards against ideological prejudices.

It has been the consistent stand of China not to practise national chauvinism at home and hegemonism abroad. China pursues an independent policy of peace, refuses to bring ideological differences into state relations and is ready to develop friendly relations and cooperation with all countries of the world on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.

"One central task and two basic points" is the basic line guiding the building of socialism with Chinese characteristics. It is a correct line that has stood the test of practice and won the support of the entire Chinese people. Comparison brings truth into relief, and through comparison the Chinese people will have firmed up their belief in socialism and will under the leadership of the Chinese Communist party, advance unswervingly along this road.

The world ahead of us, at least for the rest of this century, will be full of turbulence in its march towards multipolarity. It is also a world in which the people strongly demand peace and development. The trend of multipolarity and the torrent for peace and development are sure to clear away power politics of all descriptions and hasten the establishment of a new international political and economic order on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.

Tremendous and Profound Changes and Complex Contradictions

--Retrospects and Prospects on the international strategic situation

PROFESSOR LUO RENSHI

The international strategic situation in 1991 underwent the most profound and tremendous changes in this century which were marked by such events as the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Gulf War and the civil war in Yugoslavia. Although these changes are the outcome of the development of a series of events for years, it is difficult to estimate in a short period of time the shock they have caused to the whole world and their possible far-reaching impact. As the opinions of the strategic researchers of all countries vary, no unanimous conclusion can be drawn. People cannot help calling to mind the description of the bewilderment in a period of great change by the great English writer Charles Dickens: "It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the season of light, it was the season of darkness." In short, the dust has not yet settled down, it still takes time to see clearly the prospects of development of the current events, and the conclusions of some questions have to be drawn by history.

This article intends to focus on the study of the basic changes which already took place and tries to explore the important trend of development of the international strategic situation.

I

All current dazzling changes contain some fundamental major turns which can be tentatively boiled down to the following points:

Change in the world pattern: the bipolar system has been disintegrated completely and will move gradually to a multipolar system. The disintegration of the Soviet Union put an end to the world strategic pattern

Professor Luo Renshi is a Senior Fellow at the China Institute for International Strategic Studies. He is a graduate of the West China Union University, and worked in the PLA and the Ministry of National Defence from 1950 on. He served successively as Deputy Representative and Representative of the Chinese Delegation for Disarmament to Geneva in 1979, Chief of the Arms Reduction Working Group in the Defence Ministry, Military Attache' of the Chinese Embassy in France. He retired from active service in 1986. He is also a professor of Nanjing College of International Relations.

with the two poles of the United States and the Soviet Union playing the predominant role. The United States has become the sole superpower. However, its national strength has been on the decline. In addition, the United States has been contained by various ever-growing forces such as Western Europe and Japan. It is losing the capability of stretching out its hand to all corners of the world. Pending the ultimate formation of a multipolar system, the world pattern will be one of "one superpower plus many powers" in a considerably long time to come, meaning a pattern in which one superpower and various forces coexist. In this complex pluralistic world pattern, consideration should be given to the possible role of some regional powers and regional groups. Even some small and medium-sized countries play a major role in relevant regional affairs in different scopes and at different levels. In sum, when talking about the world pattern, one can by no means ignore the important position of the Third World countries. It is a better reflection of the reality of the international situation to consider the current world pattern as a multi-levelled three-dimensional structure.

The disintegration of the bipolar pattern is conducive to the independent development of all countries and can promote the process of development of the international relations towards democratization. Nevertheless, there still exist in the transitional period uncertainties in the trend of development of the national strategies of some important forces such as Japan, Germany and Russia. In the multforce and multilevelled pattern, the relations are complex and are in a fluid state of realignment and regrouping. Therefore, the end of the bipolar pattern means the nonexistence of the relatively stable unitary equilibrium which had existed for a long time. In the years ahead, it is very difficult for an equilibrium among many forces in the world to take shape and it is very easy to upset this equilibrium even if it is formed. This brings about a great instability to the world situation.

Change in international contradictions: the contradictions between the East and the West have eased while those within the West and between the North and the South have become prominent. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, a fundamental change has taken place in the contradictions between the East and the West characterized by the contention for hegemony between the United States and the Soviet Union. The US-Russian relationship has become one of cooperation. As the Soviet Union, the common opponent of the United States, Western Europe and Japan, has vanished, the contradictions among these three forces have escalated to an important position. These three major forces of the West are organizing their own regional economic groups and are stepping up their contention for markets and spheres of influence. They all wish to play their predominant role in the international political struggle, unwilling to make concessions to each other. These West-

West contradictions produce a widespread important impact in all aspects of the international affairs and may possibly develop into principal contradictions in the world.

The North-South contradictions find their expression mainly in the ever-widening economic gap between the Third World countries and the developed countries. Some Southern countries have been more dependent on the developed countries economically and have become the "periphery" of the world economy. In the meantime, the development of the Southern countries is uneven and they contend for funds and markets among themselves. The domestic political contradictions in some countries and the regional ethnic, religious and territorial issues among them have run out of control in the new situation. This has provided the big powers with pretext of their intervention. The North-South and South-South contradictions will continue to develop in the future.

The change in the principal international contradiction also contains the change in the nature of contradiction. In the past, the US-Soviet rivalry for world hegemony was an antagonistic life-and-death contradiction. Although the contradictions among the United States, Western Europe and Japan in the new situation may become quite acute, a relationship of multifaceted interdependence exists among them and such international coordinating mechanism as the summit meeting of the group of seven has been established. The West-West contradictions will not intensify to such an extent as causing the outbreak of direct conflict. The strength of the Southern countries is relatively dispersed now. It is difficult for them to play their role as a whole and their strength is inadequate to let them confront the Northern countries. Instead, some regional disputes among the Southern countries may develop into direct confrontation and may even lead to the outbreak of local wars.

Change in the focus of competition among big powers: after the end of the Cold War, the arms race among the world major countries has been reduced to a secondary position while the economic, scientific and technological competition has become the focus of international competition. All big powers have carried out economic reforms and made readjustments. They are trying their utmost to enhance their own economic strength and gain high sci-tech superiority and, at the same time, are extending energetically their markets and economic spheres of influence abroad. Western Europe, the United States and Japan have strengthened their respective positions in competition by setting up economic groups. The Third World countries have also organized regional economic groups of all descriptions in an effort to safeguard their own interests and seek development vigorously.

The development of the trend of regionalization and of grouping of the world economy has pushed forward the internationalization of the economy. Economic cooperation and mutual infiltration are being enhanced by countries at different levels of development. Economically developed countries have exerted their influence upon developing countries by such economic means as trade, investment and assistance and have even exercised political control and carried out intervention. The international economic relations have acquired more political character. In the new situation, economic powers can strengthen their own international standing and attain their national strategic objectives without relying on military strength and territorial expansion. An article published in the *New York Times* on December 5, 1991 asserted that Japan is establishing a new East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere with its yen. Although the United States has stationed more than 100,000 troops in Asia, its position has been on a constant decline. A "New Cold War" of expansion and counterexpansion and of control and countercontrol in the economic field is emerging on the international arena with a most complex and intense momentum.

Change in the form of war: as a world war will not break out, local wars and regional conflicts become the principal form of war. Of the only two superpowers which were capable of fighting a world war, one has vanished and the other has been on the decline. The two world wars which involved all major countries in the world in this century may possibly become a historical phenomenon and it can be said with certainty that such wars will not be repeated in a considerably long time to come. However, small wars are on the increase. After the breakup of the bipolar pattern, regional conflicts are no longer conditioned by the struggle between the East and the West and there is no need to worry about the danger of leading to an all-out war. Furthermore, the forces are in a state of imbalance in some regions because of the disappearance of the Soviet influence. Thus, contradictions within regions have become conspicuous and disputes on territorial, boundary, ethnic and religious questions between neighbouring countries have often led to conflicts. The expansion of the ambition of regional powers and of the intervention by big powers is also one cause for the increase in the number of small wars. Besides, the struggles among all political forces and the conflicts for national independence have occurred in some countries under the influence of the changes in the political situation in Eastern Europe and the achievement of independence by the republics of the former Soviet Union one after another. It was against this background that the Gulf War and the civil war in Yugoslavia broke out. New "hotspots" will continue to emerge in future.

The fact that small war becomes the principal form of war reflects the great change in the world military situation. All countries in the world have

been making readjustments to their military strategies and defence policies and developing their military strength on the basis of the new security environment and operational needs. The world arms race has entered a new cycle.

Change in the situation of ideological struggle: socialism has retreated to take a posture of defence and the Western capitalism and market economy have got the upper hand in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The struggle between two ideologies has appeared since the end of World War II. In the 1950s and 1960s, due to the upsurge of worldwide national liberation movement, the influence of socialism was extended considerably and a group of socialist and socialism-inclined countries emerged. Under these conditions, letting themselves get carried away, the leaders of the former Soviet Union intensified their military and political outward expansion and exported socialism of the Soviet model. The struggle of expansion and counter-expansion between the East and the West represented by the two major blocs of the United States and the Soviet Union was of the character of the struggle between two ideologies. At that time, the "containment strategy" pursued by the West was defensive in nature. In the mid-1980s, Gorbachev came to power. He implemented his "New Thinking" and policy of reform, making fundamental changes in the political line and foreign policy of the Soviet Union. Soon afterwards, the United States put forward the strategy of "beyond containment", changing its defensive posture into an offensive one and "exporting" the Western parliamentary democracy and market system of economy to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

It is inevitable that different ideologies and concept of values coexist, infiltrate and compete against each other. But if a country takes ideology as the basis of its foreign policy and as a means of attaining its political and economic objectives, this will lead to antagonism and struggle in international relations. Compulsory "export" of any ideology will surely infringe upon the right of free choice of a sovereign state and people. All such actions should be opposed by the world opinion without exception. At present, there has emerged a new situation in which offensive posture alternates with defensive in the ideological struggle. The "export" of ideology and concept of values continues to constitute the important source of international contradictions and conflicts.

The outcome of the occurrence of the above mentioned important changes in the international situation will be as follows: some relaxation of the situation will emerge, and peace and development will remain the two major themes of the times, but the international contradictions will be more complex, new rivalries will continue to be intense and the world will not be tranquil.

II

Looking ahead, the trend of development of the situation in different parts of the world in the international vicissitude will vary. The situation in the Asian-Pacific region will be relatively stable and that in Europe will be turbulent and eventful; signs of relaxation have emerged initially in the Middle East; Africa will continue to be in chaos.

In the Asian-Pacific region, the former state of cold war with the United States and the Soviet Union confronting each other has come to an end and their military deployments have contracted. "Hotspots" have moved towards a political settlement. The development of relaxation of the situation is encouraging despite the continued existence of factors for instability. The agreements on reconciliation, mutual non-aggression and non-nuclear weapon state reached between North and South Korea have changed the situation in Northeast Asia. The pattern of mutual cooperation and conditioning among many forces formed by China, the United States, Japan and Russia plus the ASEAN nations and India can maintain a situation of balance and stability by and large. The sustained high-speed economic growth in this region in recent years has made the efforts to seek economic association to maintain regional peace the common goal of most Asian-Pacific countries.

In Europe, the regional strategic balance has been upset owing to the changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and the reunification of Germany. In the wake of the disappearance of "balance of terror" formed by the long-standing confrontation between the two major military blocs, ethnic contradictions and territorial disputes of all kinds have emerged. The chaos-caused by war in Yugoslavia is by no means an isolated incident and the conflict may possibly spread. The Commonwealth of Independent States and Eastern Europe breed potential turmoil. The struggle for the leading political and economic position among the Western countries have started to appear. It is difficult to find a solution to the turbulence and imbalance in Europe within a short period of time. The contradictions in Europe are an epitome of the contradictions in the world and will produce an impact on the world situation.

In the Middle East, the old contradictions have continued to exist after the Gulf War. However, with the US-Soviet rapprochement and the change in the overall situation, the Peace Conference on the Middle East has been in session and a new stage of the peace process has started. Furthermore, Lebanon has moved towards reconciliation and unification, Cyprus has accepted the UN mediation, and the hostage crisis has come close to a settlement. But it is difficult to solve various contradictions in the Middle East in a short time

which were accumulated over the past four decades and more, and there remain quite a few factors leading to conflict. Should the parties concerned attach importance to the settlement of the questions of Palestine and the occupied territory and guarantee the sovereignty and security of all countries in the region including Israel, the peace in the Middle East may make progress.

In Africa, hotspots have cooled down, the civil war in Angola has stopped, and the situation in the southern Africa is turning for the better. However, internal contradictions have become prominent, and with the aid of the tide of the Western "democratization", six coups and more than twenty cases of social turbulence have occurred over the past year. The situation in Africa will remain chaotic and unstable.

The world military situation has displayed the characteristics of "no major war, but incessant small wars". All major powers have made readjustments in succession to their military strategies, shifting the focus of their strategies from preparations for an all-out war to preparations for coping with regional challenges, from coping with realistic threats to coping with potential threats, and from one-direction defence to multidirection defence.

Upon the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, Russia and other states of the Commonwealth of Independent States have developed relations of cooperation with the West. The United States and other Western countries are no more confronted with the great threat from the East. Although they are still worried about the military power of Russia and the danger of nuclear proliferation, a fundamental change has taken place in the security environment. The focus of Western defence has been shifted, the unitary focus is being replaced by many focuses, and the emphasis is now placed on coping with regional conflicts in and outside Europe.

In their summit meeting held in November 1991, the NATO countries revised their military strategy. Making a change in the "forward defence" with Central Europe as the focus, they decided to adopt the extensive omnidirectional defence. The original "strategy of flexible response" based on nuclear weapons was replaced by the "new strategy of flexible response" based on mobile conventional force. As far as the US "military presence" in the western Pacific is concerned, the first-line troops will be reduced on the basis of maintaining the original framework of "forward deployment", and in the meantime mobile forces and reserve force will be strengthened.

The military readjustments made by the West have shown an important trend. After the Gulf War, the US concept of military interventionism has

gained ground. Even Japan is prepared to play some role overseas by dispatching its troops abroad.

Disarmament will develop further and most military powers in the world are reducing their armament of their own accord. The antagonistic arms race between the two major military blocs headed by the United States and the Soviet Union has stopped, but the motive force of armament development continues to function and the regional arms race is still intensified.

After the conclusion of the INF Treaty, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the treaties on the reduction of strategic weapons and on the conventional disarmament in Europe. In September 1991 both sides announced their considerable reduction of tactical nuclear weapons of themselves. If the goals of the above-mentioned reduction are attained, the number of nuclear warheads possessed by these two nuclear powers may be reduced to approximately half of the total prior to the reduction. At present, the United States and Russia are still discussing the question of further reduction of nuclear weapons. Russia has proposed to the United States to reduce the number of nuclear warheads of both sides to 2,000-2,500. It should be noted that substantive progress has been made in disarmament which is developing to a greater depth. There are some characteristics. The progress of unilateral disarmament will outpace bilateral disarmament agreement; multilateral talks on arms control will be gradually raised to an important position; regional disarmament, particularly the prevention of proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, will become urgent. Currently, most military powers are cutting their military expenditures. A solution to the question of arms control in the Middle East which causes the greatest concern in the world is being sought by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council through consultations.

The world arms race is entering a new period. The US-Soviet disarmament process has failed to check the arms race. A trend of pluralism has emerged in the arms race in the new situation, and regional arms race becomes noticeable. The driving force of armament development continues to function. This includes: (1) strategic driving force. Some countries still attach importance to the strategy of nuclear deterrence, holding that it is necessary to maintain considerably strong nuclear attack force and defence capability and to improve the capability of rapid reaction of conventional forces for the purpose of implementing the new strategy of conventional flexible response. (2) political driving force. Military strength continues to be an important component part of the comprehensive national strength and to some countries the maintenance of powerful military strength is an important pillar of their international political position. (3) economic driving force. Developed

countries need appropriate military orders to maintain existing defence industry enterprises and wish to make profits from arms export. (4) technological driving force. The development of new technology promotes the automatic renewal of weapons and equipment. Therefore, the prospects of a complete halt to the arms race are not in sight today. Some small and medium-sized countries have developed their armament in excess of the needs of the development of situation for different reasons. Over the past year, eight countries (regions) in the Asian-Pacific region have increased their military expenditures by 10 per cent or more, constituting a latent worry for regional security.

In the period of historical turn when changes have taken place in the world pattern, the question of establishing a new international order has become prominent. The struggle between continuing to maintain the old order based on power politics and seeking to establish a fair and rational new international order will become the central issue of the international politics in the future.

The disintegration of the bipolar pattern and the great changes in the international balance of forces and in state-to-state relations inevitably lead to the reestablishment of an international order. The outbreak of the Gulf War, the increase in regional conflicts and the imbalance in the North-South economic relations have made the question of seeking to establish a fair and rational new international political and economic order increasingly urgent. At the 46th Session of the UN General Assembly, some fifty nations put forth the proposition on the establishment of a new international order.

On the question of what kind of new international order is to be established, there exist now two diametrically opposed propositions. Their basic difference lies in: (1) whether to let big powers play a predominant role or all countries, big or small, handle affairs through negotiations on an equal footing in the international order: (2) whether to take the realization of the Western concept of values and social system as the goal or to let peoples of all countries choose their system of their own accord: (3) whether to put forward various reasons for interfering in the internal affairs of other countries according to one's own criteria or to stress mutual non-aggression between states; and (4) whether to maintain regional security and stability by relying on "military presence" abroad and "international police" action or to let the United Nations play the mediatory role and resolve international disputes by peaceful means. The essence of the first proposition is to stick to old hegemonism and power politics whereas the essence of the second proposition is to demand the establishment of a fair and rational new international order on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence.

Of late, there has emerged in major Western countries the ideological trend of the so-called "new internationalism". It propagates the theory of taking human rights as the central issue. It holds that the central question of the international relations is human rights and thus the "human rights diplomacy" has been carried out vigorously. It advocates the theory that concept of national sovereignty is out-of-date, as a result of the new trend of the international economic integration and regional grouping. Furthermore, it propagates the theory that intervention is necessary by taking the "experience" of the Gulf War and the outbreak of civil war in Yugoslavia as the basis. The above-mentioned three theories have become the ideological weapons for carrying out interventionism in all forms under new conditions. It is quite possible that some countries will make use of them to extend their own spheres of influence in the world and to establish a world order in which power politics is practised. This is a noteworthy trend.

The establishment of an international order does not depend on the wishful thinking of people. It is the product of the development of history and is decided by the international political pattern and the material foundation formed by the balance of all forces in the world. In a period when great change and turbulence have occurred in the world pattern, the world people can propel forward by their conscious and active struggle the international order in the direction conducive to the democratization of international relations and to peace and development. Therefore, it is a cause worth fighting for. Establishing a new international order is a long process of gradual realization. In the 1990s, the establishment of political and security coordinating mechanisms is possible by way of the development of economic cooperation in some regions, thereby giving rise to new regional orders in different forms suitable to local conditions. This will be the realistic way of establishing a global new international order in steps which people can expect.

Volatile World Situation

HUANG ZHENGJI

With the disintegration of the Soviet Union the universally acknowledged "Yalta system" has come to an end. People everywhere are wondering what the new strategic structure will be like after the old one is gone.

Almost everyone admits that the world is heading for multipolarity. But opinions differ as to its composition. There has been the theory of a pentapolar world. Now we have a variety of theories such as the tripolar world of the United States, Europe and Japan, the world of one super-power (the United States) plus several other powers, the domination of the world by G7 (Group of Seven Powers), etc. All these boil down to the idea of world domination by several powers or a bloc with these powers at the core. On their part, the US ruling circles are trying hard to establish a new world order headed by the United States and under its control, namely, Pax Americana.

Wither the world?

In discussing the new world strategic structure, we may as well review the formation and breakup of the old ones.

Only the Versailles system after the First World War and the Yalta system after the Second can be really called global strategic structures. Before them the Metternich system after the Napoleonic Wars and the Bismarck system after the Franco-Prussian War were, strictly speaking, confined to Europe. But they did have a global significance since the European powers possessed vast colonies in Asia, Africa and Latin America and turned many nations into semicolonial countries.

All these strategic structures were the outcome of war. With the uneven economic development of capitalist countries, some states grew stronger and were keen to snatch colonies. And when all the colonies had been appropriated, the desire to redivide the world eventually led to armed conflict. Naturally, the winners in war kept and expanded their spheres of influence

Mr Huang Zhengji is a Senior Adviser at the China Institute for International Strategic Studies. He joined the Eighth Route Army in 1938. During the Anti-Japanese War, he served successively as Section Chief and Regiment Commander. After the founding of the PRC, he worked successively as Division Chief and Deputy Chief of Intelligence Department of the General Staff of the PLA. He retired from active service in 1985 and has been invited as Senior Consultant of CIISS since 1988.

and colonial interests, while the losers had to admit defeat and bided their time to stage a comeback. When they recuperated, there would be another trial of strength.

Likewise, the breakup of these strategic structures was almost entirely due to war. The only exception is the collapse of the Yalta system which deserves special consideration.

The Yalta system resulted from the Second World War. That war differed from previous wars in that it was a just war against Fascism and aggression. Nevertheless, the strategic structure after the war was still built on the foundation of power politics. The stronger the nation, the greater its sphere of influence. It extended its influence wherever its army went. The three great powers, the United States, the Soviet Union and Britain, all mouthed high-sounding words, but in their summit meetings, except for independent states temporarily occupied by the Axis Powers, they did not allow any colonial country to win immediate independence despite its contribution to the war effort. What is more, almost all former colonies of Germany, Japan and Italy were placed under their mandate or trusteeship. Nothing changed except that the masters were different. The East European countries were liberated through the heroic struggles of their people with the help of the Soviet army. But the Soviet Union claimed to be their liberator and tried to keep them under its thumb. The people of Korea struggled against the Japanese rule for several decades and the restoration of its Independence was explicitly stated in the Cairo Declaration. But the United States perpetrated its division after failing in the attempt to secure a mandate. China was one of the four major allies and had fought as long as 14 years since the September 18th Incident of 1931. It bore the brunt of the Japanese attack and made it possible for allied countries to concentrate their efforts on defeating Germany and Italy first in Europe and then Japan in Asia. China had contributed immensely to the anti-Fascist war but was subjected to the humiliating terms of secret Yalta agreement. The Yalta system kept the institution of colony and semi-colony intact. However, the anti-Fascist war had educated the people. They contributed to the war effort and in the process came to realize their own strength. They certainly would not be satisfied with this unjust state of affairs and would rise in revolt. This is the root cause of the collapse of the Yalta system.

In the early post-war period, the United States, and the Soviet Union were most powerful and so the Yalta system was characterized by the bipolar domination of the world. Of the two superpowers the United States suffered no direct war damages, grew rich through the war and had an edge over the Soviet Union. Enjoying great prestige among the ruling classes in most countries,

it thought it was best qualified to lead the "free world" and could attain world hegemony. Although the Soviet Union had suffered heavy losses, it succeeded in expanding its territories and spheres of influence, exerted a greater impact on the rest of the world and was dreaded by the West as great scourge. The struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union was unavoidable. It was not without reason to hold, as some did at the time, that the third world war between the two superpowers would spell the doom of the Yalta system. But history has shown that the collapse of the Yalta system is due not simply to US-Soviet rivalry, but also to a variety of causes.

The earliest and most powerful assault on the Yalta system came from the surging national liberation movement in colonial and semi-colonial countries.

Before the war Britain and France were the two biggest colonial empires with colonies sprawling across various continents. The United States, Holland, Belgium, Spain and Portugal also had large colonies. The Yalta system left all these intact.

After the war the national liberation movement first rose in Asia. On many occasions Churchill declared, all in vain, that he would not give up a single inch of the territory of the British Empire. By 1948 a dozen Asian countries, including India, Pakistan, Burma, Indonesia and the Philippines, had won independence through political or military struggles. In 1949 the Chinese people overthrew Chiang Kai-shek and founded the People's Republic of China, smashing the shackles imposed on China by the secret Yalta agreement. In 1953 the Chinese and Korean people defeated the US aggressor and forced him to sign the Korean Armistice. And in 1954 an agreement was signed at the Geneva Conference on the restoration of peace in the Indochinese states, thus ending the colonial war waged by France to restore its colonial rule. The Yalta system was undermined first in Asia.

In the meantime, and specially hereafter, the national liberation movement in Asia, Africa and Latin America were spreading like prairie fire and military suppression, political deception and economic control by colonialist powers all ended in failure. By 1990 more than 100 countries had shaken off the colonial yoke and won independence. Among them over 50 countries emerged as independent states from the British rule and over 20 from the French rule.

Old colonialism collapsed. The Third World stood up. The Yalta system was falling apart.

The second powerful assault on the Yalta system came from the respective allies of the United States and the Soviet Union.

Britain, France, Germany and Japan had been world powers, but they were either seriously weakened or compelled to surrender in the Second World War. The United States gathered them under its aegis. To contain and contend with the Soviet Union, it had to assist, foster and arm them. On the other hand, to seek hegemony, it pursued its own interest at their expense, inflicting damages on them politically and economically. Their dependence on and submission to the United States were only temporary. When they regained their strength, they became its formidable adversaries. The GNP of European Community have out-stripped that of the United States. Japan's GNP is 60 per cent that of the United States. Its per capita GNP has already exceeded America's. These countries have grown powerful economically and demand political status commensurate with their economic strength. They are asserting independence, which constitutes serious challenge to the United States. The unquestioned dominating role of the United States in the western world is tottering.

Socialist countries should be the allies of the Soviet Union, and all of them should unite and cooperate on the basis of independence and complete equality. But looking upon itself as the liberator of East Europe and the leader of the socialist countries, the Soviet Union, obsessed with great power chauvinism and national egotism, interfered in their internal affairs and external relations, tried to control or controlled their economy and in some case even resorted to armed force for this end. This lacerated the national pride of these countries and hampered their economic development. Things turn into their opposites when they reach the extreme. Some of its allies became the thorn in its flesh when the Soviet Union embarked on the road of hegemonism. Moreover, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union regarded itself as the patriarchal party in the international communist movement and strove to interfere with and control other parties, causing a grievous split. The international communist movement, once on the upsurge, was on the decline. There were various causes for this decline, but one of them was undoubtedly the great-power chauvinism of the Soviet Union.

Another powerful assault on the Yalta system was the hegemonic practice of the United States and the Soviet Union and their rivalry.

The two superpowers in the bipolar structure were interdependent. Their hegemonic practice and rivalry, while being the cornerstone of this structure, would inevitably lead to its destruction in the end. For over forty years they were afraid of head-on collision, of fighting a frontal war. But in their scramble for power, they had engaged in a comprehensive and ceaseless Cold War politically, economically and ideologically and were locked in a military confrontation and arms race unprecedented in human history. For

the sake of contention they both extended large amounts of military and economic assistance to various countries and had a hand in many postwar local conflicts either overtly or covertly. According to rough estimates, the United States took part in at least 40 of the 150 local wars. There had been three large-scale local wars since 1945, namely, China's war of liberation, the Korean War and Vietnam War, and the United States joined or started every one of them. And each time it was dealt a telling blow; as a result, it fell from the pinnacle of power. The Soviet Union, on its part, dispatched troops to Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan to its discredit as the first socialist country.

The rivalry and hegemonic practice of the two superpowers resulted in bringing damages to both. The overall strength of the United States declined in relative terms. Its GNP dropped from 50 per cent of the world's total in the 1950s to 21.5 per cent in the 1980s. Once the largest creditor country, it has become the largest debtor country and had to extract money from Germany and Japan to pay the expenses of the Gulf War. The Soviet economy was in shambles. The hegemonic policy of the Soviet Union was the most important cause of its disintegration. It was no coincidence that in 1975 when Brezhnev was most active in pushing expansionism abroad the growth rate of the Soviet economy registered a marked decline.

The breakup of the Yalta system does not mean victory for one of the two superpowers, but a major defeat for power politics and hegemonism.

Must a new world strategic structure be built on power politics? Some people think so. And some states act so. However, the people of the World and the majority of countries are firmly opposed to it. Hence the struggle, a struggle of long duration. And in the course of this struggle the World is highly volatile. In my view, this is the characteristic of the present world situation. Only through prolonged, arduous struggle can we achieve a new international order on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Let me state the reasons briefly as follows.

Unipolarity cannot hold. One of the two superpowers has fallen, and so it seems that the other is in the predominant position. But this is simplistic thinking. In the long struggle after the war, the power of the United States included that of its allies right from the beginning. It was because they considered the Soviet Union to be the common threat that they supported the United States as the leader of the alliance. The strength of the allies grew in the course of the struggle, whereas that of the United States gradually shrank. This is clear to every one. In the absence of a common threat would the allies continue to take order from the United States and defend US interests at the expense of their own? In the Gulf war they sided with the United States who took the lead, but they also had interests in the Middle East. They joined in

to protect their share of profits in the effort to prevent the United States from monopolizing the fruits of victory. True, the United States is the strongest military power in the present-day world, but military might alone is not omnipotent. Military might has to be backed up by the overall strength of a nation, and by its economic strength in particular. Like the former Soviet Union, the United States suffers from the arms race. The difference is a matter of degree. US economy has long ceased to dominate the world as it did in the early postwar years. Apart from a small number of people in the United States, no one in other countries believe it has the strength to lord it over the world, nor do they so wish. The United States is fierce of mien but faint of heart. The theory of unipolarity does not hold water.

Multipolarity is already a fact. It has been 20 years since Nixon spoke of the multipolar trend of the world in his speech at Kansas city. The multipolar forces have already gradually come in being. In particular, the strength of the Third World cannot be underestimated. With the collapse of the bipolar world various forces have come to the fore. This is what multipolarity means. We must not judge the world of today by the standards of the past. Formerly, the number of power centres was decided by war, and things were clearcut. But the power centres now have been formed gradually. The differences between them are considerable, just as the five fingers are of varying lengths. To insist on three power centres or five is too rigid a view and to ignore the fact of multipolarity is to depart from reality. As the various power centres have come into being gradually, it is not easy for a new centre to emerge all of a sudden. Nor is it possible to get rid of any of the power centres already in existence. There is no such superhuman power in the world. The gradual breakup of the bipolar world has given rise to multipolarity, a fact which no country or force can possibly change.

North cannot decide the fate of South. There is some ground for doubting and underestimating the strength of the Third World. In the Third World countries, the economy is underdeveloped; its GNP constitutes only a small proportion of the world's total; some are debt-ridden; the living standards are low; science and technology are backward, with very little high technology; some rely entirely on the export of primary products; the gap between them and North is widening; and so on and so forth. Undoubtedly, all these are facts. But we must look at them in a historical perspective. What are the Third World countries? They are former colonies and semi-colonies. Under the colonial rule, with a few, isolated exceptions, they were mostly even more underdeveloped and backward, and the gap between them and the colonial power was even wider. It is their status as the enslaved and the exploited that prompted them to wage stubborn struggles. They have won political independence and are now striving to develop their economies. Is their plight now

worse than before? Is their development now slower than the past? Some people say that the strength of South lies in its mineral resources, but as North masters high technology, it is less dependent on minerals, because many materials imported from South can now be synthesized. As a result, the Third World has lost its bargaining power and become even more irrelevant. But such assertion is not true, or at most is only partly true. As a matter of fact, many developed countries live off the Third World. They derive profits through the exchange of unequal values between manufactured goods and primary products and by shifting economic crises on to the Third World countries, thereby reducing them to poverty. The Third World countries which were able to shake off colonial yoke certainly have the ability to develop their economies with their own resources. Of course, it will take time and require arduous effort.

The World situation is bound to be volatile and unstable. The collapse of the Yalta system brings no real resolution of any of the contradictions confronting the world today. At the most, some contradictions have eased off. But others have sharpened, become more pronounced and even turned into antagonistic contradictions. How could the world not be turbulent?

The disintegration of the colossal Soviet Union gives rise to a variety of unsettling factors. The former Soviet republics are still in a state of chaos politically, economically, ethnically, socially and militarily. There are ceaseless squabbles inside these republics as well as among them. Armed conflicts have occurred in some places. Similar turmoil exists in East Europe. Yugoslavia is fighting a civil war and is fast falling apart. All this has affected the rest of Europe, which used to be relatively stable but is now in a sorry mess. It is difficult to expect the situation, and especially the economic situation, of these countries to stabilize within the next few years.

Western countries are directing their attention to this fertile land and trying to grab it. The former Soviet republics are rich in natural resources. Though messy at present, their economies have solid foundation to build on. And no one should belittle them in the field of science and technology. Whoever controls them and puts them to good use will have secured a very real advantage indeed. Therefore, Western countries are manoeuvring and vying with each other on the question of "aid" and other matters. But this will only aggravate and prolong the chaos in the former Soviet republics and arouse the opposition of their people. The people and ruling groups of these countries certainly will not take foreign control lying down and be ordered about by Western countries.

European Community is a body full of contradictions. The more its members, the more numerous the contradictions. After unification Germany

grows stronger, has more say in decision making and sometimes even acts peremptorily. The doubt arises as to whether Germany belongs to Europe, or the other way round. For the time being, such problems will not lead to confrontation, but the possibility does exist.

The rivalry among the United States, Europe and Japan comes to the fore after the Soviet disintegration. Europe and Japan have their own interests and plans, which are incompatible with the idea of US domination. Clashes are inevitable. There will be long and repeated struggles, sometimes intense and sometimes relaxed.

After the breakup of the Soviet Union, Western powers practise power politics even more blatantly in the name of "democracy" and "human rights", interfering in the internal affairs of Third World countries which will naturally put up resistance to such interference. Let no one think that Third World countries, poor and weak as they are, will meekly submit to bullying and resign themselves to their fate. History will show that as they succeeded in smashing colonialism, they can certainly stand up to other brands of power politics and hegemonism.

In conclusion, the multipolar world following the collapse of the Yalta system is not the multipolar world before the Second World War. Nor is it a world dominated by a few powers. It is a multipolar world in which the Third World has become an important force. It is a volatile world because of the practice of power politics and reasons given earlier. The centre of turbulence may change, and there will also be changes in the division and regrouping of various forces. The situation now becomes tense, now eases up, the possibility of a world war is getting less likely, but regional wars are hard to avoid. Generally speaking, amid turbulence things are moving towards a new world order built on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. The world trend is becoming more conducive to peace and development.

Value Added Defence

LT COL RAHUL K BHONSLE SM

INTRODUCTION

Conventional war is no longer an economically viable option, a nuclear war is less so. This harsh reality led to thawing of the Cold War half a decade ago. Even the United States with its abundance of economic wealth and technological prowess is strapped for funds to sustain its military build up in an Unipolar World. The Russians, as is now history, had to forsake the arms race due to economic insolvency. Developing countries of the Third World like India and Pakistan can afford a war or a heavy expenditure on the armed forces even less and yet their propensity to go to war appears far greater than those of the developed countries today.

Nations go to war only when the cost of open conflict can be offset by the gravity of the issues involved. The real cost of war is not as great as is imagined, as wars are fought on the basis of sunk costs or investments made prior to outbreak of hostilities. However, it is the raising of armed forces, equipping, training and finally maintaining these at a high state of readiness, which taxes the exchequer. India, afflicted by the proverbial Hindu rate of economic growth, on one hand and a constant threat from belligerent neighbours as China and Pakistan on the other has been left with the Hobson's choice of heavy investment in defence at the cost of development and poverty alleviation. The dilemma is compounded by depleted foreign reserves and escalating costs of military hardware, the best of which comes in hard foreign currency.

There are no soft options before our policy planners, burdened with the unenviable task of balancing the budget with demands of national security. Greater efficiency in military spending, creative solutions to security problems, 'perestroika' if need be of our defence organisations and 'glasnost' definitely of matters military is thus the need of the hour.

AIM

The aim of this Paper is to analyse the reforms required in the management of defence against the backdrop of the security environment in South Asia and the resource crunch.

This essay has won the First Prize in Group A of the USI Gold Medal Essay Competition 1992. Lt Col Rahul K Bhonsle is serving with HQ 18 Infantry Division.

PREVIEW

The problem of defence budgeting of a developing country like India can be simplistically stated as that of balancing the requirements with the availabilities. A multi disciplinary approach to this enigma is essential for which the following issues need to be examined:-

- (a) National goal or aim.
- (b) National threat perception.
- (c) Strategies to counter threats.
- (d) Economics of defence spending.

An overview of the above mentioned factors would enable us to re-structure our security management mechanism for better efficiency within the available resources.

NATIONAL POLICY AND STRATEGY

NATIONAL AIM

Geo-strategic factors as size, demographic proportions and geographic location would dictate the national aim. To attain the status of a power of influence in South Asia in the upper spectrum and retention of unity and integrity in the lower one is a viable aim for India.

ANALYSIS OF AIM

An examination of the aim of dominance in South Asia further would highlight its multiple facets as follows:-

- (a) Stable polity, sound administration and national will to go to war if necessary.
- (b) Expanding economic base.
- (c) Proactive foreign policy.
- (d) Omniscient intelligence network.
- (e) Social stability.
- (f) Sound technological base.
- (g) Potent armed forces.

NATIONAL AIM
DETERMINES
NATIONAL SECURITY

Affected By Internal and External Security Environment

RELATED TO FOLLOWING FACTORS

Political Stability and Will
Social Stability

Economy
Technological Base

Armed Forces

National security policy is determined by the national aim and influenced by the internal and external security environment. Ideally a synergy of factors stated above would contribute to symmetry in security rather than security through excessive reliance on the power of the sword.

CHALLENGES TO NATIONAL SECURITY

External Threats. China and Pakistan are the main external threats to India's national security.

Internal Threats. Fissiparous proclivities, population, poverty and unemployment resulting in social and political instability are some of the internal threats to our national security.

SUPPORTS

India's survival as a nation for over four and a half decades now is sufficient proof of the many supports to national security possessed by the state as follows:-

- (a) Geographic proportion and population.
- (b) Economic potential.
- (c) Trained manpower.
- (d) Vibrant bureaucracy.
- (e) Committed armed forces which are also the fourth largest in the world.

We should thus undertake measures to blunt the edge of the threats and fortify the supports.

DETAILED ANALYSIS OF THREAT

China. China's demographic size, its geographic location straddling our Northern Borders, nascent ambitions of being a Super Power, propensity of forming a nexus with Pakistan are some of the many factors which render the Chinese threat to our security a potent one. On the other hand from the ebb of 1962 our relations with China have progressed steadily, the recent visits of ex President Mr R Venkatraman and the defence delegation under Mr Sharad Pawar being indicators of detente. China is undergoing a transitional phase of modernisation which could last for two to three decades, after which it is bound to emerge as a strong and vibrant power willing to challenge the might of even the USA, if need be. The Armed Forces of China also included in the programme of modernisation are making capital of a steady annual growth in the budget of 12 percent since 1987.¹ This combined with a slash in manpower is likely to see the emergence of a powerful force by the turn of the century. The Chinese threat is thus essentially a long term one.

Pakistan. Pak threat to our security is omnipresent and multidimensional to include religious, political, economic and military. Pakistan's primacy in the US sphere of interest in the Eighties resulted in its acquisition of arms worth \$ 1.5 billion in five years from 1982 to 1988.² This factor has not only contributed to the arms race in the subcontinent but also resulted in kindling Pak ambitions of assuming leadership of the Islamic World. A combination of factors as, rise of Islamic fundamentalism, fall of Iraq, Mujahedin success in Afghanistan and the relative professionalism of its armed forces has contributed to the emergence of Pakistan as a front line state in the Islamic World. This has enabled it to pose a diplomatic and military challenge to India. Pakistan's policy of proxy war in Kashmir and Punjab is the second visage of Pak threat, the constancy of which would be felt over the years. Pakistan thus poses a three dimensional threat as follows :-

- (a) An all out war both conventional and/or nuclear.
- (b) A long term threat of destabilisation in conjunction with other fundamentalist Islamic states.
- (c) A perpetual threat of proxy war in the strategic frontier states of Punjab and Kashmir.

INTERNAL THREAT

The threat of insurrection which has been plaguing India since the 1950's has assumed gigantic proportions today engulfing Assam, Punjab and Kashmir. While a lasting solution to these problems lies in the political and

socio-economic fields, the impositions affecting defence expenditure cannot be overlooked and are summarised as follows:-

- (a) Enhanced outlay on manpower, as combating insurgency is troop intensive. For example to cover an area of 528 sq kms an infantry battalion or approximately 800 men are required.³
- (b) Deterrence is weakened and training for conventional war retarded.
- (c) Heavy strain on vehicles and equipment through extensive use as well as neglect in maintenance.
- (d) Despite legislation to the contrary, the burden of employment of armed forces in aid to civil authorities falls on the defence budget, as the insolvency of states as Punjab and Kashmir, renders it impossible for them to foot the bill.

STRATEGIES FOR DEFENCE

Role of the Armed Forces. The role of the armed forces in a developed society is not only to win a war but also to deter it. Victory in war and deterrence are two components of this role.

ANALYSIS OF ROLE

- (a) The compulsions of a war winning strategy are heavy investment in manpower, equipment, aircraft, ships, doctrines, training, maintenance, housing, and research and development. This outlay is a long term one and needs progressive sustenance.
- (b) Deterrence implies convincing the potential adversary of the futility of going to war. Though military might is its main component, deterrence includes a number of other facets as political will, ability to sustain a long drawn out conflict, national morale and so on.

STRATEGIES OF DETERRENCE

Definition. Deterrence is defined as that state of defence preparedness which would inflict unacceptable damage on the aggressor in case of war.⁴ Deterrence is difficult to quantify and cannot be related to military superiority alone. Deterrence embodies two strategies - strategy of military superiority and strategy of sufficient defence.

Strategy of Sufficient Defence. Absence of quantified parameters for deterrence has led to the strategy of military superiority. An excellent example of which is the monstrous nuclear build up of the USA and the erstwhile Soviet Union surfeit with overkill. This negative spiral is being witnessed in the Sub Continent as well with Pakistan's military acquisitions through US arms aid alone jumping from a naught in 1979 to \$ 300 million per year in 1984 and sustained at the same level till 1987.⁵ Consequently the Indian defence budget leapt from Rs 8728 crore in 1986-87 to Rs 12,512 crore in 1987-88, a quantum increase of 43.35 per cent in a single year.⁶

Strategy of Sufficient Defence. The vision and statesmanship of Mikhail Gorbachev and the dire straits of the Soviet economy saw the emergence of strategy of sufficient defence. Viewed in the context of NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation in Europe, it envisages equipping of armed forces to deter war rather than win it.⁷

In the context of the security environment in South Asia the advantages of adoption of this strategy on the Sino-Indian front has been evident over the past few years. A rapprochement on the political and the diplomatic front resulted in reduction of force levels on the border and consequent saving in defence expenditure. Thus a positive spiral is set into motion as against a negative one through the strategy of military superiority.

SUMMARY OF STRATEGIC FACTORS

- (a) To achieve a national goal of regional dominance, a synergy of factors which contribute to national security has to be achieved rather than placing exclusive reliance on our military might.
- (b) While the threat from China remains quiescent for the present, in the long term we can ill afford to ignore it.
- (c) Pakistan's growing challenge to national security will continue to impose heavy strains on our defence spending.
- (d) The internal threats of terrorism and insurgency have to be countered for which non military options need active pursuance.
- (e) The positive spiral of sufficient defence must be fostered to save on defence expenditure by opting for adequate deterrence rather than military superiority.


ECONOMICS OF DEFENCE

GENERAL

Defence is surrounded by a halo of secrecy in our country, yet it is of vital importance. We can ill afford to allocate even the current 3.8 per cent of Gross National Product (GNP) on defence and comparisons of China spending 10 per cent and Pakistan 7 per cent of GNP are specious. Considering that defence expenditure forms 30 percent of the non developmental outgoings of the government and also it being the largest single head of government spending, prudence needs to be exercised. The soaring costs of defence equipment, with a modern fighter aircraft priced between Rs 50-70 crore and a tank Rs 3-4 crore, underlines the need for thrift in defence spending.

TRENDS IN INDIA'S DEFENCE SPENDING

Past Trends. From an abysmally low defence outlay of Rs 168 crore in the year 1950-51 our defence budget has multiplied exponentially to Rs 16,350 crore in 1991-92. This rise is shown in the following bar chart :-



There were essentially two peaks in our defence expenditure. The first occurred in 1963-64 after the shock of the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962. The

second came in the 1980's due to a combination of factors as, the negative spiral of arms spending set into motion by US arms aid to Pakistan and corresponding Indian weapon acquisitions, a rapid rise in manpower costs and dip in the value of the Indian rupee.

Future Projections. Given the immutability of threat, our defence spending is likely to rise to Rs 20,000 to Rs 25,000 crore by 1995 and could go upto Rs 40,000 crore by the end of the century. With the trends in inflation and rising costs of defence equipment, this would virtually represent a zero growth highlighting the need for better management.

HEADS OF DEFENCE EXPENDITURE

The army takes the cake of the defence outlay at 52% the Air Force a quarter at 23 per cent, the Navy 11 per cent and Capital Expenditure and pensions taking away approximately 7 per cent each.

Within the main head of the three services, pay and allowances account for 40 per cent of the allocations and miscellaneous fixed maintenance requirements 45 per cent. This leaves a mere 15 to 16 per cent for major acquisitions and force modernisations. Considering the outlay on pensions in the defence budget as a whole being 7 per cent, the ratio of expenditure on modernisation vis a vis personnel costs is lopsided in favour of the latter.

The diluvian way of mobilising resources for modernisation and weapons acquisition has been to scrounge on training and maintenance. This is a myopic approach which ultimately adds to the cost of defence as ill trained pilots, flying poorly maintained aircraft invariably crash with their costly payloads.

SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF DEFENCE ECONOMICS

- a) The present allocations to defence of about 4 percent of the GNP are likely to continue over the decade and are barely sufficient to meet the envisaged expenditure.
- b) Manpower costs including pay and allowances and pensions are cutting into a sizeable portion of the budgetary allocations to defence.
- c) Funds allotted for modernisation and weapons acquisition are disproportionately low. Given the inflationary trends, greater allocations have to be made or else low renovation levels accepted.
- d) Defence expenditure has to be planned and executed judiciously with precision and foresight. Telescoping defence acquisitions to a short span is counter productive as it cuts into the general budget.

- e) Efficient management and preventive maintenance of equipment to enhance its life is necessary.

MATCHING THREATS AND RESOURCES

OVERHAULING NATIONAL SECURITY MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE

There is a necessity to undertake a holistic view of national security management and higher defence organisation in our country today for synergy in the factors affecting national security as discussed earlier. This will avoid lopsided, reactive and short term defence management which invariably increases the burden on the exchequer. The Arun Singh Committee report is a good beginning in this direction but needs refinement through debate and discussion. The various levels at which the restructuring is proposed is as follows.

Apex Level. At the highest level, an apex body in the form of a National Security Council has to be constituted for co-ordination of diplomacy, polity, economy, intelligence, human resource development and defence. The proposal mooted during the regime of the Janata Dal Government under Mr V P Singh needs to be thus revived.

Macro Level. There is ample scope for restructuring the Ministry of Defence and the Service Headquarters into an integrated defence headquarters as the Pentagon to avoid delays in critical decision making as also integration of the resources of the three services. The military erudition of the staff at the ministry of defence has frequently come for debate. To overcome this shortcoming, we must harness the services of serving as well as retired senior officers of the three services by inducting them into the defence ministry through lateral sidestepping. The military experience of a brigadier or an air commodore retiring at the ripe age of 54 can be better utilised in the defence ministry rather than as a security executive in a nationalised bank after superannuation.

Theatre Headquarters Concept. At the level of command or theatres, the Integrated Theatre Commands under a Chief of the Defence Staff as proposed by General K V Krishna Rao in his study on national security, "Prepare or Perish" is a fresh thought to synergise the services organisations and effect savings by forming five theatre /task oriented commands rather than fifteen army, air force and naval commands existing at present.⁸

FOREIGN POLICY - THE LOW COST OPTION

Defence and foreign policy are closely interlinked, the latter being the low cost option to parry external threats. Our lack of integrated approach in

these two fields is commonly acknowledged.⁹ The formation of a National Security Council as suggested earlier is designed to achieve this integration. Diplomatic parleys can contribute substantially to lowering the threshold of a war including proxy war. This would enable savings in the defence budget by reduction in troops deployed on the borders in Kashmir, Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh. For it is the maintenance of these remote outposts on the frontier which consume a sizeable portion of our budgetary allocations. The proposed steerings for our foreign policy are summarised as follows:-

(a) In the light of the Unipolar World, invigorate Indo-US relations recanting our inhibitions of non alignment.

(b) Retain concord with Russia in particular and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in general, keeping in view the advantages of an alliance against China as also the strategic proximity of the Central Asian Republics of the CIS to Pakistan.

(c) Ripen amity with China even to the extent of resolving the vexatious border dispute.

(d) Pakistan, being the greatest challenge has to be dealt with an aggressive, dynamic, proactive and non altruistic policy as follows:-

(i) To undermine the challenge of proxy war, initiate proceedings to have Pak declared as a terrorist state, an issue which would ostracise it in the international community like Libya.

(ii) Western fears of rise of Islamic fundamentalism need to be fanned with particular reference to Pakistan, to shackle the nation further.

(iii) Woo the Central Asian Republics to keep alive the threat of the Russian Bear to the North of Pakistan.

(iv) Create a rift in Sino-Pak relations.

AMENDING MILITARY STRATEGY AND DOCTRINES

Glossing over the military truism of manoeuvre and indirect approach being the low cost options for winning a war, our "no loss of territory" syndrome has led us to foster costly doctrines of attrition warfare. This has resulted in full scale deployment of troops all along the border from Akhnur to the Lohit and investment in the "Maginot Lines" of the Ditch Cum Bunds when exchange of territorial gains made in a war after cease fire parleys is an accepted international norm today. This has also resulted in our inability to exploit the tremendous potential for tactical and strategic manoeuvre of

the vast inventory of ships, aircraft, helicopters, tanks and guns built up over the years. Developing a theory on use of tactical nuclear weapons, which as the defence pundit, Mr K Subrahmanyam testifies time and again is not only of immense deterrence value but would lead to offshedding of excess manpower, thus deserves due attention.¹⁰ The doctrine of air land battle simplified to read as integrated warfighting by use of sea, land and air forces also needs to be implemented so as to concentrate at the point of decision with maximum economy of effort, two complementary principles of war which we can scarcely ignore.

INVESTMENT IN INTELLIGENCE

Neglect of intelligence, military and otherwise has weakened our national security structure. Restructuring the intelligence organisation to achieve better co-ordination, induction of dedicated personnel with an acumen for sleuthing and greater investment in terms of funds is essential, the spin offs of which would be as follows:-

- (a) Reduction in state of readiness with the availability of greater warning.
- (b) Retrenchment of manpower with reliance on mobilisation of reservists.
- (c) Intelligence being the most significant aspect of counter insurgency would receive the required impetus thus leading to decrease in outlay on internal security duties.

DEMYSTIFYING DEFENCE

As a result of a restrictive information policy and complete absence of national debate, defence is affected by the extravagance of ignorance. Thus defence debates as the Bofors take off at an ethical tangent obfuscating the security implications and resulting in cost overruns. Demystifying defence is thus essential which can be achieved by a glasnost with the media, creating professional think tanks and giving a fillip to the numerous departments of defence studies in our universities to obtain the following benefits :-

- (a) Better accountability and enhance efficiency.
- (b) Ease government task of taking difficult decisions related to national security.
- (c) Enable evolving of creative solutions to problems rather than militarycentric ones.

- (d) With the real potential of our armed forces coming to light, it would enhance deterrence.

MAXIMISING BENEFITS OF TECHNOLOGY

India's technological base is vast and all pervasive covering intricate fields of metallurgy, food preservation, space technology, electronics and so on. This has not been exploited in activities relating to normal maintenance of troops and equipment in the field which is a major head of budgetary expenditure. Some micro level suggestions in this regard are as follows:-

- (a) Developing retrofitted packages for upgradation of costly equipment as aircraft and tanks to save on procurement costs of new acquisitions.
- (b) Developing techniques for mothballing of equipment to economise on maintenance costs without degrading operational readiness.
- (c) Mass introduction of tetrapack food to replace the heavy and cumbersome tinned stuffs issued to submarines and troops in remote areas. This would save on transportation and fuel costs as well.
- (d) Harnessing non conventional energy as solar rays for heating, cooking and battery charging to save on fuel costs. Consequently a major saving would accrue in expenditure on transportation of fuel to remote areas as Siachen.

TRAINING COSTS - INTEGRATE AND REDUCE

There is considerable scope in streamlining training by integrating the requirements, creating centralised facilities where pooled equipment is available for use by formations without incurring expenditure on moves and introduction of simulators and trainers. Timely decisions in selection of equipment of training is another key area which would contribute to economy in operational costs. A case in point being the delay in introduction of an advanced jet trainer for the Indian Air Force despite its poor safety record of 46 air accidents in 1987-88 and highest write off rate of 2.4 per 10,000 flying hours.

DECONTROLLING DEFENCE PRODUCTION AND LOGISTICS

Our logistics infrastructure is based on a long chain of ordnance factories, reserve stock holding depots, forward depots and so on being a legacy of the colonial past. Today with enhanced surface communications, rapid

means of transportation, indigenous stock holding agencies as the Indian Oil Corporation and Food Corporation of India and a vast industrial base, this chain is redundant and only adds to costs apart from delays. Our ordnance factories can be privatised or even sold off for the value of real estate on which they stand and greater reliance can be placed on the private and public sector to meet our defence needs without prejudicing our state of readiness.

DECREASING MANPOWER LEVELS AND COSTS

While other facets of defence expenditure can be tackled by value engineering, financial management and waste elimination, manpower costs in a population surplus country as ours are difficult to reduce. To retain efficiency and élan, the best talent has to be attracted to the Armed Forces for which salary and perks are a big draw. As we cannot lower our pay and allowances, the other option of reduction in force level has to be exercised. Such a course has been effected by some of the major armies of the World as the People's Liberation Army (PLA) of China with consequent emphasis on modernisation.

The belief that numbers win wars is fallacious in as much as personnel are concerned. Arjuna preferred Lord Krishna over the entire Yadav army. In modern history, Seeckt's 100,000 strong Wehrmacht went on to defeat the best in Europe and Africa between 1939 and 1943. Thus manpower cuts need not raise qualms of insecurity.

The teeth to tail ratio in the Indian Army, the largest of the three Services, is said to be the poorest in the world. Rationalisation of manpower and abdicating antiquated ceremony of the, "Koi Hai" era would enable us to trim the fat off the tail, as the bottom line today is organisational efficiency.

Some of our formation and unit level organisations and capabilities envisaged for the same have been formulated during the Second World War. Today fire power, mobility, surface communications, precision guided munitions and lethality of weapons has revolutionised warfare to enable a few to achieve what many did yesterday. Thus a fresh look at many of our organisations is essential.

The argument of requirement of additional manpower for counter insurgency operations can be countered by developing new operational tactics, by greater reliance on para military forces to tackle the militancy and an intelligence network which can generate actionable information for the security forces.

PENSIONS REDUCING THE BURDEN

The burden imposed by pensions on the defence budget is highlighted by two factors - the yearly allocations for pensions are soon likely to equal the budget for the navy and shortly for every serving soldier we could be having two pensioners. Reduction in manpower suggested earlier would correspondingly reduce the people under the pension umbrella but is considered inadequate. For dynamic tackling of the problem, the following measures are suggested:-

- (a) Modified voluntary conscript service with expanded reserve liability could be introduced instead of the present 15 year term service with pension. Some of the finest armies of the world as Russia, Germany, South Korea and Israel are conscript armies while the PLA of China comprises of 50 percent conscripts.¹¹
- (b) Expansion of the Territorial Army (TA) concept could be considered especially in the light of the creditable performance of many of the TA Units in Kashmir.
- (c) By reducing the number of people drawing pension, the rate of pension for armed forces personnel can be increased from the present level of 50 percent of the last basic pay drawn to 75 percent and gradually to 100 percent, thus making the terminal benefits of the Services more attractive and drawing in better talent.
- (d) A financial exercise in the form of delinking the pension head from the defence budget could be undertaken. This would not merely be a cosmetic manoeuvre but would enable defence financial planners to focus on the key issues of force modernisation and weapons acquisitions which tend to be neglected with a hydra headed budget with multiple sub heads.

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

TEN ECONOMISERS

1. Overhaul national security management structure.
2. Invigorate foreign policy.
3. Reform military strategy and doctrines.
4. Invest in Intelligence.
5. Demystify defence knowledge.
6. Maximise benefits of technology.

7. Reduce training costs through better management.
8. Decontrol logistics infrastructure.
9. Lower force levels and personnel costs.
10. Reduce pension costs.

CONCLUSION

The esoteric pedestal on which issues related to defence are perched today needs to be firmly dismantled to universalise knowledge of matters military without qualms of spilling national secrets. While the cutting edge of the Armed Forces has to be retained, we can ill afford to achieve it at a high cost. Political will, a holistic approach, waste elimination and efficient management thus assume considerable significance. These reforms have to be undertaken at the earliest to avoid the pitfall of economic ruin through extravagance and unplanned defence expenditure leading to greater social turbulence at home and in turn increasing the vulnerabilities to external aggression. The horse thus needs to be firmly put before the cart.

NOTES

1. Walsh, James. "The Great Stone Wall". *Time International*. 6 Jul 1992. No 27. pp 20-21.
2. *Military Balance 1988-89*. The International Institute of Strategic Studies. 1988. p 223.
3. Anand, Lt Col V K. *Insurgency and Counter Insurgency*. Deep and Deep. New Delhi. 1981. p 220.
4. Vohra, Lt Gen A M. "Mounting Burden of Defence Spending". *Times of India*. New Delhi. 13 Apr 1990. p 6.
5. *Military Balance*. Op Cit. p 223.
6. Sinha, Lt Gen S K. "Commitment Within Means" *Hindustan Times*. New Delhi. 12 Feb 1992. p 8.
7. Mukherjee, Dilip. "Not By Guns Alone" *Times of India*. New Delhi. 18 Sep 91. p 8.
8. Rao, General K V Krishna. *Prepare or Perish*. Lancer. New Delhi. 1991. p 491.
9. Venkateswaran. A P. "Challenges Today and Tomorrow" *Hindustan Times*. New Delhi. 11 Feb 1992. p. 8.
10. Subrahmanyam, K. "Nuclear Deterrent is Cheaper" *Hindustan Times*. New Delhi. 20 Feb 1992. p. 8.
11. *Military Balance*. Op Cit. p 147.

From Confrontation to Cooperation: A New Agenda for the Indian Navy

VICE ADMIRAL (RETD) MIHIR K ROY, PVSM, AVSM

There is no 'blitzkreig' possible in naval warfare - no lightning flash over the seas striking down an opponent. Seapower acts more like radium - beneficial to those who use it and are shielded; it destroys the tissues of those who are exposed to it.

— Basil Liddell Hart

The fertile Indo-Gangetic plains attracted successive waves of invaders from Central Asia who, however, shied away from salt water. To these heartlanders, the culture and the way of life of the great plains of Hindustan became, in turn, their strategic perceptions which focused their security compulsions inwards towards the Himalayan passes. This left the small embayed Indian Ocean which contained one third of the world's population, three fourths of the earth's oil resources, two thirds of its strategic minerals and almost the entire reserves of jute, tin, rubber, cashew and groundnuts untended and forlorn. It was, therefore, not surprising that this jilted ocean eloped with the attentive European maritime powers which 'firenge' (Anglo-Indian) relationship continued for more than three centuries. Pax Britannica was born of this association and therefore usurped the dowry of seapower - be it sea transportation, ocean trading, marine technology or the utilisation of sea force. This enabled the ice free ocean to keep London and Liverpool, Manchester and Lisbon flushed with commerce and cash from the richest jewel in the Imperial Crown. The Subcontinent combined both Mackinder's theory of domination by heartland countries as also Spykmen's thesis of the inherent strength of rimland States. This dichotomy, in a way, still applicable to-day with the Vindhya providing the divider between the continental North and peninsular South.

INDIA'S NAVY - A LACK LUSTRE AGENDA

India's newly established Navy received scant attention at the time of independence due to the mindset of 'Mughal Delhi' which was further aggravated by the conflicts with Pakistan and China over their northern borders. The

Vice-Admiral Mihir K. Roy, a naval aviator, was the Flag Officer Commanding in Chief of an Operational Naval Command. He has also been a Nehru Fellow. He has been responsible for the establishment of Deptt of Ocean Development, Government of India, New Delhi.

defence budget was therefore tilted heavily in favour of the Army. Hence the Navy had perforce to go in for second hand destroyers, frigates and cruisers which were made available off the rack by the Royal Navy. Britain also continued to urge caution and impressed on the need for Indians to gain knowledge of seamanship which England had acquired over centuries from the sailing ship days of Drake and Nelson to the technology era of Cunningham and Woodward. Hence the country's political leaders retained British Admirals till the end of the 1950's although Indians had already earned a reputation for being quick learners.

Therefore, when war with Pakistan broke out in 1965, there lacked a sense of urgency in Delhi for the navy to come to grips with Pakistan's equally lack lustre Fleet. Hence while not losing ships or aircraft, the Indian Navy suffered a serious loss of morale and confidence as the majority of well motivated officers and sailors were prepared to leap frog time and timidity to be blooded in battle along with their other sister services. It was only in 1971 that India's navy had perforce to sail into the heavily defended port of Karachi and blast the oil tanks at Keamari¹ as well as sinking a destroyer and a mine sweeper. This resulted in the tightening of the blockade and the isolation of East Pakistan. The Eastern Fleet in turn attacked Cox's Bazar, Chittagong and Chalna daily from the moving platform of the aircraft carrier VIKRANT in order to prevent the beleaguered Pakistani forces from escaping the noose of the Indian army.

THE AGENDA FOR UNORTHODOX WARFARE - EAST PAKISTAN

A new agenda was introduced in maritime operations by the 'frogmen chindits' of the Mukti Bahini, who were the forerunners of the present 'commandos' or 'special forces' which are found in contemporary navies. Hence the hitherto untold story of the courage and sacrifice of the frogmen of East Pakistan merits mention. This wing of the Mukti Bahini was initially composed of Pakistani sailors from East Bengal who had escaped from the submarine Mangro which was being commissioned in France. But the effective core of this highly motivated force were the town and rural educated youth mostly from Chittagong, Khulna, Dacca, Narayanganj, Daudkundi, Chandpur and Barisal. The majority of the water borne guerrillas were Muslims and the few Hindus circumsised themselves as they felt they had a better choice of survival if captured. Their only aim was to seek revenge on the West Pakistani forces who had killed and raped their mothers and sisters and had literally driven nearly ten million of their countrymen out of their beloved 'Sonar Bangla'. They exploited their intimate knowledge of operating in riverine areas to which they belonged. They were linked to MAO's 'fish

which live in the seas and its water must be warm and familiar enough for them to proliferate'.

Their objective was to neutralise the main seaports of Chalna, Mongla and Chittagong where earlier Major Zia-ur-Rehman, the late President of Bangladesh had turned his guns on West Pakistan's soldiers sent to crush the dock workers who had refused to unload arms from the cargo vessel M.V. Swat. This major port had also witnessed a revolt by a large contingent of East Bengal Rifles who were being shipped out to Karachi. In addition, their plan was to disrupt the vital inland waterways, and river terminals of Narayanganj, Chandpur, Barisal, Faridpur and Daudkhanda which controlled the movement of defence supplies to the military cantonments of Dacca, Comilla, Jessore, Rajshahi and Bogra as there was hardly any railway or roadway system in East Pakistan's delta region.

The frogmen, who are excellent swimmers, utilised bamboo and papaya reeds for breathing when floating down stream on the ebb tide just below the surface. They had no sophisticated underwater equipment such as schnorkles or scuba diving sets although some sets had been purchased by their more wealthy countrymen from sports shops in the U.K. Their attire continued to be lungis and banians. Each pair of frogmen carried two neutrally buoyant limpet mines and four hand grenades. They were not burdened with any other arms and hence could quickly melt into the countryside. Intelligence was made available to them by their kith and kin who mostly worked in these ports and waterway systems.

The first all out attack was on the night of 15/16 August, 1971 when they simultaneously commenced operations against the ports of Chittagong, Chalna, Khulna and the riverports of Narayanganj, Daudkhanda and Chandpur. They sank / damaged the freighter S.S. Lightning, four coasters, three river steamers, six mini tankers, eight mechanised barges, six pontoons, four launches and some communication facilities. Claire Hollingworth of the *Daily Telegraph* operating from the Intercontinental Hotel at Dacca summed up the results as 'brilliant'.² Sydney Schanberg of *New York Times* reported that the Pakistan Army controlled only five miles of the Karnaphuli river. The East Pakistan jute and tea industries were so badly crippled that Islamabad had to order two million pounds of tea from abroad for consumers in West Pakistan. The August score was 16,000 tons sunk and another 14,000 tons damaged.

In September, 1971 the frogmen again struck major ports and riverine installations on a moonless night. According to Lloyds casualty list they sank / damaged the Pakistan freighters Al Murtaza, Imtiaz Baksh, the British Vessel

Teviot Bank and the Greek freighter Avlos. In addition, they sank the coaster Digha, three tugs, one steamer, the buoy laying vessel Path Finder, two ferries, four barges, one terminal position and three passenger launches. The September toll was 6,000 tons of shipping sunk and another 17,000 tons damaged.

The month of October witnessed yet another major strike inspite of the tight security measures imposed by the martial law administrators which included patrolling by light aircraft as also by armed launches manned by West Pakistan personnel. The coasters Nasim, Sher Afghan, Lalsira, three small tankers, navigational buoys, three launches and one ferry terminal were destroyed totalling 8,000 tons of shipping sunk and a further 16,000 tons damaged which were later refloated in view of the shallow drought of the rivers and inland ports.

The November strike was a bigger success in spite of the repressive measures taken by the Pakistan Army which had by this time been heavily reinforced. The British freighter St. Albans came under small arms fire and was forced to return back to Calcutta. The Greek freighters Chrysovalendus and Mastrosteliouse were disabled in the Pusur river and the freighters Mercara, Skyter and Berlion damaged. The coasters M.V. Shams, Africa Proctor, Lili, Jaipur, and Gafoor sunk. Two river launches were captured. The toll for November was 20,000 tons of shipping sunk and another 10,000 tons damaged. The Port Directors closed the ports of Chittagong, Chalna, and Mongla. The inland waterways lay paralysed. Lloyds casualty lists published in London could not be challenged.³ And therefore, the enhanced insurance rates made it uneconomical and risky even for the Greek, Panamanian and Somalian ships under flags of convenience to take advantage of the high cargo rates in East Pakistan.

In retrospect, one has to view not only the lakh tons of shipping sunk or crippled in just four months which no major navies had ever achieved in the Indian Ocean but also take into account the large number of foreign ships that refused the bait of high compensation if they remained in harbour to embark the mounting stocks of jute, tea, rice and betelnut. This is a significant tribute to the sacrifices and courage of young men who were content to return to their previous life styles after the liberation of their beloved 'Sonar Bangla' with minimum fuss and no fanfare while some of their other counterparts rose to the highest positions in the country. This form of unorthodox warfare was later inducted into the agenda of several strife stricken States in East Africa, S.E. Asia and presently in Bosnia and Northern Ireland. A history of the tactics, equipment, ingenuity, and valour of these young Bangladeshis merits being written in blood in the history of the birth of the People's Republic of Bangladesh.

THE EMERGING INDIAN NAVY - A REGIONAL POWER

The eighties saw a leap forward in the conflict potential of the Indian Navy with the acquisition of the latest conventional submarines, missile frigates, land based maritime aircraft, an aircraft carrier with ski jump to operate Harriers together with indigenously designed missile destroyers as also a nuclear propelled submarine from the erstwhile Soviet Union which has since been returned to Russia. The Naval Review at Bombay in 1989 hit the cover page of the *Time* magazine which categorized India as an 'awakening power'. The *Washington Post* instead described India as an 'oriental bully' and Richard Armitage, a former U.S. Department of Defence official, pronounced India as a 'regional super power'. The Australians rang the alarm bells by highlighting the blue water naval capability of the Indian Navy which they felt had expansionist aims!

The U.S. once again shut their eyes to Pakistan's nuclear weapons and leased eight missile destroyers, long range maritime aircraft with Harpoon and Exocet missiles and also retrofitted Pakistan's submarines with Harpoon missiles thus giving them an edge in the sea denial role in the North Arabian Sea despite the causes belli for the previous Indo-Pakistan conflict remaining unresolved. This encouraged Pakistan to accelerate their insurgency activities in Kashmir and Punjab as also encourage Islamic fundamentalism on the Sub-continent.

However, with the withdrawal of the Soviets from Afghanistan and the break up of the USSR, the United States enforced the Pressler Amendment on Pakistan and supported India's democratic and secular government which had liberalised her economy. Nonetheless the conflict syndrome remained the major agenda for the two Navies.

THE AGENDA OF NON-USE OF NAVAL CAPABILITY

The Asians have still not understood the spectrum of options available to a sea force in view of the indivisibility of the seas linking oceanic borders. The gradual induction of protective sea forces by the U.S. during the Iran-Iraq conflict was apparently not taken into cognizance when nine Indian tankers including Ambedkar, Ras Vishwamitra and Jalpari were hit by missiles. This sea blindness continued with India failing to enforce the right of innocent passage during the Gulf conflict when unarmed merchant ships carrying foodstuffs for Indian citizens with U.N. approval were stopped, boarded and searched on the high seas in violation of international norms.

And still later, India's large amphibious landing ships as also

temporarily denuded aircraft carriers with kitchens and toilet facilities could have evacuated Asians fleeing from Kuwait in a single sea lift although this default earned Indian Air Lines an entry into the 'Guinness Book of Records'. The lessons of the use of British, French, U.S. and Soviet warships on 63 occasions in the last three decades for successfully tackling international bush fires apparently went unnoticed. The non-use of India's three dimensional navy for other than naval operations is therefore a sad reflection on the Indian taxpayers as capital intensive sea forces are a highly flexible tool of the nation just as a hammer is a visible tool of the carpenter and therefore requires to be used deliberately and purposefully. And only recently, the Indian Navy has been used for delivering food and medical supplies to Somalia thus emphasising cooperation in lieu of confrontation.

THE CHANGING AGENDA FOR A NEW OCEAN ORDER

In this terrestrial disorder, a new ocean regime was promulgated on 30 April, 1982 after 14 years of discussion and debate among 160 States for sharing equitably the earth's greatest resources - its oceans and seas. This Convention of the Seas created a historic division of the oceans into three separate jurisdictional zones: Territorial, Contiguous and Exclusive Economic Zones. The oceans are the largest reservoir of energy in the form of currents, waves, thermal gradients, vents and so on. Again in the oceans, there are factories churning out minerals at place where the earth's plates meet. In addition the water columns above the seabed are a reservoir for food, chemicals and drugs as also a medium for transportation and a fly wheel of the world's weather. Hence, as the pressure on land increased, man turned more and more to the oceans for sustenance, minerals and energy. And the key to harnessing these ocean resources will necessarily be science, technology and human resources in order to utilise India's broad continental shelf as the Panchayat of the New Ocean Order.

The Indian Ocean thus became a fish pond, a resource mine, an oceanic factory, an energy producer as also a rubbish tip and a self effacing battle field. This in turn not only subjected the seas to every day economic, political and technological pressures but has added a spectrum of new responsibilities such as the delineation of maritime boundaries, dumping of nuclear wastes, oil spillage, poaching, safety of navigation, narco terrorism, gun running, innocent passage, and environmental cooperation.

In the international zone, the mining of seabed minerals are exclusively governed by the rules and regulations of the International Sea-Bed Authority (ISBA) while living resources need to be exploited within prescribed ecological parameters. The resources of the international ocean zone can therefore be only exploited through cooperation between littoral states.

These extended zones, in turn, ushered in a spectrum of new technologies such as seabed mining, remotely controlled vehicles, aquaculture engineering, wave energy and the surveillance, exploration and exploitation of both living and non-living resources. This demanded close cooperation between like minded nations to utilise the seas which is the common heritage of mankind for obtaining energy, food, pharmaceuticals, minerals and transportation.

THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

These ocean based activities have in turn resulted in a quantum jump in R&D encompassing data processing, acoustic and electronic sensing along with the use of moored and drifting buoys, submersibles, satellites, robotics and new diving systems which have expanded the frontiers of research in marine geology, biotechnology, physical oceanography and pollution control. These technologies are however highly capital intensive and so a possible way could be regional cooperation from among Indian Ocean littorals. But groupings such as Asean, SAARC, G.C.C. are still fragile with many of the States like Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and Myanmar being unrepresented. Therefore India must play the role of a harmoniser between the North and South as also encourage South-South cooperation. Therefore, the emphasis on the agenda for maritime forces in this region must necessarily change from conflict to cooperation over a wide band of oceanic activities.

Further, in the present global environment, the littorals are better served by the pre-eminence of the trading State. And, therefore, India with her growing middle income group is poised to take advantage of her rupee convertibility to initiate a mini ocean revolution. The swords of yesterday may well become the ploughshares of the seabed of tomorrow.

AN AGENDA FOR PEACE

The end of super power rivalry and the demise of the Soviet Union curiously threatened the survivability of some States which depended on the largesse of the competing super powers. These nations belong to three groups: The first group are the 'failed States', such as Bosnia, Cambodia, Liberia and Somalia which need urgent succour from international institutions and peace keeping forces for their survival'. The next group are the 'failing States'; such as Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Georgia and Zaire, who are trying to evolve a national consensus to overcome the present crisis. And lastly, the reorganized States of Russia, Yugoslavia, Haiti and Cuba are looking to financial institutions such as the World Bank, IMF, World Food Programme, UNICEF as

also the U.N. High Commission for Refugees to tide over their present difficulties.

The 'Agenda for Peace' report released by the U.N. Secretary General, Boutros Ghalli in June, 1992 set forth the concept of 'post conflict peace building'. The Secretary General went on to state that in order to prevent conflict, the UN must create a new economic, political and social environment for States riven by war. This should include the strengthening of governmental institutions, the protection of human rights and the strengthening of bilateral cooperation'.

It is under this 'renaissance of strategic studies' that navies have a special part to play by identifying areas for maritime cooperation which will perforce find a prominent place in the agenda for regional cooperation in the Indian Ocean which will lead to a broader concept of national security.

NAVAL AGENDA TO ACCELERATE REGIONAL COOPERATION

The Indian Ocean has often been characterized as being replete with trouble spots. Yet paradoxically most of the conflicts between or within littoral States have been on land and over issues on land - Indo-Pakistan, Arab-Israeli, Iran-Iraq, Kuwait-Iran, Horn of Africa, Cambodia and Vietnam. Therefore, regional navies have not been generally involved in direct confrontation and with their inherent flexibility, mobility and the areas of their operation being away from emotive national boundaries are uniquely placed for initiating confidence building measure particularly when Pakistan, Nepal and Bangladesh have opted for a democratic form of government after a considerable period of autocratic governance.

India's navy has on several occasions gone to the aid of her own coastal areas as also island nations during natural calamities. Therefore, the Navy and Coastguard should structure a readily available reaction force for coming to the assistance of neighbouring countries during cyclones and earthquakes as also to combat blow outs in off shore wells and oil spillage due to tanker disasters. It is pertinent to state that there were 70 incidents resulting in the spillage of 133 million gallons of oil. In the Malacca Straits itself there were five spills with 3.5 million gallons of crude polluting the coastal waters when the Japanese tanker Nagasaki Spirit collided with a container ship in September 1992. Again on 21 January 1993, the tanker Maersk Navigator collided with Sanko Honour at the entrance of the Malacca Straits spilling 40,000 tons of crude oil when the Indian Coastguard and a Singapore salvage company were able to prevent a major ecological disaster in the Andaman Sea.

In the same vein, hospital ships with modern equipment and manned by experience doctors should be available for not only disaster management but also to visit the less developed littorals in the Indian Ocean with large ethnic Indian population, such as Maldives, Seychelles, Mauritius, East Africa, Aden, Mynamar, as also Laccadives and Nicobar Islands where blindness and other ailments have taken a heavy toll of the population.

Again naval vessels with helicopters and sophisticated communication facilities should be earmarked for not only disaster management but also for peace keeping operations. It was perhaps for the first time that Indian Naval Ships were used to transport food and medicines to Somalia.

Further, amphibious vessels and landing craft of the navy could be utilised in peace time for transporting livestock and bulky equipment like bull-dozers and power generation equipment to islands where there are no jetties to handle such contingencies.

AN AGENDA FOR CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES

A beginning has been made for initiating confidence building measures by joint naval exercises to encourage openmindedness and transparency of information based on reciprocity. The Indian Navy has already conducted such exercises with Australia, Britain, United States, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Oman navies. These exercises include not only cross operating at sea but also people to people contacts in port.

There are several other areas for such measures such as erecting Joint Maritime Centres with standard operating procedures for combating oil spills, piracy, dumping of nuclear wastes and monitoring international drug trafficking for which the track records of regional navies have not been altogether satisfactory.

In addition, the setting up of Search and Rescue (SAR) Centres, regional maritime and safety organizations with ship plots and information exchange systems will further minimise the risk of collisions at sea. Then there is a requirement for marine salvage and towing facilities linked to joint SAR centres.

The necessity to pool capital intensive requirements, such as towing tanks for ship models and wind tunnels for vessel design in order to be less dependent on Europe, Japan and the United States needs no further elucidation.

With regard to Indo-centric confidence building measures, selected Indian built warships, such as the Leander class frigates should be specifically outfitted as floating platforms for exhibiting India's cultural, industrial and export potential particularly in view of her market-oriented reforms. Such port visits should be carefully programmed in consultation with the External and Commerce ministries with special emphasis on visiting countries such as Mauritius, Fiji, Nauru, Vanuatu, Singapore, Hong Kong, West Asia, East and South Africa whose reception to our Naval Ships is even more enthusiastic than that extended to our cricket teams! Such cruises can be later extended to Britain, Australia, Canada and the United States in view of the strong support given by N.R.Is to India's economy. The support given to Britain in her dark days by the English Speaking Union as also the assistance to China by overseas Chinese is a paradigm which merits emphasis as there are millions of ethnic Indians abroad with strong cultural and economic links to the Subcontinent.

In this context, power projection in peace time which in common parlance, is gun boat diplomacy is perhaps less productive in today's environment than fraternal visits, cultural expositions, handicraft exhibitions, medical facilities and renewal of age old traditions and customs which have stood the test of time. In the oceanic environment, there are no international frontiers on the high seas and the laws of the seas conventions recognise the sui generis nature of what Alfred Thayer Mahan termed the 'great common'.

It is, therefore, becoming increasingly necessary for the agenda of the navies to identify maritime policies and activities for promoting confidence building measures in order to do away with popular cliches such as hegemonistic ambitions, blue water navies and big brother interventions.

The sea and sailors are a natural and readily available medium for bringing together the hearts and minds of like minded nations which in turn will influence the texture of the country's strategic, economic, cultural and industrial perceptions. The new agenda for cooperation will perforce bring in its wake other cooperative programmes for furthering bilateral understanding and consequently enlarging the brotherhood of the seas for as the Norwegians say 'The land divides and the sea unites'.

NOTES

1. Admiral S.N. Kohli, *We dared* (Lancers International, Delhi). pp. 90.
2. *Daily Telegraph*, London. 28 Oct. 1971.
3. *Lloyds Casualty List*, London. Nov. 71.
4. Sreedhar and Kapil Kaul, *Tanker War* (ABC Publishing House, Delhi: 1989) p. 87.
5. Stephen M. Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies"; *International Studies Quarterly* 35 (June 1991) pp. 221-239.

Security Issues in Central Asia

MAJ GEN D BANERJEE, AVSM

BACKGROUND

A region that was turbulent and conflict prone for much of its history, but considered by Moscow till recently to be, "a godforsaken place of no strategic consequence", has emerged after the dissolution of the Soviet empire as an area of considerable security concern.¹ In earlier times it was a meeting point between what was termed as the Near East, India, Europe and China and was known by the collective name of Turkestan. By virtue of its position astride the major caravan routes across its vast plains it controlled movement in all directions and influenced developments far from its borders. Today this region is known as Central Asia and it has suddenly emerged again as an area of major interaction between the great powers with potential to influence events in all directions.

Before analysing the implication of recent developments, it may be useful first to clarify the geographic extent of Central Asia. There are varying perceptions depending on the viewer's orientation. A minimalist approach seeks to restrict the region to an area between the Caspian Sea and the Tien Shan mountains, encompassing mainly the ethnic Muslim majority areas. On the other hand, a maximalist interpretation attempts to include a region termed as "Inner Asia", which is a larger area of nomadic civilisation that includes the frontiers of Russia and China, the Middle East as well as north western portions of India. In considering strategic implications, it is preferable to include a wider area which would more correctly reflect the influences that prevail in the region and how developments there affect happenings in its neighbourhood. But in this particular case, regions and countries on its boundary such as West Asia, Russia, Central Europe and South Asia, have all come to acquire a distinct identity of their own through practice and long usage. Excluding Russia from this, what remains are the five Central Asian Republics of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kirghistan, and Kazakhstan.

Three major foreign conquests and its own expeditions to India have shaped its past and now influence its present. First, the Muslim conquest of the region in the 7th Century AD. From this time onwards Islam dominated

Major General D. Banerjee is the Deputy Director, Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis, New Delhi.

its life and culture, but in its own peculiar way, with a touch of Sufism and tolerance as well as of violence and aggression. Second, was the Mongol invasion and the establishment of a flourishing settlement at Samarkand. The final wave of conquest was a competition between two European powers, Great Britain and Russia. This 'Great Game' for the dominance over this region followed the defeat of Napoleon in the early 19th Century. It saw the rivalry between Moscow and London (via India) last a hundred years.² While the British were more concerned with sea routes around the world to sustain their commerce and to control those areas on land that were relevant to their dominance, the Russians were directed by geography to seek a wider extension of their central position in Eurasia. Underpinning this desire was a need for port facilities in the warmer waters of the Indian Ocean, which the British were determined to prevent. This resulted in a period of high drama and great adventure, where gallant individuals from both sides pursued the imperial game with vigour and daring. This continued under the Communists after their revolution in 1917, as a process of forceful annexation ensuring Moscow's hold over this region. Soviet occupation was characterised by arbitrarily breaking up the region into different autonomous Republics, each with a bewildering mix of ethnic populations to which were now added Russian, German and Jewish peoples driven from the north. The region became independent, although somewhat reluctantly, on 21 December 1991 along with the breakup of the Soviet Union and became a part of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The Republics may now be called by the collective name of Central Asian Republics (CAR).

Expeditions from Central Asia radiated in all directions, but its effect on India was permanent. For it was from the Ferghana valley that Babar set forth on his conquest of India where he founded the Moghul empire. This is naturally a special tie that has bound the regions together, for the influence from Samarkand and Bokhara came to pervade all areas of life in the sub-continent and has lasted to this day.

It is in this backdrop of historical experiences, arbitrary splintering, rising expectations, and yet inadequate ability to meet the challenges of a new environment, that we need to examine the security environment of the CAR. In this it is not the external influences emanating from the region that are now important. More appropriately it is the stability of these Republics as well as outside interests that may influence internal developments, that will determine its security interactions. Strategic issues will then revolve even more around geography, demography, ethnic composition, economic stability and religious influences.

GEO-STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE

Geographically, politically, and demographically the maximalist concept of Central Asia is not merely that of "Inner Asia", but one of being "Central to Eurasia". Turkic cultural and ethnic predominance, the presence of large Russian and minority German population in all these Republics irrevocably connects this area with Europe and provides a bridge with the Asian heartland. To the South they are connected to Iran, Afghanistan - Pakistan - India and to the East with China. These linkages and location endows the region with both an European and Asian identity which allows it to be considered as a zone of convergence of the major geo-cultural regions of Eurasia with its security interactions spanning both continents.

An important factor is its location, next to a geo-strategic shatter zone, West Asia. In this area, the cross currents of Arab-Israel rivalry, intra-Arab hostility, and the conflict between Iran and Iraq, have kept this oil rich region in a state of continuous turmoil. Central Asia is susceptible to be dragged into their conflicts and may even contribute to it. The Kurdish population that straddles national frontiers in the region is a case in point. Lastly, a major complicating factor is the presence of nuclear weapons in some of the Central Asian republics (atleast in Kazakstan) and the urge of the other oil rich countries around it to have them. The dreams of some atleast of the latter came tantalisingly close to fulfilment and will surely be revived. This has led to some referring to the developments here as a sort of "Nuclear Great Game", where the major players are now from the South.³

This has resulted in a phenomenon that has turned around Halford Mackinder's theory of geo-strategy. In this concept, it was Russia with its central position in the 'heartland' of Asia, that was to dominate the 'rimlands', and through them influence the 'world' islands. The rimlands represented the periphery of the Central Asian land mass, including areas near the sea. The 'world islands' were Europe, America and Australasia. His theory of centrifugal thrust from the 'heartland' dominating and controlling the 'rimland' and the 'world islands' may have been rather tenuous and unreal; yet, it had a historical basis in the Mongol invasions of West Asia and Europe. In the post Second World War era, this was the plank on which western strategic thinking revolved and which came to be dominated by the perception of sudden, massive attacks by Russian hordes into Western Europe that could not be stopped by anything short of a major nuclear counter-attack. Instead, now it is the reverse of Mackinder that poses a possibility of future instability. Turbulence in its periphery has every potential of sucking in and further destabilising the already unstable situation that is fast developing within Russia.

A few geo-economic data of the region will help to show both its potential and its current significance.

CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS - GEO ECONOMIC DATA

	Pop mn	Pop Growth 1989-90	Area ²	Per capita GNP ³	Eco Growth 1986-89	Major Natural Resources & Industry
Turkmenistan	3.8	2.49	488	3370	4.9	Oil, natural gas, lead, zinc, copper, mercury, Metallurgy Chemical petrochemical, carpets.
Tajikistan	5.7	2.72	143	2340	3.2	Iron, tungsten, lead zinc, copper, gold, uranium. Food processing & Textiles.
Kirghistan	4.6	1.79	198	3030	4.9	Metallurgy, machine building, textiles, food processing.
Kazakstan	17.1	0.94	2717	3720	1.9	Oil - 25 mn tons, gas 7 mcm ⁴ , coal 138 mn tons, uranium processing, iron, steel, def ind.
Uzbekistan	21.6	2.09	447	2750	2.9	Natural gas 41 mcm, oil - 3 mn tons, coal-6 mn tons, gold, building materials, marbles. Chemical, fertilizer, machine building, mining, iron, steel, food processing, light industry.

1. July 1992 figs. (CIA Fact Book).

2. In thousand km sq.

3. In 1989 in US \$.

4. mcm - milliard cubic metres.

SOURCES: *The World Fact Book - 1992*, CIA, Govt of USA. *Military Balance, 1992*, IISS, London. Information on Central Asia, compiled by Prof Madhavan K Palat, IIC, New Delhi, 1992; *The Middle East*, Nov 1992, p. 38.

THE DEMOGRAPHIC AND ETHNIC DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION

The distribution of the population along ethnic and national lines presents an interesting mosaic. This is shown below:

CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS MUSLIM POPULATION 1990

<i>Republics</i>	<i>Pop in mns</i>	<i>Russians</i>	<i>Other Nationalities</i>
Turkmenistan	3.6	10%	9% Uzbeks, 3% Kazaks & 1% Ukrainians.
Uzbekistan	20.3	8%	5% Tajiks, 4% Kazaks.
Tajikistan	5.3	8%	24% Uzbeks, 1% Tatars, 1% Kirghiz, 1% Ukrainians.
Kirghistan	4.4	22%	13% Uzbeks, 3% Ukrainians, 2% Germans.
Kazakstan	16.7	38%	6% Germans, 5% Ukrainians.
Total	49.7	(9.6 mn Russians and 1.50 mn other nationalities)	

SOURCES: Derived from "The Soviet Union's Unequal Parts; Diverse and Restless," *The New York Times*, Sep 11, 1990; *Time*, Sep 9, 1991; *Statesman's Yearbook*, 1990.

NOTE: The figs for population etc. may vary in the Charts depending on the year of data and source.

The percentage of Russians in the total population has been declining in the last decades⁴. This process been accentuated by the recent riots in the region as well as the possibility of the rise of ethno-nationalism. In Tajikistan alone 23,000 skilled Russians left during the first seven months of 1990 mainly because of the riots in Dushanbe in 1990 and the fact that Tajik was declared as the official language.⁵ The table below displays the national composition of population in Central Asia including the annual percentage change over a period of 30 years.

NATIONAL COMPOSITION OF POPULATION IN THE CAR

<i>Nation</i>	<i>1959</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>1989</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Av Annual % change 1959-89</i>
Uzbek	5,973,147	26.0	16,520,080	33.6	3.4
Kazakh	3,232,403	14.1	7,476,296	15.2	2.8
Tajik	1,385,835	6.0	4,162,524	8.5	3.7
Turkmen	985,643	4.3	2,672,174	5.4	3.3
Kirgiz	962,001	4.2	2,482,210	5.1	3.2

Russian	6,213,830	27.0	9,516,229	19.4	1.4
Ukrainian	1,034,965	4.5	1,234,556	2.5	0.6
Tatar	779,840	3.4	1,178,698	2.4	1.4
German	985,623	3.0	1,134,097	2.3	0.5
Korean	212,472	0.9	320,189	0.7	1.4
Belorussian	121,596	0.5	239,765	0.5	2.3
Uyghur	92,974	0.4	258,952	0.5	3.4
Azerbaijan	102,169	0.4	187,273	0.4	2.0
Jewish	147,495	0.6	137,445	0.3	-0.2
Armenian	47,066	0.2	111,064	0.2	2.9

NOTE: Robert J Kaiser, "Nations and Homelands in Soviet Central Asia", in *Geographic perspective on Soviet Central Asia*, ed. Robert A Lewis, (London, Routledge, 1992), p. 289.

Another aspect of demography is the spilling over of the ethnic peoples of the CAR into neighbouring countries. Apart from Russia, where the numbers are not significant, the ethnic spill over into neighbouring China, Iran, Afghanistan and Turkey are shown in the table.

SPILL OVER OF ETHNIC POPULATION

	1978	1983
People's Republic of China		
Uzbeks	14,000	13,000
Tajiks	20,000	26,500
Kirgiz	120,000	115,000
Kazakhs	840,000	930,000
Iran		
Turkmen	550,000	650,000
Azerbaijani	5,800,000	6,200,000
Tajiks	40,000	44,000
Afghanistan		
Uzbeks	1,300,000	1,500,000
Tajiks	3,000,000	3,500,000
Kirgiz	10,000	5-8,000
Turkmen	300,000	350,000
Turkey		
Turkmen	100,000	120,000

NOTE: Lee Schwartz, "The Political Geography of Soviet Central Asia: Integrating the Central Asian Frontier", in *Geographic Perspectives on Soviet Central Asia*, Ed. Robert A Lewis (London, Routledge, 1992), p. 48.

Some characteristics of recent demographic developments need to be noted.

* The Muslim population has shown a very rapid growth. At a rate of 3 per cent per annum, it is about four times the growth of the Slav population. At this rate of increase they are likely to exceed 100 million by early in the next Century.⁶

* The decline in Russian population is marked.⁷ It is on two counts. First, a low birth rate; and second, emigration. Though movement away from the CAR has slowed on account of the severe adverse conditions in Russia itself, but sudden outbreak of violence or change in policy, such as declaration of regional scripts as official languages, can alter the scene as has happened recently in Tajikistan.⁸ The Russian exodus adversely affects industry and economy as they still form the bulk of the experienced managerial and bureaucratic work force, which in turn affects security, not the least because of growing Russian impatience with such developments.

* Next, is the question of preponderance of Uzbeks in the population of the CAR. Today they number over 16 billion and are 33 per cent of the overall population. They are present in all the Republics but predominate in the Fergana valley and especially the rural areas of the CAR. They also extend into Afghanistan, where again they are a factor to contend with. This percentage is likely to rise as the Russian Population, which comes next, continues to decline.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITION

No other region has perhaps felt the beneficial effect of the socio-economic revolution in the erstwhile Soviet Union as much as Central Asia. This has been possible entirely because of the positive discrimination that Moscow ensured in its favour. In terms of education, technical training and infrastructural facilities there have been both dramatic and substantial improvements. Per capita income today is around US \$ 3,000 even though this may presently appear somewhat unreal with the utter distortion of all Central Asian economies. In education, industrialisation, scientific training and investment, these Republics have all benefited greatly. Literacy alone has moved from a level of around 3 per cent 60 years ago to around 60 per cent today, a condition that contrasts sharply with all its southern neighbours. There was substantial industrialisation, even though much of it had been skewed and may need to be undone today. Enormous strides were made in scientific and technological training, though its full benefits were not utilised

by the people. But the ill effects of the socialistic structure persists. Corruption and nepotism are rampant. Lethargy and inefficiency hamper production, and now the breakdown in state structures is preventing central authority from being effective. A decline in industrial production had set in even before the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Suddenly the inadequacies of their centrally planned economies with their umbilical cord still tied to Moscow are becoming ever more apparent.

An example is the cotton production in Turkmenistan. Its cotton was being exported entirely to the factories in Russia except for only about 3 per cent that was processed locally.⁹ In exchange for this and its coal and iron ore, it was provided all its other requirements.¹⁰ The cotton could have been used locally to generate employment, but this issue could not even be seriously raised in the era of the Gosplan. As a result unemployment continues to soar today. Uzbekistan wants to reduce cotton production and instead grow badly needed fruits and vegetables, but finds this transition neither easy nor quick enough for their immediate needs.¹¹ The sudden severance from the Soviet economy has affected most of these states adversely. Without cheap fuel from Russia, and in the absence of other viable economic linkages or massive assistance from other sources, there is a real danger of the region once again slipping into underdevelopment.¹²

ISLAMIC REVIVALISM

Over a period of sixty years, especially during the Stalin regime, the Communist Party attempted to curb religious practices with a firm hand. But somehow the people generally adjusted to this policy without entirely giving up the inner core of their religion. Now there is a sudden resurgence of Islam in all the Republics. To a great extent this may be due to long denial but it is also in keeping with trends elsewhere around the globe. One of the factors for this may have been the rise of Ayatollah Khomeini, but this does not sufficiently explain the phenomenon.¹³

Religious revivalism may said to have commenced from around 1987. In recent years there has been a greater observance of Islamic rites, adoption of 'Asslamwalaikum' as a form of greeting, religious marriages, performance of daily prayers and attendance at mosques. There has also been a phenomenal increase in the construction of religious places. A number of 'madrassas' have opened, particularly in Azerbaijan and Tajikistan. The number of people who performed the Haj in 1991 showed a sharp increase, notwithstanding the enormous cost of such an undertaking in the present condition of economic depression. Fifty million copies of the Holy Koran were reported to have

been printed in the region in 1989 alone apart from substantial gifts from Saudi Arabia and Iran.¹⁴

What we are witnessing today is not only resurgence or revival of an ancient and dormant religion, but something much more fundamental. But the very term 'fundamentalism' when referring to Islam is both a misnomer and highly inadequate. 'Fundamentalism' is a Christian shorthand meant to describe born again protestants who insist on the literal truth of the Bible. There is no Arabic or Islamic equivalent for this because Islam is per se 'fundamental'. For to a Muslim every condition and circumstance of life is governed by the Sunna and Sharia. There is no concept in Islam of the separation of the mosque from the State. Yet the very idea of going back in history to adhere to tenets laid down centuries ago, in an altogether different context, is what contradicts so sharply with modern day reality. Its basis of inequality between peoples and sexes, rigid adherence to Koranic strictures interpreted by Mullahs, denial of democracy in practice, rejection of a secular and tolerant approach and the identification of State with the Mosque - these are all elements of extreme radicalism which go against the grain of present day geo-politics, and is therefore, often seen as a security threat.

It is true that Islam has seldom unified nations and it is perhaps more fractious today than ever before. There are numerous sects and the Shia-Sunni divide is real and deep. There are Arabic and Persian influences and Southeast Asian Muslims have an altogether different alignment. Central Asian Muslims after their 70 years under Communist rule may well have lost their Islamic moorings. Yet, the 'fundamentalist' forces have a peculiar appeal, especially in times of economic distress, when a sense of wrong amongst the populace is heightened and where patriotic fervour is aroused by whichever ideologue has the pulpit at the moment. It is this Islamic reassertion, fuelled by ideological dogma and translated in conflictual terms that is perceived as threatening the west.

ISSUES OF ASIAN SECURITY

MILITARY FORCES AND CAPABILITIES

All Republics deployed significant members of Red Army units prior to the break-up of the Soviet Union and especially at the time of the Afghan War. In 1992 these were to be put under the overall command of the CIS Armed Forces and were to remain deployed here as before. Many problems have arisen on this issue. While the CAR provide a bulk of the soldiers because of their higher recruitable male population, the proportion of officers was higher from the Slav Republics. Redeployment of these soldiers now

returning from the other Republics of the erstwhile Soviet Union, and the need to provide them with accommodation and employment, arranging for the repatriation of the Russian troops, are all issues that are engaging the serious attention of the leadership in all these Republics. These are problems that cannot be resolved early. A brief assessment of the military situation is necessary.

Kazakstan had originally supported the formation of the Joint General Purpose Forces of the CIS. Later it changed its stand. On 20 Apr 1992 it claimed command of the 14th Army stationed in the Republic. Again on 8 May 1992 it formed its own armed forces and transferred the property and forces of the CIS under its own jurisdiction.¹⁵ Currently it is said to have around 25,000 troops.¹⁶

Uzbekistan and Kirghistan are also probably going to set up their own armed forces as well while at the same time supporting with conscripts the CIS forces through volunteers. Kirghistan may have an Army of 5,000 soldiers with 7,000 in reserve.¹⁷ Uzbekistan probably has as yet a force of only one brigade of 700 soldiers.¹⁸

Tajikistan projects a different and complex picture. Located north of Afghanistan with the same ethnic population on both sides of the border, problems on either side are bound to affect the other. The prolonged fights between the supporters of Nabiev and the Islamic Renaissance Party have effectively bifurcated the country into two. The CIS 201 Motorised Rifle Division has managed to keep out of this turmoil, but only just. Some of its officers have been killed and reinforcements were sent from the other Republics for its extraction. Should the Russian people suffer, the neutrality of this or other formations in the region can hardly be assured. Warring factions here are said to possess some 80,000 rifles as well as some artillery and mortars and could pose more than a symbolic challenge.¹⁹

These are very substantial developments over one year in the CAR. But the future remains uncertain. The existence of the CIS itself is in doubt. Ukraine, the second most important Republic in the CIS is determined to be out of it. Economic linkages, strong as they are, do not seem enough to hold them together. The position of the Joint Command Forces is uncertain. How will these be employed in internal security environment that may deteriorate rapidly? The 201 Motorised Rifle Division which was deployed in southern Tajikistan showed admirable restraint, but would this apply in all cases? According to Marshal Shaposhnikov the CIS forces will not be drawn in to settle armed conflicts on the territory of the Commonwealth. They would be used solely to guard strategic sites in the CIS.²⁰

THE NUCLEAR DIMENSION

Kazakstan is the only Asian country other than China to have declared nuclear weapons on its territory. It has a total of 1340 strategic nuclear weapons and was said to have had 650 tactical nuclear weapons on its territory. Details of these holdings are shown separately for all the erstwhile Soviet Republics at Tables I & II. There was considerable speculation as to what will happen to these weapons once the overall responsibility of the Soviet Union ceased. Initially President Nazarbayev had stated that it would keep its nuclear weapons for another 15 years.²¹

At the same time in Washington in May 1992, President Nazarbayev agreed to sign the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty as a non nuclear weapon power.²² It signed the Treaty later in London. The strategic nuclear weapons in Kazakstan's possession are for delivery by 104 SS 18 missiles from two launch sites and by 40 Tu-95H (Bear) heavy bombers.²³ However, by Oct 1992 he changed his Government's position. In a major policy statement, he said that, Kazakstan did not become a nuclear state of its own accord. The Republic had overcome this problem by signing the Lisbon Protocol on 23 May 1992 and had assumed all the obligations of the former USSR under the START 1 Treaty. Since Kazakstan now is recognised as a participant of the Treaty and will be involved in further negotiations in connection with setting up the collective security system with the seven CIS states, Kazakstan has now relinquished its original intention to remain a nuclear state until all nuclear warheads have been destroyed. Therefore, in accordance with START 1, in the course of the next 7 years, ie. by 1999, Kazakstan will be cutting its nuclear armaments in the same proportion which would have been applicable to the Soviet Union. At the same time Kazakstan and Russia, bound by their defence treaty will decide for themselves where to station these nuclear weapons in the future.²⁴ The latter will possibly be within Russian territory as the USA has asked. It is also likely that in tune with the acceptance of START I provisions, Kazakstan will also accede to START II provisions in the same manner.

TABLE 1 STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE CIS

<i>Republic</i>	<i>Sites or Bases</i>	<i>Launchers</i>	<i>Warheads</i>	<i>%</i>
Russia				
ICBM	24	1,064	4,278	
HB	4	122	367	
SLBM	2	940	2,804	
Sub-total: warheads in Russia			7,449	72

Ukraine

ICBM	2	176	1,240	
IIB	2	101	168	
Sub-total: warheads in Ukraine			1,408	14

Kazakhstan

ICBM	2	104	1,040	
IIB	1	40	320	
Sub-total: warheads in Russia			1,346	13

Belarus

ICBM	2	54	54	<1
Total ICBM	28	1,398	6,612	
Total IIB	7	263	855	
Total SLBM	2	940	2,804	

Total Warheads			10,271	100
----------------	--	--	--------	-----

TABLE 2 TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE CIS

Republic	Ground	Air Defence	Air Force	Navy	Total	%
Russia	2,600	1,450	1,750	2,750	8,550	60
Ukraine	930	125	1,050	500	2,605	18
Kazakhstan	450	125	75	-	650	5
Belarus	270	125	575	150	1,120	8
Other republics	420	575	285	-	1,280	9
Total					14,205	100

SOURCE: William Walker, "Nuclear Weapons and the Former Soviet Republics", *International Affairs*, Vol 68, No. 2, p. 258 & 260

There was considerable speculation regarding tactical nuclear weapons in the Republics. Major Soviet formations all had these weapons on their establishment which were held at central depots. Marshal Shaposhnikov emphasised again on 12 Oct 92 at Moscow, that these have already been moved to facilities in the Russian Federation.²⁵

SECURITY IMPLICATIONS

Given this backdrop it is important to consider the crises that may emerge and the threats they pose to security. There are three characteristics that are relevant. One is of artificial borders that were imposed entirely

arbitrarily. As a result there are many unsettled if not disputed boundaries. The one between Kazakhstan and China has been made even more complex by recent events.

Next is the potential for ethnic conflict, which may be seen atleast in two dimensions. One is of inter-ethnic problems and the other that of the rise of radical ethnic nationalism. Inter-ethnic conflict is not restricted merely to different ethnic minorities, but is likely to take on progressively an anti-Russian orientation. These are all likely to aggravate atleast in the near term. It has now been accepted that change over to a market economy will be a slow and painful process. Before things get better it will certainly get much worse atleast in the initial stages than what prevailed under the command economy. The conditions in Central Asia are particularly bad and the prospects even more gloomy. In times of economic difficulties inter-ethnic clashes become even more likely as recent events have already demonstrated. In Kirgiztan in Jun 1990 some 200 peoples were killed as Uzbeks rose against the Kirgiz. The former had strong economic interests whereas the latter controlled the political structure. The potential for anti-Russian programs too is huge, especially if anticipated economic progress does not materialise.²⁶

Radical ethnic nationalisms are more likely in the politically backward Republics. Anti-Uzbek feelings are probably next only to anti-Russian sentiments in the CAR save in Uzbekistan. There are 17 million Uzbeks in Uzbekistan and several million more in the other Republics making them the largest ethnic community. Uzbek assertiveness has manifested itself frequently in the past and with violent consequences.²⁷ There are other ethnic tribes that spill over national frontiers complicating an already serious problem of national identity.

The years immediately ahead are likely to be extremely uncertain and unpredictable. It appears quite likely that the CIS will not last many months. Economic difficulties in Russia continue to mount causing great anxiety. President Yeltsin had a turbulent time at the Conference of People's Deputies and is again more popular abroad than in his own country, just as Gorbachev was during 1990-91. How long will Yeltsin and his policies last? His Foreign Minister dealt a severe shock to the world at a recent international conference regarding what might then happen.

The prognostication of economic transition in Central Asia can only be more pessimistic than in Russia. An optimistic time frame was spelt out by President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan in a major strategy speech for his country on 16 May 92.²⁸ According to this it will take another 20 years in three stages before the nation can join the ranks of "new industrial countries". But even

in this estimation, the first phase of "normalisation of the consumer market", which is the most critical scheme has again optimistically been put at three years.²⁹ On present reckoning a peaceful transition may have at best a chance of one in three. What then are the likely scenarios if things do not go well?

One, is the re-establishment of Russian domination. With or without support from Moscow, the indigenous Russian population alongwith the Russian Army still in the Republics can reassert their authority through force. Without Moscow's overt support and that of its Army, it is unlikely that such a situation can develop. Given the low morale in Russia and its total involvement in its internal problems, such an adventure will only be possible if there is a change in Russia itself and if there is severe provocation. Whether it will bring stability is debatable, but it will surely lead to open confrontation with Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan supported by Pakistan and the West. The overwhelming hostility towards the Russian population by the ethnic minorities and the recent historic memory of the war in Afghanistan, makes this an unlikely contingency.

Another possibility is the balkanisation of the region into its separate ethnic nationalities. Given the existing cleavages between various ethnic groups and fierce tribal loyalties, this can hardly be discounted. This is the pattern that may well come about in neighbouring Afghanistan and give an impetus through the ethnic Tajiks and Uzbeks to the other nationalities in the Republics. If there is no major power involvement, the world may not be unduly concerned and let the situation continue on its own momentum. Existing international mechanisms are unable to deal with such situations, and major power involvement in a much less important part of the globe is unlikely. But given the presence of the Russian population here and the Kazakhs and Kirgis overflowing into China, it is possible that these two countries will watch such developments with more than benign interest. There will be major temptations to aid and intervene in favour of their own people and ethnic groups. This and the presence of nuclear weapons here, may well engulf other powers into this turmoil.

The last possibility is the region emerging as an unified Islamic or Turkic community. If the ethnic separatisms can be contained this would well be a likely option. Presently, it appears that notwithstanding Iranian, Saudi or Pakistani overtures, the Republics are more keen to move towards Turkey, with its European connection. If this were to come about the chances are that the orientation will be more towards secularism and modernism. There may continue to be a certain amount of tension with its neighbour in the South, notwithstanding many protestations of Islamic cooperation from both sides. The other option, of greater integration with Iran and Pakistan will be a

more pronounced move towards Islamic fundamentalism. This is what the West and other secular minded nations would wish to avoid.

CONCLUSION

The Central Asian drama is a continuing one. What sort of a new Great Game will emerge? The CAR is not a candidate for a major power confrontation, nor is it likely that the USA will be enticed to intervene, no matter what the circumstances are. It is also unlikely that Central Asia will itself emerge as a powerful entity. Prospects of unification too are not bright, even though they have recently mooted a proposal for an "United Central Asia" at their recent Summit at Tashkent on 4 Jan 93.³⁰ Each Republic is actually siezed with the vital task of creating viable independent nation states, of which there are no immediate precedence. They are also ethnically divided. Islam will be an unlikely integrating factor. The major strategic issue then is of possible disintegration along ethnic lines, as in Yugoslavia. Should such a situation come about, what will be the role of the nations along its periphery? This is perhaps the major strategic question that will confront us in the immediate future.

NOTES

1. George Mirsky, *Current History*, Oct 1992, p. 334.
2. For a recent study of this topic, refer to Peter Hopkirk's, *The Great Game*, London, John Murray, 1990.
3. *Newsweek*, 3 February 1992, p. 17.
4. Shamsuddin, "Demographic Changes and Nationality Problems in Soviet, Central Asia", *Central Asian Survey*, Vol 9, No 1, 1990, p. 81.
5. *Current Digest of Soviet Press*, Vol 42, No. 31.
6. Warikoo, "Dynamics of Change in Soviet Central Asia", in *World Affairs*, New Delhi, Vol. 3, Dec 1991, p. 48, quoting Shamsuddin, "Demographic Changes and Nationality Problems in Soviet Central Asia", in *Perestroika and Nationalist Question in USSR*, Delhi, 1990, p. 96.
7. Warikoo, *Ibid*, p. 48.
8. *Current Digest of Soviet Press*, Vol. 42, No. 31.
9. *Izvestia*, 19 Apr 1989.
10. n.5.
11. FBIS-SOV-92-062, 31 Mar 1992, p. 60.
12. Madhavan K Palat, "The Emerging Blocs - Siawi and other Unions", *Frontline*, (New Delhi), 17 Jan 92, p. 20.
13. For a recent study, see *Muslims in Central Asia*, ed by Jo-Ann Gross, Denham, Duke University Press, 1992.

14. Neelam Mathews, "Islam in the Soviet Union", *Hindustan Times*, 12 Nov 1989.
15. *Military Balance 1992-93*, (IISS, London), p. 127.
16. Ibid, p. 133.
17. Ibid, p. 127-8.
18. Ibid, p. 138.
19. FBIS-SOV-92-197, 9 Oct 92, p. 34.
20. FBIS-SO-92-198, 13 Oct 92, p. 6.
21. FBIS-SOV-92-036, 4 May 92, p. 47.
22. FBIS-SOV-92-098, 20 May 92, p. 55.
23. n. 24, p. 133.
24. FBIS-SOV-92-194, 6 Oct 92, p. 47.
25. n. 29.
26. n. 12, p. 15.
27. Ibid.
28. FBIS-SOV-92-098, 20 May 92, p. 64.
29. Ibid.
30. *The Economic Times*, New Delhi, 7 Jan 93.

Service to the Services

CANTEEN STORES DEPARTMENT

"ADELPHI"

119, MAHARSHI KARVE ROAD,
BOMBAY - 400 020

IN PURSUIT OF ENHANCED CONSUMER
SATISFACTION TO OUR VALIANT
ARMED FORCES

History and Strategy

AIR MARSHAL H K OBERAI, PVSM, AVSM, VM (RETD)

In 1950, strategy emerged in the USA as a new field of study. Major work was done at RAND by thinkers like Bernard Brodie, Thomas Schelling, Albert Wohlstetter and William Kaufmann. Some others like William Fellner were active at other centres. The author contends, that this extraordinary intellectual activity reached a dead end around 1966 and nothing notable in the approach to nuclear issues has emerged thereafter.

Trachtenberg has brought out, that even after the nuclear attack on Hiroshima and Nagasaki there was no appreciable shift in the USAF's concepts on strategic bombing for some years. The civilian strategists however believed, that while an all out war had become an absurdity, yet nuclear threat could be exploited for political objectives. But with the arrival of Hydrogen Bomb and deliverable means at the disposal of both super powers - 'nuclear revolution' as the author terms it - pursuit of such a concept became unworkable. The emphasis now shifted to 'deterrence through retaliation'. But soon, the explosive power of even the fission devices reached one MT from the 12 KT dropped over Hiroshima and a view emerged that a nuclear war had become unthinkable. It would amount to national suicide and surely this could not be the national objective. Clausewitz's time tested linkage of war with political objectives seemed to become obsolete. But some others held the belief that war, though gigantic violence, was planned and controlled violence and the offensive could be conducted in a deliberate way to serve basic political objectives. Manipulation of risk appeared a good strategy, where difficult decisions could be put in the lap of the enemy. Nevertheless, the progressive loss of control by both sides over a situation which could be the cause of a major conflict, remained unreconciled.

Deterrence was considered workable only up to a certain point and thereafter it could not be divorced from the question of use. Thus, target selection assumed fundamental importance. Since there would be no time for mobilisation, targetting of industrial bases was considered pointless. Targetting of cities barring the exploitation of power to hurt offered no real military advantage. Engagement of counter-force targets promised the best results.

* *History and Strategy* by Marc Trachtenberg, (New Jersey : Princeton University Press, 1991). p. 292, \$ 14.95, ISBN 0691 - 07881-5.
Air Marshal H K Oberai was Senior Air Staff Officer of an Operational Air Command and Principal Staff Officer at Air H.Q.

In this, the Soviets at the time appeared vulnerable. As per available evidence, out of five Soviet bomber bases only three were protected by SAMs. Their nuclear weapons were unmarried and stored 90 - 100 KMs away. The Americans though were better placed, but could not survive a surprise attack and yet launch an effective retaliatory strike. Mutual vulnerability placed a premium on surprise and pre-emption. It was feared that vulnerability may become the primary cause for war. Mutual deterrence quite obviously was not automatic.

Paradoxically the solution appeared in leaving each others strategic forces alone. The alternative i.e. pre-emption and a protected retaliatory capability was no better. It was interactive and caused instability. Such was the position till the end of 1950s when civilian strategists at RAND proposed two radically different ways of looking at nuclear issues :-

(a) *Stability Doctrine*. At its heart it accepted that vulnerability of strategic forces is destabilising and there is premium on pre-emption. Negotiated arms control achieves stability. Rough parity is supportive of this objective, whereas strong counter-force capability could be a constraint. The doctrine implied, that nuclear threat 'implied or overt' could not be the ultimate basis of policy.

(b) *Controlled and Discriminate General War*. This entailed the destruction of military targets, but cities were to be spared and used as hostages for a war of coercion and bargaining. Nuclear forces here carried some political weight.

To many, the two appeared inconsistent and second strike counter-force capability was preferred even though it stood in the way of negotiations. The problem of instability was considered as inherent in nuclear warfare. The author believes, that no clear cut solutions could emerge as purely military side of war causation became the focus of analysis. The basic insight of Clausewitz was somehow overlooked. The thinkers failed to examine the historical process and the way the political and military interacts with each other not just in times of war or crisis but in more normal times as well. The study thus remained 'ahistorical'.

It has been highlighted that whichever way the strategists turned there were problems. But in the latter chapters, the author himself reveals that the on going historical process by itself was providing some answers though not in full and in an indirect manner.

In 1958, the USSR fearing the nuclearisation of West Germany, where

control of such weapons could rest with the Federal Government, announced that it intends to sign a peace treaty with East Germany. The rights of Western powers with regard to Berlin, which the USSR had recognised in an agreement signed in 1944, were declared null and void. The Soviets proposed that West Berlin be transformed into a 'free city' and gave the West six months to negotiate a settlement of Berlin issue. While the Western powers willy nilly accepted the juridical order in Central Europe based on status quo, they refused to forego their rights in West Berlin. Realising the Western resolve, the Soviets after 4 - 5 years of discussions/consultations, finally backtracked. Their ICBM fleet was comparatively smaller but nonetheless, this was a classic case of 'how to apply pressure without appearing to give an ultimatum'.

It may seem strange today, but during the Cuban missile crisis the Russians even though aware of a possible American pre-emptive strike, did not make any preparation for a general war. The strategic balance which was in favour of the US was important but ultimately the balance of resolve proved crucial. The Soviets seeing that a point of no return had been reached agreed to withdraw their missiles. The threshold of acceptable risk was higher in this crisis. It also became clear, that nuclear weapons could be used for achievement of limited political objectives.

Marc Trachtenberg concludes by saying, that strategy hit a dead end in the mid 1960s. This is only partially true. Undoubtedly the subject lay dormant for over a decade, but then it took a new dimension. A clue to this is provided by the author himself. He emphasises that USA - USSR relations are interactive and the Soviet response, its nature and cost, should be factored in all original calculations. The development of star wars and other military systems with the cutting edge of technology by the US was the logical extension of nuclear strategy. The USSR not only lacked the requisite technology but just could not bear the economic burden of these programmes. Active pursuance of these programmes by Reagan administration clinched the issue at least for the foreseeable future.

The book is illuminating and fascinating reading. Our countrymen who favour the signing of NPT would benefit the most by it. How do you face an adversary or negotiate with him as an equal when you suffer from nuclear asymmetry?

Pakistan - The Socio Economic Factors Involved in Emergence of Bhutto and Gen Zia-Ul-Haq as Political Leaders *

BRIG SUBHASH KAPILA

Professionals in India whether military or civil tend to arrive at very simple summations on the factors that have enabled emergence of leaders in Pakistan. The rise of political leaders like Bhutto at the helm of affairs in Pakistan or the emergence of the late President Zia-ul Haq as the military dictator of Pakistan with the longest tenure in office are attributed to the interplay of politico-military factors amongst the political and military elites of Pakistan. Very few delve deeper into an analysis of the prevailing socio-economic environment or socio-economic factors that enabled the emergence of leaders like Bhutto and Gen Zia-ul Haq. It is in this important field of analysis that Shahid Javed Burki, a Pakistani citizen who is Director of the China Deptt at the World Bank, has stepped in to produce the present work under review, which is a revised second edition of his original work of the same name authored in 1979.

The book is set in four parts - Part-I Backdrop; Part II- The Regime in Power, 1971-77 (i.e. the Bhutto regime), Part III - The Fall from Power and Part IV - The Bhutto Legacy. Since the author has not attempted to lay forth a chronological history of Pakistani politics in the period covered but has attempted analysis of the socio-economic causes leading to each major political development in Pakistan, each of the parts of the book deserve detailed reading to fully comprehend the major conclusions that he has arrived at in this analytical work and that is the role of the Pakistani middle class.

In brief the author contends that it was the Muslim urban middle class which spearheaded the movement for the creation of Pakistan and dominated events during 1940-53. It was the Pakistani urban middle class of students, lawyers and journalists which enabled the rise to power of Bhutto in 1970-71. It was the Pakistani middle class again that was responsible for the fall of Bhutto when in 1974 he changed tracks and his populist economic policies of land distribution hit the middle class farmers and the urban trading community. The Pakistani middle class totally broke away in 1977 when

* *Pakistan under Bhutto, 1971-77* by Shahid Javed Burki, London, Macmillan, 1988, p. 285, £ 10.99, ISBN 0-333-45085-X.

Brigadier Subhash Kapila is a Research Scholar with the University of Allahabad.

Bhutto, sensing their hostility tried to reach out to two opposite ends of the Pakistani social strata; the rich landlords and the industrial and rural power.

In an interesting analysis for the military professional the author shows that professional training and environment detached from politics do not provide sufficient explanation for the behaviour of military in Pakistan and that the answer lay in the changing social composition of the Pakistani officer cadre. While the first generation of Pak senior military officers was from aristocratic families and moulded in the Western pattern, the second generation was a product of an entirely different socio-economic environment and by the time the generation of Gen Zia-ul-Haq came at the helm, the Pak army officer cadre was decidedly middle class in origin and they could not be oblivious to political trends of the Pak middle class outside, and more-so when they had grown up and been educated along with their political leaders and hence a harmonisation of interests took place between the two. In explaining the contradiction as to how the first generation of Pak generals trained in the apolitical Western mould felt tempted to intervene in politics, the author concludes that Pak Generals too would have had the same attitudes as Indian Generals of the period had an institutional structure been quickly constructed to support political development in Pakistan.

This review would be incomplete if the author's conclusions about the emergence of Gen Zia-ul-Haq are not quoted briefly. In the author's analysis, Gen Zia-ul-Haq unlike Ayub and Yahya emerges in the 'role of facilitator rather than a perpetrator' of political events in Pakistan and as the author states that "what gave the middle classes tremendous political power was the remarkable change that had occurred in the social composition of the armed forces". The generation of senior military officers that put a reluctant Gen Zia into power, men like General K.M. Arif, Said Qadar, Jahandad Khan, Malik Ghulam Gilani, Akhtar Abdul Rahman Khan and Mirza Aslam Beg, like Gen Zia himself had strong urban middle class roots.

The Islamization of Pakistan credited to Zia and his unusually long tenure at the helm of Pakistan for nine years is traced to Zia's empathy and psychological consonance with the 'shurafaa' (people who order their lives to 'adab') of the Pakistani middle class and their concept of 'adab' (ethical and practical norms that regulate the life of a good Muslim). The 'shurafaa' had brought down a charismatic leader like Bhutto when they saw that Bhutto's political and economic policies were letting 'nafs' (without principles) overpower "aql" (the facility of moral discrimination and discipline). Hence once again a harmonisation of interests occurred in Pakistani political environment between the Pakistan military and the 'shurafaa'.

Part IV which is an analysis of "The Bhutto's Legacy" is equally interesting. The author opines that in the history of modern Muslim South Asia only two charismatic leaders stand out -- Jinnah and Bhutto. Both shared common heritage of Sindhi background, belonging to the Shia sect, elitist Western style upbringing and with mass following though devoid of parties with strong organisational base. Despite their strong personal popular appeal, Jinnah's legacy was a 'moth eaten' truncated Pakistan while that of Bhutto was a vaguely understood approach towards politics termed as "Bhuttoism". What he could have given Pakistan were credible political institutions, and a constitution that could not be subverted, and a political party that could synthesise the hopes and aspirations of the main strata of Pak social structure i.e. the under-privileged, the middle class and the elite. The author concludes that for the under-privileged, Bhuttoism means the promise of alleviating their economic conditions, for the middle class Bhuttoism has a negative connotation as attacks on the 'shurafaa' and for the elite it means a political and economic arrangement to win over the under-privileged without making major economic sacrifices themselves. With that a final judgement is pronounced that with Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party unlikely to achieve a synthesis of three different aspirations and the different interpretation of Bhuttoism, his legacy to his own party itself is not an easy one.

Bhutto in this book, therefore, appears no different a politician or a committed democrat as made out by a section of our intelligentsia or in the West. Perhaps, his pronouncements on socialism, non-alignment and penchant for foreign policy initiatives may have given him more limelight than other Pakistani politicians. To substantiate this, one could quote Omar Noman, *The Political Economy of Pakistan 1947-53* (London KPI Ltd. 1988 # p. 107) "Had the PPP taken its responsibility for creating a democratic structure seriously it would have ensured that the mechanism for transfer of power to an alternative civilian government would not be disturbed. The rigging of the 1977 elections provided distasteful evidence that the PPP had abandoned its commitment to a free, democratic structure. It had degenerated into a party of patronage, dominated by the traditional rural elite and reliant on Bhutto's populist appeal to retain mass support".

Shahid Javed Burki amply analyses the 'hows' and 'whys' of Bhutto's loss of populist appeal. A fascinating and penetrating analytical book arriving at its conclusions without lapsing into heavy reading. A recommended reading for all serious observers of Pakistan's political environment and developments and their underpinnings.

Para Operations in the Burmese Campaign

LT GENERAL S N SHARMA, PVSM (RETD)

Sangshak was a fiercely fought battle with horrendous casualties on both sides; it passed almost unnoticed into history, over shadowed by the larger events which followed immediately after. Yet it had a crucial effect on the outcome of the Japanese offensive of March 1944, directed at Imphal, Kohima, and their links to the railhead at Dimapur. We now have an authentic book, widely and analytically researched, recounting the events leading upto Sangshak, a blow by blow account of the fighting, and the aftermath.

Harry Seaman was in the thick of it with 153 Para Battalion; he presents a story, with personalities and individuals vividly adding life to the facts collected from varied sources, including the Japanese, and leaves one wondering at the courage of fighting men and the politics of high command, even in war.

The Japanese offensive was expected; but they achieved surprise by their ability to move with unexpected strength and speed across terrain judged unsuitable for a major thrust. Anticipating the main offensive from Tiddim towards Imphal, IV Corps staff is described as near paralysed with indecision when the diversionary attack expected on the north flank turned out to be a powerful thrust, aimed at Ukhrul, Kohima, Dimapur, and Imphal from that side. The book analyses much of what happened, along with the personalities involved, which led to undue losses and running battles, whereas plans were to withdraw into Imphal in good time to fight on favourable ground with a well prepared defense. Seaman lays much of the blame on Lt. Gen Scoones, and, in the aftermath, attributes to him and his staff a monstrous cover up in which the defenders at Sangshak, 50 Para Brigade, became the scapegoats. Such things do happen in the politics of higher command, at which the British are particularly adept; it was made easier because the Japanese side of Sangshak was not known and rumours that "two para battalions ran away" could well be believed until the Japanese efforts and casualties became known long after the war in 1946.

The Battle at Sangshak : Burma, March 1944, by Harry Seaman, London, Leo Cooper, 1989. p. 148, £ 12.95, ISBN 0-85052-720-1.

Lt Gen SN Sharma a Sapper and a distinguished paratrooper was the Engineer-in-Chief, Army HQ, India.

All this does not detract from the stirring narrative of the actual fighting. We read of C Company 152 Para Bn, "on guard against small enemy patrols", suddenly being confronted by overwhelming numbers of Japanese - more than 900 counted in the first half hour. They held the first attack on 19 March afternoon, but by 20th only a few incoherent survivors made it back. We learn from the Japanese of their heroic fight, of about 20 men making a last desperate charge, and the British Officer shooting himself rather than being taken prisoner - all in the finest traditions of their samurai enemy.

Alerted, warned, 50 Para Brigade gathered into a defense perimeter on the village hill top at Sangshak along with 4/5 Marathas and 15 (Jhelum) Mountain Battery. The battle went on from 22 March to 26th, with the Japanese at their bravest, determined to eliminate Sangshak rather than by pass and contain it - a crucial decision which delayed their offensive, and resulted in such heavy casualties that it contributed to their failure to capture Kohima, the objective for 58 Japanese Regiment. We have accounts of many gallant actions, of guns firing at 100 yards being captured and recaptured, of the precarious situation on 26 March, when a brave Japanese, Capt Nishida, led 120 men to nearly overcome the defense, but was finally beaten off with only eight survivors, all wounded.

That night Imphal ordered the Brigade to evacuate Sangshak : air supply had continued, but failed to fall within the perimeter in sufficient quantity, while no land relief was possible. The garrison managed to extricate themselves and fight their way back. They left behind 150 casualties who could not be moved. In a notably uncharacteristic gesture for that time, the Japanese meted out "humane and sometimes even compassionate" treatment to the wounded and prisoners.

In his order of the day, Slim paid tribute to the staunchness of the defence, which earned time for the readjustment of defences at Imphal. Years later, Nishida, who so nearly won the day at Sangshak, said his regiment had never met so determined an enemy. 50 Para Brigade, battered, continued on to parachute into battle at Elephant Point in 1945, including Harry Seaman who survived to write this book. The heaviest casualties were borne by 152 Para Bn of mixed battalions of today, but at that time a very suspect concept in the Indian Army. The battle demonstrated once again that all the Indian soldier asks for is to be led by officers of courage and good heart, and with them he will cheerfully go to the gates of hell, no matter what he has to face.

Options in Kashmir

MAJ GENERAL S C SINHA, PVSM (RETD)

This book is a lucid and a discerning analysis of the intractable Kashmir tangle, which has been a long festering sore on the body-politic of both India and Pakistan. The presentation of this complicated problem, which has dogged the relations between the two nations ever since their independence, has been presented in a very interesting and concise form. It brings out clearly why, inspite of two major sub-continental wars, this problem has defied any solution and continues to remain a major reason for bitterness between the two countries.

Dr Kadian has wisely traced the relevant historical background of Kashmir thus making for a better understanding of the intricate situation by helping to put it in its proper perspective. The causes of the problem have been objectively brought out by giving details of the part played by the British, Indians and Pakistanis and by personalities like Lord Mountbatten, Pandit Nehru, Sheikh Abdullah and others.

What comes out clearly in the early part of the book is the very competent manner in which the newly formed Army Headquarters in Delhi handled the initial induction of Indian troops into Kashmir. It also brings out the glorious part played by these brave men in saving the Valley, against heavy odds, from the depredations of the ruthless Pakistani tribesmen, who did not spare even their co-religionists. In stark contrast is the inept handling of the situation by the political leaders and later by the diplomats in presenting India's case before the United Nations. Also brought out is the inefficient way the counter-insurgency operations have often been handled in recent years because of the lack of proper orientation training of the para military forces who operate "as if they are fighting bandits of the Chambal ravines". This has sadly resulted in disastrous set backs, as was the case in the panic handling of the situation created at the funeral of the Mir Waiz. Thus many opportunities have been lost. The author is also right in emphasizing the deficiency resulting from a total lack of an unified command that is so essential to coordinate the operations of the several different security agencies employed for counter-insurgency duties and also to exploit the differences between the several disparate militant insurgent groups active in the Valley.

* *The Kashmir Tangle - Issues and Options* by Rajesh Kadian, (New Delhi : Vision Books, 1992) p. 194, Rs. 190/- ISBN 81-7094-101-6.

Maj General S C Sinha is the Director, United Service Institution of India. New Delhi.

In his concluding chapter the author discusses various Indian options. Inevitably there is mention of the option of an Indo-Pak War to finally settle the problem. In this he sees greater advantage in India limiting her operations to the mountainous terrain of J & K with the objective of occupying the tract of Kashmir occupied by the Pakistanis. In his examination, he, however, fails to take notice of the logistic difficulties of undertaking such operations at the end of a long and vulnerable line of communication. Nor does he seem to be aware of the disadvantage offensive operations have over defence in mountain terrain. Therefore, his recommended reduction of mechanised forces to offset his recommended increase in infantry required for additional mountain divisions can only prove counter-productive. In any case, the option of any war, to solve the Kashmir tangle, would certainly be the height of utter folly for both India and Pakistan.

ADVERTISEMENT RATES IN THE USI JOURNAL

Outer Cover Page (per issue)	Rs. 3,500/-
Four consecutive outer covers (four issues)	Rs. 12,000/-
Inner Cover Page (per issue)	Rs. 3,000/-
Four consecutive inner covers (four issues)	Rs. 10,000/-
Full Page (inside) per issue	Rs. 2,500/-
Full Page (inside) four issues	Rs. 8,000/-
Half Page (inside) per issue	Rs. 1,500/-
Half Page (inside) four issues	Rs. 5,000/-

Type size of advertisement page

11.5 cm X 20 cm

Screen for half tones

80

Published quarterly in April, July, October and January

The Story of the Indian Army

LT GENERAL A M VOHRA, PVSM IA (RETD)

The British conquered India on the strength of the Presidency Armies. The East India Company, which had been granted a charter on 31 Dec 1600 by Queen Elizabeth I to trade across the world and permitted by Emperor Jahangir's "Firman" in Jan 1613 to establish a trading post at Surat (which remained the headquarters of the Company's Western Indian trade until 1687, when it was succeeded by Bombay) supplemented its protective forces in 1683 by adding to it two companies of Rajputs each 100 strong and commanded by its own Rajput officers. This small force, auxiliaries to the Bombay-European troops, though not the first Indian soldiers of the English, may be regarded, in the opinion of Sir Patrick Cadell, as the beginning of the Indian Army. Similar forces were created by the Presidencies of Bengal and Madras establishing a Presidency Army system of small military units, composed of Europeans recruited from England, or locally, and of Indian auxiliaries.

From mid eighteenth century, the purely commercial nature of the company changed and it started getting involved in governance. The British and the French were also, as Penderel Moon puts it, in fact fighting a war of succession for the mastery of India after the Mughals. In this contest, the contending armies of the British and the French in India could only be augmented by Indian troops whose value began to be appreciated after each conflict. Before the battle of Plassey, in June 1757, Clive began to reorganise Indian troops in his command into regular battalions with a few European officers. In 1765, the Indian battalions were formed into brigades. By 1796 the Europeans in the military in India numbered about 13000 while the Indian troops numbered 57,000.

In 1752 Major Stringer Lawrence, who was appointed the Commander-in-Chief of the company's forces in India, was subsequently deemed by the English as "the father of the Indian Army".

From 1776 till 1857 the Bengal Army was almost entirely recruited from among the Purbias" and, till 1857 they were viewed as "brave and manly" and were mostly Brahmins and Rajputs. The Madras and Bombay

* *Fidelity & Honour : The Indian Army From the Seventeenth to the Twenty - First Century.* By Lt Gen S L Menezes, New Delhi, Viking, Penguin Books, 1993, p. 625, Rs. 295. ISBN 0-670-83995-7.

Lt General AM Vohra, who was the Vice Chief of the Army Staff Army HQ, New Delhi, India, is an internationally known expert on defence matters.

Armies contained a majority from their respective hinterlands. Some Pathans, Rohillas, Rajputs, Arabs and Abyssinians, were also enrolled in Bombay and even Madras. The 940 Madras soldiers, who had arrived with Robert Clive in Dec 1756, proved themselves. They marched from Falta and recaptured Calcutta in 1757.

After describing, the "Early Beginnings" in his book *"The Indian Army" from the 17th to the 21st century*, Stan Menezes, surveys, "The Presidency Armies in War Before 1857". As a consequence of Plassey, the English prospered and the Dutch influence declined. Buxar (1763) supplemented Plassey by strengthening the English hold over Bengal and Bihar. By 1765, the English had subdued as far as Allahabad, Benares, Faizabad, Lucknow and Emperor Shah Alam II sought British protection.

The Indian element of the Bengal Army was highly thought of. In 1767, Colonel Richard Smith had this to say, "Some of our sepoy battalions would astonish the King of Prussia as they astonish me". Again in 1803 after his campaign in the Deccan, mainly with Madras Army, after Assaye, Arthur Wellesley wrote, "The (Madras Army) sepoys astonished me". Yet the Sepoys suffered badly during the First Afghan War 1839-42 but that was because the war was a result of a gross strategic miscalculation and the lack of wisdom of retaining a British-Indian garrison in Kabul; "giving a semblance of permanent occupation, aggravated by the libertine behaviour of many British personnel with Afghan women". On 3 Nov 1841, tribesmen poured into Kabul and on 10 Dec, it was agreed that the British would be allowed to withdraw. In the event, they were ambushed and about 3000 were killed. Several hundred frost bitten Indian soldiers who subsequently returned from Afghanistan with the relief force, gave eye witness accounts that the British had been found wanting in leadership and courage. Menezes concludes that "the memory of First Anglo-Afghan War contributed to the 1857 Uprising - most Bengal Army units that had served in Afghanistan mutinying".

The author deals comprehensively with the 1857 mutiny which he feels "should more appropriately be referred to as the Indian Uprising of 1857, as segments of the civil population were also involved." Be that as it may, it started with the Bengal Army which "was employed on increasingly distant and difficult campaigns in Afghanistan, Sind and the Punjab, without corresponding improved prospects for the Indian sub-officers or enhanced emoluments for Indian ranks serving so far from Oudh and Bihar. On 27 Nov 1849, Sir Charles Napier, the then Commander-in-Chief, resigned in protest to Dalhousie's withdrawal of certain benefits from Bengal Army on the annexation of Punjab. On his return to Britain he wrote, "He (the Sepoy) is devoted to us as yet but we take no pains to preserve his attachment. It is no concern of mine shall be dead before what I foresee will take place but it will take place".

Another cause which contributed to the Uprising was the annexations carried out by Dalhousie under his 'doctrine of lapse' but to concentrate on Company's Indian troops, the author points out that since the disaster of the First Anglo Afghan War, the sepoy's faith declined and doubts in regard to their British officers increased. (At that time the Army in India was 313,500 Indian and 38,000 British).

From the first incidents in Feb-Mar 1857 in Behrampore and Barrackpore, the author deals in detail with the developments in Meerut, Chittagong, Lucknow, Cawnpore and other places and brings out many cases of inept handling by commanding officers which aggravated situations; a point relevant even today. This would be of considerable interest to the officer cadre of the armed forces.

The shattering experience of the Mutiny resulted in serious consideration in regard to the role of Indian troops. It was not possible to garrison the country only with British soldiers both on account of numbers and costs involved. A Royal Commission in 1859 concluded to depend mainly on Indians and fixed a ratio of 3:1, with all artillery units manned by the British. The actual strength soon after was 13,500 and 62,000 respectively.

In 1865 the forces consisted of the three Presidency Armies, the Punjab Frontier Force, the Hyderabad contingent and other local troops. Some consolidation took place in 1864 with a Central Audit and Accounts Department to be followed by Remounts in 1876 and the Ordnance Department in 1884. In 1886, Indian units were linked together by grouping 2 to 3 battalions which facilitated reinforcement of trained personnel to the battalions of the group in the field. In 1891 'Recruiting Depots' were established.

The Bombay Army reconstituted two Baluchistan Frontier Regts of Hazaras, Baluchis, Dogra Brahmins, Punjabi Mussalmans (PMs) and Sikhs. In 1893 class company system was introduced in lieu of general mixture. The same year sixteen Hindustani Regts of Bengal Army were made class (instead company class) regiments of Brahmins, Rajputs, Hindustani Mussalmans (HMs), Jats and Gurkhas.

In 1879 Army Organisation Commission had recommended the abolition of the Presidency Army system and the division of a unified Indian Army into 4 territorial Commands. This was implemented only in 1893 when the British Parliament abolished posts of Cs in C of Madras and Bombay armies and in 1895 the four commands; Punjab and NWFP, Bengal, Madras and Bombay, were established.

Apart from giving the story of the Indian Army from its early beginnings, of which I have tried to give the prospective reader a taste in this review, General Menezes' well researched book provides an insight into many landmarks in its history. The chapter on "The Kitchner Era and Kitchner-Curzon Dispute" makes fascinating reading.

Lord Kitchner reorganised the Army to face what he considered had now become its main task; to guard the frontiers against external aggression. A field force of nine divisions was constituted by closing down a number of small military stations. Of this, the Northern Army of five divisions was to guard the North Western front.

It is interesting to note that as late as 1911 there was reluctance to employing Indian troops against Europeans (except Russians) but the "Army in India Committee" appointed in 1912 recommended that while the Indian Army was not to be maintained with a view to meeting external Imperial obligations, it should be capable, when the Frontier situation allowed, of cooperating in overseas theatres.

In August 1914, the Indian Army was asked to provide two divisions for Egypt which were, in the event, sent to Marsailles. As the war proceeded the contribution of the Indian Army increased and by the end of World War I more than a million Indians served abroad, 60,000 were killed and 9,200 had been decorated including 11 VCs. In a subsequent chapter, the author records that "the First World War proved to be, as the Second World War was to prove later, both an engine and catalyst for social change, particularly for the millions who served in the Indian Army".

The chapters on Martial Race Dogma and Indianization of the Indian Army would be of deep interest to the present officer cadre. Even though partial Indianization was introduced in the civil and medical departments and the King was desirous in 1911, of announcing this in the Army also, "the 'cheek by jowl' mess life and the close daily association in the Army made the proposition different." However, in 1921, "with commendable courage, the Rawlinson Committee proposed the formal postulation of the eventual replacement of British by Indian officers, indigenous self-sufficiency, and the broadening of the base of all recruitment including that of officers." This was not acceptable to Whitehall. Meanwhile 39 cadets who passed out from Daly College, Indore in 1919 were granted temporary commissions; KM Cariappa being one of them.

From 1922, infantry battalions were grouped into regiments and redesignated. Cavalry regiments were reduced from thirty nine to twenty one.

Whitehall agreed to Indianization of 6 and 2 respectively. The first Indian artillery regiment was raised in 1935. It was the Second World War which speeded up the process of Indianisation. This the author covers fully in his chapter "The War Years", which also goes into the acceleration of the moves for the grant of self-government, inspite of Churchill's lack of confidence in the Indian Army due to the fall of Singapore and occupation of Burma and half truths communicated by him to Roosevelt.

The 4th and 5th Indian Divisions distinguished themselves under Wavell in Cyrenaica but it was after Auchinleck was appointed C-In-C in India in Jan 1941 that the expansion of the Indian Army started in earnest to ultimately reach a figure of over two million of the Indian Army that served during the war. He discarded the prevalent fixation of non-martial classes and of posting Indian officers over the British whenever necessity arose. The 1941 plan envisaged the raising of fifty new battalions. In due course "the mainly Indian 14th Army under General William Slim, repulsed the Japanese, and then inflicted on them the biggest defeat that their ground forces suffered in the Second World War."

There is a revealing chapter on the INA and the author ends the chapter on partition with a poignant observation, "Today, we should spare a thought for the very many like Maulana Azad, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Shah Nawaz Khan, Sir Shafat Ahmed, Badruddin Tyabji and Brigadier Mohammed Usman, more numerous than the protagonists of the two nation theory."

Chapter 15, The Nehru Years, portrays the Army's performance in the 1947-48 Jammu & Kashmir operation, the Police Action in Hyderabad and the melancholy lead upto as well as the conduct of the 1962 debacle succinctly. Performance under the UN as Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and Custodian Force supervising the exchange of prisoners of war on the end of the Korean War in 1953 is covered as also the task performed as United Nations Emergency Force to supervise Egyptian-Israeli cease fire in the Sinai from 1956 till June 1967.

After the Indian Army's reverses in 1962, President Radhakrishnan remarked, "War or no war, invasion or no invasion, attack or no attack, we must not be caught napping again. We must increase our strength..... Military weakness has been a temptation, a little military strength may be a deterrent." It was subsequently decided to raise the manpower ceiling of the Army to 825,000. This was in the process of being implemented when the 1965 war with Pakistan came. The political and military aspects of these hostilities are ably covered by the author. The Yahya-Bhutto combine's political mishan-

dling of East Pakistan which led to the 1971 war and the employment of the Army in counter-insurgency in Nagaland, Mizoram, as well as various internal security operations including 'Blue Star' are all covered objectively.

An extensively researched and well written book. The author has commendably achieved what he set out to do - to write a story of the Indian Army. In this context, it would be appropriate to end with two quotations from the 'Epilogue'. The first; Archibald Wavell at the time of his departure' in March 1947 said, "I believe that the stability of the Indian Army may perhaps be a deciding factor in the future of India. It has shown that all communities may work together to meet a common danger with comradeship and devotion." The second, the author rightly says, "The Indian Army's internal future is entirely in its own hands."



A RETIRED OFFICER'S VENTURE

JINDESH INTERNATIONAL (House of Non-conventional Energy Equipments) 6/8 Shanti Niketan, New Delhi-110021. Telephone: 67-1651 Cable: JESHI ONAL, Telex : 31-70079 - WILL-IN Fax : 31-6464342

SOLE DISTRIBUTOR IN INDIA FOR

- (a) RUTLAND WIND BATTERY CHARGER (UK) (UPTO 360 KW),
- (b) CALZONI, (ITALY) WIND GENERATOR UPTO 300 KW,
- (c) ADLER-25 WIND GENERATOR - (WEST GERMANY) UPTO 300 KW,
- (d) ECCOWATT MINI HYDEL PLANT (ITALY) UPTO 100 KW,
- (e) KIJITO WIND PUMPS IN COLLABORATION WITH INTERMEDIATE TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT GROUP, (UK) - HEAD 200 METERS,
- (f) PHOTO VOLTAIC MODULES, USA

All above equipments ideally suited for generation of power and charging of batteries in isolated forward locations. Wind battery chargers and wind generators start functioning with as low a wind velocity as 4 miles per hour and mini-hydel plant could function with all types of streams available in hilly areas.

Specific concessions to defence and para military units. For further details kindly write to **COL. R.N. KHANNA (Retd) AT THE ABOVE ADDRESS.**

Book Reviews

Alchemists of Revolution : Terrorism in the Modern World By Richard E. Rubenstein, London, I.B. Tauris, 1987, p. 263, £ 16.50, ISBN 1-85043-048-9.

First printed in 1987, one expert describes this as “—quite simply the most significant book on terrorism—”. We have a dispassionate, logical, comprehensive study and analysis of terrorist violence, leading to disturbing conclusions on the “Why” and “hows” of what now seems to have become congenital to our present day international system. One believes that terrorist violence is basically immoral; also that it is illegal and unnecessary in democratic societies, and in a modern world when constitutional and peaceful means are available to dissenters. However the facts, past and present, seem to indicate that terrorism is “both a response to government policies and an imitation of their style”, a “symptom of political instability and social change rather than a cause of these”. Terrorism or counter terrorism, both violate human rights and inflict violence on the innocent, but are judged according to which side one happens to be. Emotional reactions and the primitive urge for revenge are justified by one sided morality, creating cycles of repression and rebellion. There are so many variables in terrorist violence from those in power and those opposing them, that no government has yet developed and followed a consistent counter terrorist policy. No solution can be offered by the author, other than putting an end to “the continuing oppression of classes, nations, and ethnic communities”, in the hope that this will remove the causes of terrorism; one wonders how possible this can be in a human race filled with bigotry, intolerance, and ultranationalism, all in the name of God himself.

This book is well worth study by those going deep into terrorism and policies for counter terrorism. It is an excellent source for extracting information and concise guidelines for the many physically involved in fighting terrorists.

— Lt Gen S N Sharma, PVSM (Retd)

The Green House Effect : A Practical Guide to our Changing Climate. By Stewart Boyle & John Ardill, Kent, Hodder & Stoughton, 1989, p. 298, £ 3.50.

This planet that we inhabit and flourish on, is constantly undergoing minor fluctuations of temperature, which, presently is about 15°C. The hottest period in the last 1,00,000 years was only 1° higher. The last Ice Age of the earth, about 18,000 years ago, was only 4°C colder, while the little Ice Age in the 17/18th Century occurred when the surface temperature was only lower by 1°.

The precarious balance in the temperature within the atmospheric globe around the planet is ensured by the Green House effect, first described by Baron Jean Baptiste Fourier in 1827. It involves, firstly, the filtering away of the short wave ultra-violet content from rays of the sun, by the Ozone layer in the stratosphere, and secondly, controlling and monitoring the escape of heat energy emitted by the earth,

by Ozone in the troposphere and other gases like carbon-dioxide, methane, nitrous oxides and chloro-fluorocarbons (CFC's). However, the situation today is that the surface temperature has already risen by 0.5 degrees during the last century, and is estimated to rise by 1.5 to 4.5 degrees in different parts of the globe by the middle of the next century, consequent to the increased discharge of the above listed gases in the atmosphere. On the other hand a thinning of Ozone layer was also discovered by Joe Farman of British Antarctic Survey in 1985.

Mankind has faced severe impacts on climatic changes around the globe during the last decade. It may have to prepare for worse calamities. Global warming will raise the levels of oceans and seas from 20 to 165 mm, which may submerge fertile coastal plains, river delta & estuaries, and low-lying island archipelagos, with diverse spill-off effects.

In the context of the prevailing world-wide concern about pollution control measures and growing demands for energy sources, the book under review- *The Green House Effect*-assumes special significance, both for the individual inquisitive reader as well as to promote group discussion on various vital issues raised by the authors, who have discussed the phenomenon of environment control in Nature, as also the recent changes in climate comprehensively with appropriate illustrations. They have, thereafter focussed on the imperatives for the world community at individual, national and international level.

— Maj Gen S K Talwar (Retd)

The Lessons of Modern War Volume III: The Afghan and Falkland Conflicts. By Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner. *London, Mansell, 1990, p. 471, £ 30.00. ISBN 07201-2043-8.*

In this volume the authors have covered in depth the War in Afganistan and the Falklands conflict. The lessons drawn in each case show a great deal of understanding and insight in the mechanics of war making and the 'friction' and 'fog' which are inevitable.

— Maj General B D Kale (Retd)

Who Will Win: A Key to the Puzzle of Revolutionary War. By Douglas S. Blaufarb and George K. Tanham, *New York, Taylor and Francis, 1989, p. 152, ISBN 0-8448-1583-7.*

This slim volume is an easy to read study of low intensity conflict so widespread in our world today.

The book examines US policy, doctrine and action in what was meant to be democratic support against communist expansion, but somehow lost both the "democratic" and the "communist" elements during actual intervention in low intensity but prolonged conflicts. The target is "the peoples attitudes", what we in India call "the

battle for hearts and minds". There are no sharp divisions between civil and military actions in counter insurgency, where all elements have to be thoroughly professional in their respective skills while operating as a very closely coordinated team, with patience for the long and protracted struggle. In a democracy, the overall control has to be with the civilian elected government; there can be no success without genuine and demonstrated action to back political words, ideals, and stated policies. Brute force can only beat down insurgency to a reduced level; but it will be defeated only when the mass of people opt for the rule of law and order.

The first three chapters of this book are a comprehensive and brief analysis which should be studied by all those in authority responsible for counter insurgency, be they political, civil or military.

— Tindi

Military Expenditure: The Political Economy of International Security. By Saadet Deger and Somnath Sen, Oxford, *Oxford University Press*, 1990, p. 186, ISBN 0-19-829141-8.

As pointed out by SIPRI Director, Dr. Walther Stutzle, in his Preface to this useful publication, world military expenditure is now almost \$ 1000 bn a year. Of this, the greater part is due to USA and the Soviet Union, in that order. The Soviets, at least until 1989-90 endeavoured to maintain armed forces and produce defence equipment that served to discourage the United States from encroaching on or gaining influence over areas of direct concern to Soviet Russia. A logical consequence of US policy of enlarging its area of influence and the predictable reaction of the Soviet thereto, was the constant updating of their arsenals by the two Super Powers and the periodical transfer of arms to their allies and client states.

Although the great powers are responsible for the best part of the world's total military expenditure, third world countries too, especially some in West Asia, have been spending considerable sums of money on maintaining and equipping their armed forces. India likewise has been incurring heavy expenditure on defence, necessitated by the unfriendly attitude of two of her neighbours who have attacked her on four occasions since Independence.

This publication of SIPRI covers exhaustively the growth of world military expenditure over the years, NATO's problem as perceived by USA and West Europe and the security needs of European countries following the all but formal dissociation of Baltic States from the Soviet Union. The structural changes brought about within the Soviet Union itself recently have also been discussed. So have other international, regional and national problems such as those facing the USA, the Soviet Union, China, Japan, and the two Koreas. The problems facing the Third World too have been considered in some detail.

Third world countries have been spending far more on maintaining armed forces and equipping them with military hardware, than they can afford. However, at

least some of them like India, seem to have no choice since they may have to stand up to the aggressive policies of a Super Power its allies or regional surrogates.

Besides useful discussions on international, regional and national security issues, this volume contains a number of Tables giving details of global military expenditure which add to the value of the book as a source of ready reference.

-- Col R Rama Rao, AVSM (Retd)

The Air Force Role in Low-Intensity Conflict. By Lt Col David J Dean, *USAF, Alabama Air University Press, 1986, p. 125.*

This book was written before the collapse of the Soviet Union and its eclipse as a super power. It starts with the premise, that in view of mutual deterrence, most future wars are likely to be small wars or proxy wars. But considering the changed situation, proxy wars are perhaps a thing of the past. Low Intensity Conflicts (LIC) for control of vital resources like oil or due to ethnic unrest across international borders (Mynamar-Bangladesh) or where USA decides to be the super cop are more likely.

The author contends that if the political aims are well defined and intelligence about the adversary is adequate use of air power in LICs cannot only be decisive but also cheaper. In support he has quoted the RAF experience in Iraq, Somalia and India between 1920 and 1935. Air Power also played a dominant role in the Malayam Campaign against Communist guerrillas after the Second World War

-- Air Marshal H K Oberai, PVSM, AVSM, VM (Retd)

The Nature and Practice of Flexible Response: NATO Strategy and Theater Nuclear Forces Since 1967. By Ivo. H. Daalder, *Columbia University, New York, 1991, p. 303 \$ 57.00, ISBN 0-231-07-520.*

The book deals with the lengthy debates in which NATO members advocated strategies to suit their national interests and the final evolvement of the doctrine of Flexible Response in 1967. The doctrine provided "for the employment as appropriate of one or more of conventional defence, deliberate escalation and general nuclear response" and thus conceded that every form of aggression did not require an identical response with nuclear weapons. During this phase, the USA was not overkeen to engage in a nuclear conflict with the USSR while NATO wanted a USA military presence in Western Europe and also sought a nuclear commitment from the USA for the security of its territory.

The author has examined the different viewpoints of NATO members and the lengthy debates which fructified into the strategy of Flexible Response. He has discussed the factors which guided NATO members to advocate strategies suited to their national interests at different stages, regarding the nature, size and location of nuclear stockpiles, control, delegation, deployment, location and employment of technologically advanced and long range nuclear weapons. It is relevant to know that NATO

countries were dependent for their security on the USA at this stage and the USA was advocating a conventional response to a conventional attack while France and West Germany opted for an early nuclear response. The Flexible Response, though ambiguous, reflected compromise to ensure or at least show political cohesion within NATO.

— Maj General L S Lehl, PVSM, VrC (Retd)

New Technologies and the Arms Race. Ed. By Carlo Schaerf, Brian Holden Reid & David Carlton, *London, Macmillan, 1989, p. 377, £ 16.50, ISBN 0 333 48379-0*

This book contains the papers presented at a conference on disarmament held in Italy 25-30 September 1987. The conference organised by Union of Scientists for Disarmament (USPID), was attended by delegates from the U.K., U.S.A, European countries, Soviet Union, representatives from Israel, Iran etc. but none from Asia.

Remarks on the technology are consequently five years out of date. A comment on the R&D potential of emerging nations, Brazil and India, in relation to the economic role of Technology is of interest. Authors feel they are capable of developing military technology and produce arms but not being in the vanguard of either Civilian or military technologies, cannot engage in large long term strategic themes.

Of interest to us is the chapter on Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons programme as in 1987. The Kahuta plant with 14,000 centrifuge tubes, which by now must be made of maraging steel, should be producing on basis of five units per tube and 238 work units —294 kg of 94% U235 per year, sufficient to produce 19 bombs per year.

The 1972, Arms limitation treaty —the only major bilateral arms limitation treaty, has been discussed at length. First was the limited test ban treaty (LTBT), France and China not having agreed carried out several tests in the atmosphere. This was followed by threshold test ban treaty (T.T.B.T.), negotiated in only six weeks and signed in 1974. Monitoring of nuclear explosions world wide, requires 160-170 control stations including about ten on ships. Scientists of USSR and the U.S, cooperated in tests in 1987 —the situation is still far from satisfactory.

An eye-opening book for those drawn to new technologies and the future of disarmament.

— Maj General Partap Narain (Retd)

Power and Madness: The Logic of Nuclear Coercion. By Edward Rhodes. *New York, Columbia University, 1989, p. 269, \$ 18.50, ISBN 0-231-06821-2.*

In a very provocative and insightful analysis, Edward Rhodes in the book — 'Power and Madness' raises the basic question that in a world which is dependent for strategic stability on the doctrine of 'Mutual Assured Destruction' (MAD), what components of US nuclear core structure make it feasible for the United States to use

the threat of nuclear force to deter any possible adversary against US targets as also its allies.

In spite of efforts to make nuclear war controllable and rational, the risk of uncontrolled escalation remains very high. A rational decision to use nuclear weapons is incredible. On the other hand, the potential for an irrational decision to use nuclear weapons under certain scenarios makes US nuclear commitments both actual and credible. US nuclear deterrence, thus, depends on the threat of contingently 'irrational behaviour'.

The analysis of the logic of MAD and the connected theoretical aspects has been done in a highly academic manner. Although the presentation of arguments in support of thesis is rather heavy reading, on the whole, it is a readable book and a significant contribution in the study of the subject of deterrence philosophy.

— Maj Gen M M Walia, AVSM, SM

The Swastika - A History. By Robert R. Weger, *Lafayette Trebor Regew*, p. 42, \$ 14.95.

The 'symbol' Swastika - right handed or left handed cross is the second oldest religious symbol after the Egyptian 'Eye'. It has been used in many cultures as a symbol of prosperity - Haka Risti (Fin) Hakenkreuz (German) Wan (Chinese) Manji (Japanese). Only the word "Swastika" originated from Sanskrit (India).

An erudite gem of a little book (42 pages) is copiously illustrated and is written well. A "get it now" book.

— Col Balwant S. Sandhu

The Shape of the Future : The Post Cold War World. By Donald M Snow. *New York, M E Sharpe*. 1991, p. 235, \$ 35.00, ISBN 0-87332-864-7.

The Cold War between the US led Western Democracies and the Soviet led Communist Block is now history. Eastern Europe is rid from the vice like grip of the Brezhnev Doctrine, the Baltic States are free from Russian hegemony and Germany is reunited. The mighty Soviet Union stands disintegrated, signalling that collapse of the Communist system in Europe. It is surprising that hardly anyone amongst the political observers discerned such momentous changes in the world's political map 'before hand'.

The world is in the midst of a historic revolution involving profound changes in the political, social, industrial and economic fields. A few salient features stand out in the puzzling drama of the sudden and unexpected change. First is the relative decline of the utility of military force which is rapidly vanishing as a viable option in the First World while it is still cogent amongst the nations of the Third World. The second feature is the easy exposure, despite efforts of certain regimes, to the per-

meance of satellite communication media with its news and views on freedom, democracy and openness affecting the world citizenry. The third is the growing impact of technology in the commercial, industrial and armament fields. The last, though not the least, is the clout of economic power as a factor in international relations.

The book gives a pattern of the future shape of the world as seen from the eyes of a member of the First World. The author has given inadequate space to the role of countries like India and China and the exertions and aspirations of such countries to find a place for themselves in keeping with their size, natural resources, massive populations and geopolitical situation.

A good and well produced book which helps in peeping into the future shape of the world even though the pattern of the future world is at best blurred.

— Maj General L S Lehl, PVSM, VrC (Retd)

Sipri Year Book 1992 : World Armaments and Disarmament, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 670, £ 45.00, ISBN 0953-0282.

SIPRI is an independent international institute for research into problems of peace and conflict, especially those of arms control and disarmaments. It was established in 1966 to commemorate Sweden's 150 years of unbroken peace.

This twenty-third edition of the SIPRI YEAR BOOK was produced in a period of world changes and transitions, which necessitated an unusual reappraisal of World armaments, disarmament and security matters for the otherwise standard work of the Institute. The result is a monumental work of 670 pages, covering 15 chapters and providing the reader access to comment and data on the whole spectrum of world armament and disarmament. SIPRI sources of data are of five general types; newspapers; periodicals and journals; books, monographs and annual reference work; official national documents; and documents issued by international and inter governmental organizations. This task of collecting and sifting this mass of material can well be imagined. This Year Book is divided into four parts. Part I covers weapons, technology and arms control. The chapter here covers nuclear weaponry, nuclear non-proliferation, the military use of outer space and chemical and biological warfare arms control. Part II discusses military expenditure, arms trade and production, and armed conflicts. Part III describes conventional arms control in Europe, while Part IV touches on special features, such as the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq, post-Soviet threats to security and European Security structures in transition.

There is a most interesting introduction to this very detailed study. It refers to 1991 as being a milestone year, when the political map of the world was transformed before our eyes; and the values and notions that determined international security and stability in the wake of World War II lost their meaning. Amongst the Year Books findings and conclusions are, one, the future of strategic nuclear arms control has become vastly more positive; two, that the chances of finalising a chemical weapons convention, outlawing their use, have significantly increased and three, that in

1991 it becomes clear that world defence speeding is set on a downward course.

As a reference work, this book is indispensable.

— Lt General M L Thapan, PVSM (Retd)

Self-Determination - in the New World Order. By Morton H. Halperin and Others, Washington DC, *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, 1992, p.177, ISBN 0-87003-018-3.

There is a historical precedent that all erstwhile World Orders have passed into history convulsed in violent upheavals. The peace ushered in at Vienna collapsed in 1871. The Wilsonian post Great War World Order sought to be established at Versailles had its violent end in Hitler's War. The Cold War bipolar World Order expired with the suicide of the Soviet Union. The emerging so called New World Order therefore poses the challenge of emerging with a minimum of upheaval. The most pressing factor disturbing the arrival at a new equilibrium is the concept of Self Determination.

The book under review is thus an apposite, timely and relevant analysis of this contemporary trend. Authored by Morton Halperin and David Schetter, Co-Chairman of the Carnegie Project on Self Determination, this book is a landmark contribution in the understanding of the concept and therefore is a 'must read' for both those formulating policy and those merely keeping up with the times.

This study is of relevance to India as we are faced with the challenge within whilst simultaneously having to respond to the same without. In rising to the challenge our internal policy must evolve with due regard to our democratic heritage and foreign policy must keep apace with the emerging New World Order.

— Major Ali Ahmed

The Lifeblood of War: Logistics in Armed Conflict. By Maj Gen Jullian Thompson, Brassey's (UK), London, 1991. Price £ 29.95. ISBN 08-0409776.

Julian Thompson joined the Marines at 18 and served the British Army for 34 years in various capacities and in different parts of the world. In command of 3 Commando Brigade which carried out the initial landings in the Falkland Islands in 1982, he participated in most of the actions that followed. On retirement from service he joined the King's College, London as a research fellow in their Department of War Studies. His earlier publications include two books: 'No Picnic', an account of his Brigade's operations in the Falkland Islands and 'Ready for Anything: The Parachute Regiment in War, 1940-42.

Surveying the principles and practice of logistics through the ages, the book illustrates how the problem of supplying forces was tackled through the centuries, from the earliest known standing armies of the Assyrians, through the campaigns of

Alexander the Great to modern times. Tracing changes in logistical operations in selected campaigns, Thompson attempts to identify the essential elements in effective supply and illustrates how some of these campaigns suffered through logistic inadequacy. The major campaigns highlighted include the Korean War 1950-53, Indo China and Vietnam 1946-75, The Yom Kippur War 1973, the Bangladesh Operations 1971 and Falkland Islands 1982.

Good books on Logistics are rare and Thompson's effort is a commendable attempt to rectify this deficiency. The Time Magazine quote, 'amateurs talk about strategy while professionals talk about logistics' aptly sums up the complexities and significance of logistics in war.

— Lt Gen P E Menon, PVSM (Retd)

Manhattan : The Army and the Atomic Bomb. By Vincent C Jones, *Washington United States Center of Military History, 1985; p. 660; \$ 21.00.*

This is one of the volumes authored by scholars who have been specialists in their respective fields, in the series "United States Army in World War II" issued by the Centre of Military History, United States Army, Washington D.C. This volume written by Vincent C. Jones deals with the development, production, testing and operational use of, what is often described as the ultimate weapon, the atom bomb, to bring about, or rather hasten, the surrender of Japan in 1945.

Preparations for the tactical employment of atomic weapons were begun by American planners as early as March 1944. The weapon was not then ready for use by the armed forces but tactical planning for its use against Japan was initiated by General Henry H. Arnold, Allied Commander in Chief, in order that US and her allies got the maximum return from US - and earlier British, French and German efforts - based on the theories developed by Einstein - to produce the master weapon.

However, even before these devastating bombs were dropped, Japan was getting ready to surrender. The bombs merely hastened the process a little.

The world now has five officially declared nuclear weapon powers namely, United States, Russia, Britain, France and China. Israel is also a nuclear power. So is Pakistan whose defence minister recently admitted that Pakistan has the ability to assemble "a few" nuclear explosives.

India's policy, since the days of Jawaharlal Nehru, has been to restrict the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes only. India's weakness has tempted her neighbours to attack her in the past and occupy parts of Indian territory.

These neighbours are nuclear powers. In this environment a non-nuclear India will be at the mercy of nearby nuclear powers for safeguarding her frontiers and even for sheer survival. The longer we delay building up a sizeable nuclear arsenal together with assured means of delivery of the weapons, the greater will be our vulnerability.

— Col R Rama Rao, AVSM (Retd)

Platoon Leader. By James R. McDonough, *New Delhi, Lancer International, 1990, p.195, Rs 130/- ISBN 81-7062-103-8.*

Yet another book on the Vietnam War. This one is different though, as it is set around the combat of an infantry Platoon - the smallest cohesive subunit that can operate upto a degree of appreciable independence. Notwithstanding its embryonic stature, the platoon leader exploits the fighting potential of this force to its fullest. It is, therefore, an account of combat at grassroot level. On another plane, it is also an account of the platoon leader's, in this case also the author's struggle for controlling his personal fears to enable him to direct his will and sinew towards the accomplishment of the collective mission, in face of overwhelming adversity. As the narrative unfolds, attention remains rivetted, throughout the drama of a low intensity warfare, bringing out the trauma on the populace and soldiers alike, in vivid detail. But essentially this book is about infantry sub-contingent level tactics in combat. As such foot soldiers, especially those who have served in a CI ops environment, will find it thoroughly engrossing.

— Lt Col A K Sharma

The Strategic Defense Initiative Progress and Challenges : A Guide to Issues and References. By Douglas C. Waller & others. *California, Regina Books, 1987, p. 172, \$ 10.95.*

A most interesting and informative book on the status of SDI development as in 1987. It has been published by three authors based on a congressional staff report commissioned by the members of the US Congress.

The concept of congressmen commissioning a study in advanced military weapons systems; the defence department giving the writers facilities, to probe into secret research, army and air force organisation is a precedent which we would do well to emulate.

An excellent addition to the Library.

— Maj General Pártap Narain (Retd)

Origins of the Maritime Strategy: American Naval Strategy in the First Postwar Decade. By Michael A. Palmer, *Washington, Naval Historical Centre, 1988, p. 129, ISBN 0-945274-01-7.*

This is yet another book on the US maritime strategy. However, it is different from the earlier books in that it outlines the development of the US Navy's strategic concept during a specific period (1946-1955).

Although the basic theme of the strategy remains the same each Chief of the Naval Operations had developed his own concept. While some CNO's felt that the navy should be centered around naval aviation as a fast carrier task force, the other

CNO's were of the view that there is a need to have a well balanced force complete with a striking force, bombardment group and an amphibious force with tactical air support, underwater demolition teams and minesweepers capable of effecting a landing and occupying territory against land based air and ground opposition.

The author is to be congratulated for his deep research and for highlighting the important influence in the new strategic concept of prominent leaders.

Recommended reading for all senior naval officers who are in one way or the other engaged in strategic planning.

— Captain R P Khanna, AVSM, Indian Navy (Retd)

Beyond Military Reform : American Defense Dilemmas. By Jeffrey Record, *London, Pergamon - Brassey's, 1988, p. 185, \$ 18.95, ISBN 0-08-034687-1.*

Jeffery Record, a well known thinker on American Defence policy, has tried to examine some fundamental military dilemmas facing the US today. In this very seminal study it has been brought out that American defence policy has been guided in the last decade by the two formulac coined by Reagan viz that the only thing wrong with US security was the lack of enough of it and that more money spent on defence meant more military power. Both these maxims are considered incorrect by Jefferey Record. He has cited the example of Vietnam where North Vietnamese beat the US by using inferior resources more intelligently. Secondly there is clear evidence available that the budget bonanza enjoyed by Pentagon in the first Reagan term could never be translated into functional 'Outputs' by them.

— Maj J M Singh

Vietnam at War : The History : 1946-1975. By Lt Gen P.B. Davidson, *Novato, Presidio, 1988, p. 838, \$ 27.50. ISBN 0-89141-306-5.*

The 30-year long Vietnam War is un-paralleled in the annals of military history in the sense that a small, under-developed country defeated mighty powers like France and the U.S.A. and attracted the attention of the whole world. The Central military figure in this unequal struggle was Sr. Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap of North Vietnam, architect of North Vietnamese victory. It was Giap who commanded the North Vietnamese armed forces from 1944, then consisting of only one platoon of 34 men, until 1973, when it grew to the third largest army in the world. In his wars for over 30 years, he defeated the Japanese, the French and the Americans, and the wonder of wonders was that he had no formal military schooling.

The history of these wars has been written by the author with deep understanding and critical insight and would prove to be of great interest to scholars.

— Dr B C Chakravarty

Encyclopedia of U.S. Air Force Aircraft and Missile Systems : Post-World War II Bombers 1945-1973 Vol II. By Marcelle Size Knaack, *Washington, Office of Air Force History. 1988, p. 619, ISBN 0-912799-59-5.*

Encyclopedia of USAF Aircraft and Missile Systems Vol II pertaining to the development and evolution of post WW-II Bombers period 1945-1973 has been authored by Ms Marcelle Size Knaack as a Senior Historian with the Office of US Air Force History. This is her Second Volume in the reference Series, the first one being post WW-II Fighters for the same period appearing in 1978.

Here is a book which provides all the referral material on the USAF Bombers soon after WW-II till 1973 and presented in an easy simple and lucid manner. The matter has been thoughtfully and carefully researched. The bomber development programme of the USAF has hovered around the prevailing official policies, technological constraints and the nuclear delivery capability requirement. The development of these bombers was greatly influenced by the operational necessities of the Korean and Vietnam wars. It must have been a Herculean effort on the part of the author to sift a plethora of official records not always available in a form a historian/researcher would like them to be.

This is a historical treatise in more ways than one. For one thing, she has compiled an enviable storehouse of information on the different bombers ranging from Peacemaker (B-36), Tornado (B-45), Stratojet (B-47) Superfortress (B-50), Stratofortress (B-52), Canberra (B-57), the formidable Hustler (B-58) to the Destroyer (B/RB-66). For another, she has been able to put across in a characteristic style of her own which is elaborative, exhaustive, chronological and sequential.

— Air Cmde S K Bhardwaj

Security Implications of SDI : Will be More Secure in 2010. Edited by Jeffrey Simon, *Washington DC, National Defense University Press, 1990, p. 251.*

Although the book is of recent publication (Mar 1990), the essays contained in it are fairly old (Apr 1986) and as a result the subject has not been dealt with to include up-to-date analysis of shape of things to come with regard to the future of SDI in the contemporary world.

Notwithstanding the above, the ramifications of strategic order based on the SDI in the coming century have been given a comprehensive Overview. The Soviet view of the SDI and its impact on US-Soviet relations has been accorded considerable coverage. However, with the on-going turbulence in the USSR and its uncertain future, the conclusions drawn tend to become irrelevant.

With NATO also undergoing a review of its military role, implications of the SDI for the alliance discussed in the book are also not topical. Whether or not the proposed strategic defences will make the world more secure in the coming century has been interestingly covered in the book. But, restructuring of the SDI based on the

outcome of Gulf War have not been covered in the book. The SDI, as is now understood, is likely to be oriented to deal with threat emanating from Third World countries and not from the Soviet block and therefore the emphasis has shifted to achieving Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) as against SDI being a strategic shield against threat of ICBMs from USSR.

On the whole, the book provides a worthwhile addition to the abundance of research work available on the SDI.

— Maj Gen MM Walia, AVSM, SM

Americans at War : 1975-1986, An Era of Violent Peace. By Daniel P Bolger, *Novato, Presidio 1988, p. 466, \$ 24.25, ISBN 0-8-9141-303-0.*

The author is a regular Army infantry officer with a Ph D in International Military History. Though not experienced in combat, he has analysed the actions in which the US military has been involved since the Vietnam War through a professional soldier's viewpoint.

The author describes these actions as expeditionary combat which he defines as the deployment of a small military force into a hostile area to accomplish certain definite military objectives.

Seven such expeditionary combat actions are tackled in this book. Not all of these have ended successfully - some were, in fact, tragic failures like the Iran hostage rescue attempt. The analyses by the author is based on accurate contemporary accounts and helps the military reader draw lessons, especially from the ones which were failures.

The author has carefully compiled all details of the several combat actions and the overall effect is a bit overwhelming. Yet, a useful addition to any library and, in spite of the clutter of detail, a fairly readable book.

— Col R Subramanyam

Europe After an American Withdrawal : Economic and Military Issues. Ed. Jane M.O. Sharp, *Oxford, Oxford University, 1990, p. 501, \$ 76.0, ISBN 0-19-827836-5.*

Reciprocal commitments of alliance partners tend to change with changing cycle of events and readjustments become necessary to ensure a kind of compatibility with the evolving political environment. Intentions and interests notwithstanding a nation has to act under several constraints and accordingly she is obliged to follow a kind of cost-benefit analysis in her relations with others.

American presence in Europe apparently has never been expected to be permanent. And with perceptible changes in European security environment, there arises a possibility that America might withdraw from Europe - totally or partially. The book

under review deals with the possible implications of a hypothetical American withdrawal from Europe affecting both the sides.

This book is the outcome of a research-project at SIPRI and provides the reader with multiplicity of views by various scholars dealing with specific issues, including the future of U.S. nuclear guarantee, European autonomy, alternative security systems, economic consequences of American presence (or withdrawal) and the like.

Analysed from different perspectives, dimensions of collaboration and obligations, corresponding advantages and disadvantages seem to be comprehensively treated. Still, a praise worthy intellectual exercise though this book is, it offers nothing much of perennial value.

— Anindyo J. Majumdar, JNU

Sea Wolf : A Biography of John D. Bulkeley, By William B. Breuer, *Navato, Presido*, 1989, p. 318, \$ 18.95, ISBN 0-8914 -335-9.

A fascinating book about a fascinating and daring officer of the US Navy. John Bulkeley although requested for transfer to the aviation branch was persuaded to join the exciting new branch of the service- the Patrol Boats. That is where he spent most of his time.

This book is a biography of the most decorated fighting officer who by his devotion to duty and the will to fight had won the respect of both juniors and seniors alike. The book describes his attacks on Japanese shipping in the Pacific, the rescue of General MacArthur from Corrigdor and his victory in the Water-Pipe controversy which was a big blow to Castro's ego. Lastly his contribution as the President of the Inspection and Servicing where he made sure that the standard of material readiness and safety were maintained.

Recommended reading for all naval officers in particular the junior officers who could learn many lesson.

— Captain R P Khanna, AVSM, Indian Navy (Retd)

Soviet Strategy and Islam. By Alexandre Bennigsen, Paul B. Henze and others, *London, Macmillan*, 1989. 182, £ 35.00, ISBN 0-333-47276-4.

This book examines the use of Islam as a weapon by Soviet Union to influence the Muslim World. Soviets' Islamic Strategy can be discussed in three periods. Lenin days; Stalin era and Brezhnev period. Lenin knew that Marxism offers no prescription for dealing with the Muslim world. Lenin treated Islam with supercilious hostility but he recognised the force of Islam, its supranational character and its usefulness as an emotional rallying cry. He planned that at home Islam was to be neutralised; abroad exploited. To what extent he and other Soviet leaders succeeded in using the Islamic Card within the Soviet Union and abroad is well described in the book

— Lt Col Daljit Singh, MSc (Retd)

Soviet Military Art in a Time of Change : Command and Control of the Future Battle field. By Robert Hall, *London, Brassey's (UK) 1991, 203 pp, £ 22.50, ISBN 0-08-041321-8*

The erstwhile Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has undergone a cataclysmic socio-political re-structuring during the fade-out of the last decade. The mighty tight-pack Union, which, as the hub of international communism, dominated the global arena since World War II has yet to crystalise its new personality as Commonwealth of Independent States. Consequently, military strategists and observers are tongue in cheek about forecasting the strategy of the new confederation.

"Soviet Military Art in a Time of Change" is therefore a bold venture by the author Robert Hall when the socio-political environment in Russia as well as the Eastern bloc is still in a state of flux, and therefore may appear to be too premature.

The author however, has developed his arguments with certain assumptions and prejudices, and indeed the institutional restrictions facing the Russian General staff. He has, not only, logically and analytically redefined military Doctrine in the context of a viable national strategy of the new Russian leadership, but also projected a model of the tactical battlefield environment as seen by its military heirarchy. In the extension of a doctrine of Defensive Defence based on military sufficiency, the author has projected future restructuring of battle formations and a fool-proof command and control set-up, Chapters 4 and 5 on The Military-Technical Dimension and Alliance Dimension are thus useful areas of study by military analysts.

— Maj Gen S K Talwar (Retd)

Soviet Naval Power in the Pacific. By Derek da Cunha; *Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1990, pp. 284, ISBN 155587-17-63.*

Derek da Cunha needs no introduction in terms of academic and analytical works on naval matters and in particular on Soviet naval power and Chinese naval power. The present book is a detailed work on Soviet naval power in the Pacific. It provides a useful insight into the rationale and strategies of the build-up of Soviet naval power in the Pacific. The analysis is also balanced by a coverage of the great power responses to it.

While the Soviet Union may have disintegrated following the publication of this book, the Russian Pacific Fleet is virtually still intact. Hence the relevance of the book in no way stands diminished.

— Brigadier Subhash Kapila

Almost a Revolution. By Shen Tong with Marianne Yen; *Boston, Houghton Mifflin 1990, pp 342, \$ 19.95, ISBN 0-395-5469-31.*

Among the momentous developments that shook the world in 1989, emergence

of the pro-democracy movement in the Tiananmen Square in Beijing and its ruthless suppression by the PLA, must surely rank among the most important. This Book is a personalised account of those historic days. After all, the events in that magnificent Square affected about 20 per cent of the population on this globe, whose subsequent effects will surely reverberate around the world. The movement itself was the culmination of a process rather than merely a spasmodic event in history and it will be safe to assume that we are yet to see its end. It is this that lends the Book a particular poignancy and special relevance.

The Book is fascinating in many ways. Very well written by Shen Tong with the help of a competent co-author, Marianne Yen, it is the story of the former's life spent in the very centre of China's heartland, a kilometer from the Tiananmen Square. It provides interesting insights into the life of a Chinese Youth - his schooling, hopes, aspirations, loves and relationships. The discipline and fealty of a Chinese family, the omnipresence of the Chinese Communist Party in China's daily life - its achievements and aberrations and life in China's most prestigious university, are all described here. Indian readers could surely learn much about the urban Chinese society from it.

— Maj General D Banerjee, AVSM

China : A Macrohistory. By Professor Ray Huang, *New York ME Sharpe, 1989, p. 277, \$ 12.95, ISBN 0-87332-728-4.*

There are always good reasons, for a way a people or a nation have acted over the millennia. Here is Ray Huang taking us on a journey down China's memory lane spanning 3500 years. He unfathoms the macro reasons that contributed to the rise and fall of the mighty Chinese Empires and where does China stand as a nation today? One would have preferred this to be a slow-boat journey for reading pleasure, but the rapidity with which events unfold, offers adequate compensation.

To satisfy the demands of macrohistory, Professor Huang examines the Chinese past with a longer vision and in a broader perspective but his conclusions, though one may not agree with all of them, remain precise and highly thought provoking. He emphasises, that Geography has exercised considerable influence over China's ancient history. The 15 inch isohyet line running NE to SW bisects China and separates the nomadic communities on its west from the agrarian societies on its east. Threat of nomadic incursions necessitated the construction of earthworks to act as a permanent barrier, which was later to be the great wall of China.

Professor Huang observes, "China's political unity outpaced economic organisation. Both suffered. The tragedy of China was that the unification of an enormous empire was realised, before local institutions and technological capacities could get an opportunity to develop and mature. The lack of functional capability at the middle echelon, deprived the Government of an effective grip for which despotic rulers had to compensate with their personal vigilance.

China today is the biggest country in the world. With its atomic stockpile it is

close to being a super military power. It is aiming to be an economic colossus as well. Professor Huang's book gives a considered and balanced view of China's past and the direction it is likely to take in the future.

— Air Marshal H K Oberai, PVSM, AVSM, VM, (Retd)

China Eyes Japan. By Allen S Whiting, *Berkeley, University of California, 1989, Page 228, \$ 35.00, ISBN 0-520-06511-5.*

The author is Professor of Political Science and Director of the Centre of Asian Studies at the University of Arizona. He had written a large number of books on China which include *Soviet Policies in China (1917-1924)*, *China Crosses Yalu*, decision to enter Korean War.

The book is well written and style is typically academic. The material has been well researched and documented. However the bureaucratic indifference and lack of availability of material creates a feeling that the subject could have been dealt in greater depth if all the material was available.

The subject has been presented in logical fashion and inferences drawn are logical. The book is embellished with large number of references which are well documented. The author has maintained a balanced view and therefore has been objective in his writing.

On the whole a good book for China Watchers as it provides the insight into the ethos and psychology adopted by China in decision making. Author has tried to rationalize the sudden shifts in the preceptions in China's relationships with its neighbours especially Japan.

— Maj Gen A E Joseph

The Spirit of Chinese Foreign Policy : a Psycho-cultural View by Chih-Yu-Shih. By Hampshire, *MacMillan, 1990, 231, £ 45.00, ISBN 0-333-51155-7.*

The author has presented psychological interpretation of Chinese diplomatic history. The underlying belief is that individuals behave in a way that makes sense to themselves, not logically but psychologically. Chinese culture emphasises 'shame' and the concept of 'Face' is constantly of concern to them. Since diplomacy is the tool to maintain the integrity of the national face, therefore face analysis is useful to the understanding of foreign policy motivation.

The study of foreign policy implementation and monitoring systems in operation right from Qing period make interesting reading. An extreme mode of Chinese diplomacy is use of force. It dramatises their sincerity towards fulfilment of their world view. It is interesting to note that it has never been directed for gain of more territory nor even to change the domestic policy of the opponent nor even at victory on the battle ground. The Opium War, the War of Resistance and the Korean War have been studied in detail and others in brief.

The author is of the view that Sino- Indian War was caused by Nehru not accepting the Chinese view that the border drawn by the British due to implication of imperialism had to be negotiated and inspite of China being in no position to challenge others due to failure of the Great Leap Forward the confrontation came about. Chinese sensitiveness on peripheral areas had also caused Zhenbao Island incident. However, China's unilateral withdrawal and prompt return of all PWs was in conformity with their accepted norms. A better understanding of Chinese foreign policy and sensitiveness could have changed the course of Sino-Indian confrontation of last 30 years.

Chapter by chapter exhaustive Notes and Bibliography as well as a Glossary and Index indicate the immensity and authenticity of the research work. Except for a few printers devils the presentation is praiseworthy for its brevity and clarity. The book will be a good addition to any library.

— Brigadier Kanwar Narendra Singh (Retd)

China : A New History: By John King Fairbank, *London, Harvard, University Press, 1992, p. 579, £ 22.95, ISBN 0-674-11670-4.*

It is no simple task to attempt a condensation of over 4000 Years of history of the largest most populous and most cohesive region of the world into a book of little over 400 pages. It has obviously been Professor Fairbank's long scholarship of the subject which has given him the confidence to undertake such a bold task. Chinese history could only be compacted to such a great extent by giving it the broadest of broad-brush treatment. This of course results in the need for both a high degree of selectivity as well as the risk of an out of focus perspective.

The Professor's task has been made more difficult by some recent factors. Firstly the vast increase in archaeological and historical material which is churned out and gobbled up by a large and growing army of sinologists which has become a self-sustaining industry in itself which while greatly adding to the detailed information of various facets of Chinese life and history over different periods does not substantially change the earlier interpretations. This is acknowledged by the author in his preface (page xvi). To quote "Since 1920 archaeology has broken through the ancient crust of Chinese myth and legend confirming much of it."

— Rear Admiral RV Singh, IN

Group Psychology of the Japanese in Wartime. By Toshio Iritani, *London, Kegan Paul International, 1991, p. 322, £ 45.00, ISBN 0-7103-0331-9.*

This book studies the psychology of the Japanese people under war conditions from 1931 when Japanese military expansion started, to 1945 when Japan surrendered. The saga of Japanese fighting prowess in World War II has mystified many observers. How could a tiny island nation face the combined might of the Allies and capture Singapore and sink REPULSE and PRINCE OF WALES? This book analy-

ses the Japanese war psyche with particular reference to four aspects of Japanese character. First is the unquestioned obedience to the Emperor who was considered Arahitogami (Living God). Second was self-confidence built with dedication. The Japanese people were imbued with national pride which demanded Lebensraum. Japanese favourite slogan of Greater East Asia Sphere for Co-prosperity had many buyers in South East Asia. For advance into Manchuria, Japanese created the Liut'iahu Incident of 18 Sep. 1931. By judicious propaganda, Japanese people en masse joined the Total War System. Third, is the effective role of ex-soldiers' Association (Konkubo Shiso Fukyukai) during war. Retired officers toured all prefectures to give lectures and wrote articles, to convince the public in the righteousness of their cause. Japan fought as a Nation. Fourth, is the Fighting Spirit (Yamate Damashii). Japanese strategy was to attack and to continue attacking. When the Japanese were on the receiving end, they resorted to Kamikaze tactics as used in the sea battle at Leyte in 1944. Alas! fighting spirit cannot match weapons of mass destruction like the atom bombs. The main accusation against the Japanese is their sado-masochistic methods in dealing with their enemy particularly POWs and innocent civilians. Their policy of Kill All, Burn All, Destroy All (Sanko Seisaku) is a blot on their fair Bushido spirit.

— Lt Col Daljit Singh, MSc (Retd)

Betrayals of Another Kind : Islam, Democracy and the Army in Pakistan. By Lt Gen Faiz Ali Chishti, *Delhi, Tricolour Books, 1989, p. 257, Rs 250/-, ISBN 8185404-003.*

The case of Pakistan is fascinating for its successive phases of military rule since 1958. The book has been written by a top General of Pakistan army known as the Iron Man, who has, at length, described the causes of the rise and fall of Pakistani military rulers and the power politics within the Army. The political base provided by Islamic fundamentalism to the Army military leadership, led to a diluted democracy in which people's right were curtailed to a larger extent.

— Maj General B D Kale (Retd)

The Future of the Gulf : Politics and Oil in the 1990's. By Philip Robins. *Dartmouth, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1989, p. 145, £ 27.50, ISBN 185521 00118.*

The book is the first major work of research by the RIIA Middle East Programme after its relaunching in 1987. Dr Robins, as its research scholar, has drawn his conclusions, based on academic study of the area and from persons involved in decision making in the Gulf. The book is well illustrated with maps and also gives details of proven reserves of oil producing countries of the world. The author has carried out a detailed study of the two major powers of the region; Iran and Iraq and the reasons why the smaller states formed the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in May 1981. The GCC which was to protect them against the two major powers failed to do so, as is evident from Iraq's easy occupation of Kuwait. The policies of Iran and Iraq will continue to be based on their national interest and maximum revenue from oil.

— Brig Y P Dev (Retd)

Chariots of the Desert : The Story of the Israeli Armoured Corps, By David Eshel, London, Brassey's, p. 202, £ 16.95.

Chariots of the Desert, gives us the fascinating story of Israel Armoured Corps, from its inception to date. In the narrative, perforce the War of Independence (1948-49), the Sinai Campaign of 1956, the Six Day War (1967) and the Yom Kippur War of 1973, have been covered extensively, for proper understanding, of thinking process, in evolution of concepts, organisation, logistics and equipment philosophy of present Israel Armoured Corps.

What strikes the reader immediately, is the professionalism, courage, leadership and motivation displayed by the officers, which more than neutralised, the superiority of numbers and quality of equipment, of Arab Armies.

The students of military history will find this book most absorbing and useful. Of special interest, is the assessment of performance of Soviet tanks, T 62, T 64, T 72 and T 90 (pages 190 to 193) as also the inventory of tanks/AFVs and Orbat of Mid Eastern Armies (Pages 194 to 198).

— Maj Gen Ram Nath, SM

Soviet American Competition in the Middle East. By S.L. Spiegel and others, *Indiana*, D C Heath, 1988, p. 392, ISBN 0669-16891-2.

An excellent compendium of essays by several contributors from RAND Corporation and American universities, JAFFE Center for strategic studies and others compiled by three authors. The situation is discussed taking a broad view of political, military, arms induction, their technology and the economic factors.

The UNITED STATES started taking keen interest in the M.E. in 1946 when it blocked the SOVIET entry into IRAN, in 1953 it sponsored the coup against MOSSADEG. Both countries inducted arms into the area. The initial levels were low, \$300 million annually in 1955-66, in the first half of 1980s deliveries at \$5.9 billion from RUSSIA alone. The weapons supplied were not of the highest technology.

Despite the competition both sides desired to prevent escalation in the 6 day war in June 1967, U.S.S.R used the hotline to save SYRIA. In the YOM-KIPPUR war in October 1973 it had to ask the U.S.A to intervene to prevent collapse of the Egyptian army, then trapped in the SINAI Desert. The situation changed when Sadat turned to Kissinger who created the new basis for the U.S.A by arranging the Camp David Agreement which led to the historic visit by him to Jerusalem in 1977. With the Russian occupation of Afghanistan in 1981, the U.S. posture towards Pakistan changed, it approved the 3.2 billion \$ aid -without insisting on the requirement of the Glenn amendment. It also accepted the need of a Rapid deployment force, for the protection of the Gulf oilfields. The reference to Nasser's visit to Moscow in 1970, and the consequent deployment of 15,000 Soviet troops and 150 pilots to fly the MIG 21'S against the Israelis appears far fetched. A very informative book which deserves a place in any library dealing with international affairs.

— Maj General Partap Narain (Retd)

Israel, The West Bank and Gaza Towards a Solution : Report of a JCSS Study Group. Tel Aviv University, *Jaffe Centre for Strategic Studies*, 1989, p. 24, ISBN 965-356-005-0.

The booklet is a summary of a large work 'The West Bank and Gaza: Israel's Options for Peace', produced by the Study group of centre for Strategic studies of Tel Aviv University. It discusses all the current six options on the Israeli public agenda and rejects them as untenable. First option of 'Status Quo' bodes ill for Israel as the Arab World cannot tolerate it indefinitely. Second and third options of Autonomy and Annexation would violate the Camp David Agreements. Fourth option of unilateral withdrawal can create a potentially hostile mini palestinian state capable of subverting Israel. Fifth option of a 'Jordanian - Palestinian Federation' is wholly unacceptable to the Palestinians. The last option of creating a Palestinian State is not likely to be contemplated by any sane Israeli government.

This very topical study concludes that the only possible course at present is for both parties to enter direct negotiations and step up confidence-building measures. Israel has to stop making any new jewish settlements in the disputed areas and Palestinians have to renounce terrorism as a policy. This process could eventually lead to a durable negotiated settlement.

— Lt Col J M Singh (Kumaon)

The Gulf War By Edgar O'Ballance. *London, Brassey's 1988, p. 231, \$ 35.95, ISBN 0-08-034747-9.*

When Edgar O'Ballance wrote his book - and I would say unlike his previous well researched works he wrote it in a hurry - the prospects of a cease fire were uncertain. The well wishers of both Iraq and Iran like late Mrs Gandhi and Gen Zia-Ul-Haq, had failed to make Saddam Hussain and Ayatollah Khomeini to see sense and stop the slaughter of 'flowers of their nations'. And it is no wonder that the obduracy of the Ayatollah to punish Saddam Hussain by aiming at his 'overthrow' and Saddam Hussain's so called 'teaching a lesson' to the Mullahs, dragged a senseless war to such an extent. There has been much, too much, blood letting on both the sides. The casualties of this war have been, as Edgar says 'truth'. The victors, if at all, have been the obstinate Saddam and Ayatollah in that their prestige has been further enhanced.

— Brigadier C B Khanduri (Retd)

The End of Empire in the Middle East : Britain's Relinquishment of Power in Her Last Three Arab Dependencies. By Glen Balfour-Paul, *Cambridge, Cambridge University, p. 278, £ 30.00, ISBN 0521-38259-9.*

This book is a perceptive study of Britain's withdrawal from her last three dependencies— the Sudan in 1955; South West Arabia (Aden) in 1967; and the Gulf States in 1971. Reasons for Britain's withdrawal are different for the three depend-

encies. For Sudan, it was Britain's anti-Egyptian strategy; Aden, it was world pressure along with nuclear deterrent overtaking Aden's strategic importance; and Gulf States was Britain's financial crunch. Political power requires a powerful economic base but after the World War II, Britain's treasury was empty; US lend-lease had stopped and her overseas debts were phenomenal. This made Britain's hold in Middle East untenable.

— Lt Col Daljit Singh, MSc (Retd)

Majestic Failure : The Fall of The Shah. By Marvin Zonis, *Chicago University of Chicago*, p. 350, \$ 29.95, ISBN 0-226-98928-3.

Marvin Zonis, the author, has good credentials to produce this work. By his research and conversance with Iranian affairs, he has convincingly discussed that the two key factors, responsible for the overthrow of the Shah and end of the 54 years old Pahlavi Dynasty, were his own weak character and style of rule and the betrayal of his extraordinary trust in the United States.

It is incredible that the most powerful reigning monarch, possessing an efficient but ruthless apparatus of oppression, in the form of the SAVAK the State Security and Intelligence Organisation, was kicked out in a short, swift but violent revolution. It was led by Ayatollah Khomeini, an ageing cleric, in exile in France.

By all accounts the 1978-79 revolution was an unprecedented event in this century. This study and analysis, ipso facto, are for the U.S. Foreign Policy framers; rulers, of unpopular regimes, the world over, can take a leaf from it. In a way, the revolution is also a model for study and analysis by students of history, and military and political sciences. An enjoyable and absorbing reading all along.

— Brigadier Rai Singh, MVC, VSM, (Retd)

Understanding the Crisis in the Persian Gulf. By Peter Cipkowski, *New York, John Wiley*, 1992, p. 179, £ 6.95, ISBN 0-471-54815-4.

The invasion of Kuwait by the Iraqi armed forces, which led to the second war in West Asia, was the focus of world attention during 1990-91. To those in uniform, it was of special interest, as it was the largest high-tech military operation, undertaken since World War II.

The book deals with the root causes of the War; the rise of Saddam Hussain and militarization of Iraq and how Saddam misread the West as badly as the West read him. The events leading to the recapture of Kuwait and destruction of the Iraqi War machine make a fascinating reading. Although the ground operations of "Operation Desert Shield" have not been covered in great detail, there is no doubt that air-power and high-tech weapons and electronic systems acted as force-multipliers, and had a profound effect on the outcome of the War.

The book makes a good reading and will prove very useful to those readers who do not have an intimate knowledge of the region.

— Maj Gen S C Suri (Retd)

Storm Command : A Personal Account of the Gulf War. By General Sir Peter de la Billiere; *London, Harper and Collins, 1992, p. 348, £ 18.00, ISBN 0002551381.*

The British contingent of forty five thousand tri-service troops, though less than a tenth of the size of the American force, was nevertheless the third largest element in the UN Coalition forces that took the field in the spectacular Gulf War fought to force Saddam Hussein to vacate his occupation of Kuwait. 'The Storm Command' is a personal account by General Sir Peter de la Billiere, the Commander of this Force, of the British effort in this short war that successfully ousted Iraqi forces from Kuwait.

The author states that the "primary aim in writing this book is to demonstrate the importance of individual human beings in modern warfare". He goes on further to say that his account of the campaign "is designed mainly for readers without a military background, who may be interested in the way a large-scale international operation is managed".

In today's high-tech world and in a war fought with weapons of a sophistication beyond anything previously displayed in battle, the role of the man behind the weapon is likely to be overlooked and somewhat marginalised. The author has certainly succeeded in bringing out the correct contribution made by the man behind the weapon and how his training and competence still remains a vital battle winning factor. He has thus put this important aspect in its correct perspective.

To achieve his other objective the author has reduced, what must have been very complicated plans for the sea, air and land battles, to a simple easy to understand narrative which will be of immense interest to readers, who do not have a military background. But in doing this he has perhaps missed out on the requirement of providing in greater detail the complicated plans, and the reasons for their adoption, that would have been of great value to the professional soldier, sailor and airman and which he was in a unique position to provide. He does, however, bring out extremely well the problems senior commanders face in an international force made up of so many disparate nations each with their own national imperatives and perspectives.

Some aspects that should be of interest to our own political and military hierarchy is firstly the stringent selection procedures followed in Whitehall to select the right persons with the requisite qualifications to fill the various senior appointments in the field force. Also of vital importance are the organisation of a joint service headquarters and the appointment of an unified overall commander of all the forces in a theatre. These aspects, which are well covered in this book should be of special interest to India as our greatest failure appears to be in these spheres.

The other aspect that needs to be noted is the manner in which successful commanders were rewarded. The author, who was the Commander of the British Force, was specially promoted to the rank of General and appointed as special adviser of Middle-East Affairs to British Defence Minister. Other senior commanders were also deservedly promoted. This certainly is in sharp contrast to the shabby manner most of the Indian senior successful generals were treated after the spectacular victory won by them in Bangladesh in 1971.

— Maj General S C Sinha, PVSM (Retd)

Wellington : Studies in the Military and Political Career of the First Duke of Wellington Ed. By Norman Gash, *Manchester, Manchester University, 1990, Page 262, £ 35/-, ISBN 0719029740.*

Wellington is a collection of twelve essays on the military and political career of Duke of Wellington. These essays are to commemorate the transfer of Wellington's papers to the University of Southampton in 1983. Wellington, who created a niche in military history by defeating Napoleon at Waterloo, started his military career in India in 1797 as Sir Arthur Wellesley. His elder brother Richard Marquess Wellesley was then the Governor General of India but Arthur Wellesley never lived in his brother's shadow. During his eight years stay in India from Feb 1797 to Mar 1805, he went through the crucible of battlecraft in two major Indian campaigns ie Fourth Mysore War 1799 where he defeated Tipu Sultan and the Second Maratha War in 1803 where with a mixed force of 20,000 troops, he defeated Bhonsla Raja of Berar first at Assaye (25 Sep 1803) and then finally at Argaon in Nov 1803. At Argaon, in the face of Maratha artillery barrage, British column broke and fled. Here Arthur Wellesley adopted the tactics which he was to use later at Waterloo— not to retreat but to lie down till the barrage was over and then charge at the enemy. At Argaon, Sir Arthur Wellesley was baptised as Wellington. Besides the playing fields of Eton, battle of Waterloo was won at Argaon!

Wellington is to be credited to follow three major principles— firstly never retire in face of any Indian army; secondly, a strong control at centre level is a must to maintain order in India; and thirdly, British power in India must rest on management rather than force. Wellington's biggest victory was at Waterloo, but surprisingly, there is no essay on Waterloo. A study of Wellington without Waterloo is like studies of Alexander, Allenby and Montgomery without the battles of Arbela, Meggido and El Alamein respectively.

— Lt Col Daljit Singh, MSc (Retd)

Air Bridge to Berlin : The Berlin Crisis of 1948, its Origins and Aftermath, By D.M. Giangreco and Robert E. Griffin, *California, Presidio, 1988, p. 247, \$ 14.95, ISBN 089141-329-4.*

Lately, Berlin Wall and the unification of the two Germans, has been much in the news.

Post World War II era, saw the beginning of the Cold War. The seeds of confrontation were planted at the Yalta conference in February 1945. In June 1948, Soviet occupation forces closed all overland routes from Western Zones of occupation into Berlin. The blockade was the first major test of American resolve in the Post War period. America's atomic arsenal seemed to be all, that stood in the way of a communist invasion of Western Europe.

In stunning detail, *Airbridge to Berlin*, portrays the American and Allied response to Soviet blockade. Requiring split second timings, 24 hours a day, regardless of weather, the air bridge stayed intact for over a year. The book presents complete story of the blockade and air lift, in proper historical context, so necessary for full understanding. The value of the book is enhanced by over two hundred photographs.

— Maj Gen Ram Nath, SM

The British Army and the Operational Level of War. Ed. By Maj Gen J.J. Mackenzie and Brian Holden Reid, *New Delhi, Lancer, 1989, p. 233, Rs 200.00, ISBN 81-7062-0880.*

This book is a collection of essays by some British officers who have held senior command and staff appointments. The essays were presumably written as a part of their course work while attending the Higher Command and Staff Course. They cover some of the aspects of the operational level of war mainly in the context of the Central Region of the European Theatre where NATO and Warsaw Pact forces faced each other across the border between West and East Germany until the very recent reunification of the two Germanys into one nation. Most writers have devoted their thoughts to ways and means of countering the threat posed by the Soviet doctrine of achieving a break in and inserting their operation manoeuvre groups through the gaps to rapidly exploit NATO's lack of depth and achieve success by destroying NATO reserves, forward air fields, weapon launching sites, C³ assets and logistic facilities.

One wonders why our own training establishments should not come out with similar publications to encourage reading and writing habits amongst our officers. Perhaps the Indian Official Secrets Act stands in the way.

— Brig R D Law (Retd)

Reforging the Iron Cross: The Search for Tradition in the West German Armed Forces. By Donald Abenheim. *New Jersey, Princeton, 1988, p. 316, \$ 29.95, ISBN 0-691-05534-3.*

The Author traces the raising and build up of the West German Army from the beginning, in an old stable where the first batch of cadets received their commission. During 1957-58 new units were created at break-neck speed and a number of veteran groups were inducted. The main combat power was concentrated in armoured and armoured infantry divisions and a tactical air force. The Civil advisers prohibited the restoration of Reichwehr conventions, inspite of achievements of the Army against heavy odds during the Second World War.

The author has attempted to prove that despite political obstacles the founder of Bundeswehr generally succeeded in persuading Germany and the international community that the new Army would not revive the militarism of the past. The book is an important and well informed study for historians.

— Brig Y P Dev (Retd)

Drifting Apart ? The Superpowers and Their European Allies. Ed. By Christopher Coker, *London, Brassey's 1989, p. 182, £ 25.00, ISBN 0-08-036711-9.*

The revolution of 1989 in Europe has left many perplexed about its root causes. This book provides some of the answers; though it was published before the revolution. The book is a result of the fifteenth session of the Standing Committee- on Atlantic Organisations(SCAO) held in 1988 in Cambridge. It includes nine essays by different authors; about the economics of defence as related to NATO and Warsaw Pact.

As is stated by the Editor in the Introduction, the book is one of the few comparative approaches to NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The book contains several interesting ideas which may be extrapolated to the situation prevailing in the Indian sub-continent.

The book is a commendable effort at comparing the economic problems facing NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The essays on the Warsaw Pact have depended heavily on the Soviet Press and other scarce information available on defence issues. The editorial comments need special mention for their appropriateness and brevity.

Defence economists, as a breed, are almost unheard of in India. The few who are there will do well to read this book; as also those interested in European Affairs.

— Major P K Gupta

Francis Younghusband and the Great Game. By Anthony Verrier. *London. Jonathan Cape 1991, 238 p., £ 18.00, ISBN 0-224-02505-8.*

This book is not exactly a biography of Sir Francis Younghusband, but is a detailed critique of the role played by him and others of his ilk in central Asia during the latter part of the last century and the beginning of the 20th century. It has been aptly described as a cold war of wits between the British and the Russians, wherein, the Chinese remained helpless but patient spectators waiting for a more opportune moment for interjection.

In describing the 'Great Game' the author has highlighted the unenviable and often unsustainable position of political agents. They worked in the most isolated places and very often, due to development of events beyond their control, were forced to act on issues outside their terms of reference. The author, however, has provided evidence to show that the case of Younghusband and a few others is different.

Younghusband, to an extent encouraged by his superiors including perhaps Curzon knowingly deviated from the laid down policy. The major event in support of this conclusion, is the signing of September 1904 Lhasa Convention, which challenged the accepted suzerain position of Chinese over Tibet and had to be virtually repudiated later by the April 1906 Convention between Great Britain and China and August 1907 Convention between Great Britain and Russia relating to Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet. Curzon, whose own role in the misadventure was under question made a scapegoat out of Younghusband just as Auckland and Lytton had done it to Alexander Burnes and Louis Cavangari involved in the first and second Afghanistan War respectively.

Anthony Verrier switches back and forth with the events of the era. Some of these are recapitulated very briefly and those who are not familiar with the history of this period would be confronted with unbridgeable gaps in the narrative.

— Air Marshal H K Oberai, PVSM, AVSM, VM (Retd),

The Forgotten War : British Army in the Far East 1941-45. Ed. By David Smurthwaite. London, National Army Museum, 1992, p. 201, £ 15.50, ISBN 0901721255.

As an appetiser to the study of the history of the War in Malaya and Burma in 1941-45, this book would find few competitors. It is a volume of essays, written by distinguished academic historians, veterans of the campaigns and military specialists, to serve as an introduction to the problems faced by, and the achievements of the Army in the Far East during the Second World War. What makes it most palatable is the unrivalled collection of war photographs, which are included in the text and vividly bring out the arduous nature of the fighting.

Reading through the text, one is struck by the scale of effort provided by India and the Indian Armed Forces, to the conduct of the War in Burma which, ultimately, led to the defeat of the Japanese. It is sad to reflect that the course of history has led to the break-up of a magnificent fighting machine; two of whose components now face each other in political and in consequence, military confrontation.

The essays cover a wide field. James Hunt, a former British Defence Adviser to the UK High Commissioner in Delhi, and a contributor to the USI Journal, has written a most interesting prelude on the Imperial commitment and threat in the Far East and Pacific 1918-41. An ex Indian Army gunner has written nostalgically of his years in India and during the war in Burma. There are sections on the contributions made by African Colonial Forces and Women's Auxiliary Organisations to the War effort; the Chindits and long range penetration; and technical comparisons between Allied and Japanese Infantry weapons, Artillery and Armour. At the end there are some personal reminiscences and an account of the treatment of prisoners of war by the Japanese. The cruelty inflicted was unbelievable. A section of gallantry and campaign awards 1941-45, illustrated in colour, with origins and data is also of interest.

The National Army Museum is to be complimented on producing an eminently readable book. It does much to efface the wartime impression of the fourteenth Army - the forgotten Army. What this Army achieved under the leadership of Field Marshal Viscount Slim can never be forgotten.

— Lt General M L Thapan, PVSM (Retd)

Resettlement of Ex-Servicemen in India: Problems, Patterns and Prospects. By Satyendra Kishore, *New Delhi, Concept, 1991, p. 227, Rs 160/-. ISBN 81-7022-356-3.*

The author has confined his study to the states of Bihar and Haryana. The advantages an ex-serviceman has in Haryana are obvious. Proximity to Delhi for employment and a developed state where most upper class families have someone in the defence services thereby ensuring community support. In Bihar resettlement remains an individual problem. By and large he finds that ex-servicemen are best suited to resettlement in the agricultural field. The next preferred occupations are employment in the public sector, and as security guards or supervisors. In Bihar the coal transport sector has attracted ex-servicemen though mafia connected control entails risks. Ex-servicemen are not good entrepreneurs because they have been trained to obey orders. Use of initiative or innovation are curbed just the opposite of the qualities required of an entrepreneur.

The author is of the opinion that agriculture is not really a viable full time vocation. Priority in re-settlement should be given by automatic reemployment in government agencies in the vicinity of their home areas.

— Maj Gen R L Chopra, PVSM (Retd)

Indian Police : A Retrospect. By Giri Raj Shah, *New Delhi, Cosmo Publications, 1989, p. 224, Rs 250/- .*

Mr. Giri Raj Shah, a career police officer has traced the history of police in the ancient days, during the reign of Moghul Rulers and the British Raj and what it is today. He has also given the details of rural policing in the different states during the past.

There is much criticism of police administration. There is disrespect for law and discontentment against police behaviour. Also, there is much corruption in a force which is itself responsible for its eradication.

The author has analysed the reasons for all the above in great detail, main ones being inadequate police force, the status of police constable who is equated to class IV servant, and unrealistic expectation from the general public.

Mr. Shah has made some valid recommendations namely the improvement in the quality of personnel, increase in the police force, the contingency planning and better terms and conditions. He has also given his idea of what the organisation of police force should be at the centre and state level.

A well presented book which should appeal to all those who run and control the police force.

— Captain R P Khanna, AVSM, Indian Navy (Retd)

Valour and Wisdom -Genesis and Growth of the Indian Military Academy. By B.P.N. Sinha and Sunil Chandra, *New Delhi, Oxford and IBH, 1992, pp 340, Rs 275, ISBN 81 204-0678-8*

The Indian Military Academy (IMA) is now 60 years old and so far there has been no comprehensive book on this institution. The present work fills the void. Establishment of the IMA in 1932 was a landmark. It was a coincidence that it came about just 15 years before the British rule ended though demand for such a college had been consistently made for 50 years and more before that date.

The character of a people cannot be destroyed howsoever a colonial power may try, as it is deep rooted in its culture and ethos. The claim of the authors that the British did it as far as the military leadership was concerned is open to question. It is well known that they were able to conquer the entire Indian sub-continent with the active support of the Indian soldiery and leadership remained with Indians.

While the first part deals with the genesis of the British imperial policy the major portion of the book covers the establishment of the IMA, its growth over the years until 1987. One so wishes it had been brought up to date.

A welcome addition to military literature.

— Lt Col Gautam Sharma (Retd)

Building a Defence Technology Base. By Major General B.D. Kapur, *New Delhi, Lancers International, 1990 p. 200, Rs 200, ISBN 81-7062-089-9.*

The Writer, Director of Weapons and Equipment, Army HQrs. after independence, and subsequently the first Chief Controller of Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) at its inception on 1st January 1958, is well qualified in the field of management and industrial engineering.

The book consisting of 12 chapters, is a portrayal of events leading to the building of a base for modern Defence technology in India in the late fifties and the early sixties with the catalytic role of the late Krishna Menon highlighted. The part played by the author is also narrated though without a self-indulgent emphasis along with many interesting developments at the bureaucratic echelons.

The author has made an important point of principle regarding the need for our Scientists to take initiative and also be in a position to develop equipment freely and if need be, even over the opposition of military services. The scientists should also be institutionally capable of getting the equipment tested and evaluated sufficiently near the top to ensure an unprejudiced judgement of its merits.

— Gautam Sen, IDAS

CIA : A History by John Ranelagh, *London, BBC Books, 1992, p. 256, £ 15.95, ISBN O 563 36250 2.*

John Ranelagh, who works for the BBC television had earlier written a prize winning book on the CIA, *The Agency : The Rise and Decline of the CIA (1986)*. His present work covers the history of the CIA, the world's foremost secret service from 1947 to 1991. The CIA was formed as a central coordinating agency to collect, collate, evaluate and analyse all intelligence information; after the experience of the complete failure of American intelligence services to warn the government about the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour. It was the successor of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) formed during the war for coordination, and research and analyses of all intelligence.

From a strength of 5000 in 1950, the Agency expanded to 20,000 employees in 1990; and in addition, had a large number of freelance contract workers all over the world. During the 44-year period of the Cold War covered by the author, the target of the CIA was the Soviet Union. Some of the well-known operations during this period like the Bay of Pigs, Cuban missile crisis, War in Vietnam, Iran-Contra affair, and Afghanistan along with the Agency's rising and falling fortunes have been adequately described. After the end of the cold war and during the transition from a bipolar to multipolar international system, the CIA's role and targets are being redefined.

The book provides a panoramic view of a long period during which the CIA played a major under-cover role in American international politics. It contains several interesting photographs and a select bibliography. It is a good introduction to a deeper study of the CIA's operations of espionage, sabotage and subversion during the cold war.

-- N. B. S.

USI Journal : Subscription Rates : 1992

The revised annual subscription rates of USI Journal from 01 Jan 1992 are as under :-

(a)	For	1 Year	Rs. 120.00
(b)		2 Years	Rs. 235.00
(c)		3 Years	Rs. 350.00
(d)		4 Years	Rs. 460.00
(e)		5 Years	Rs. 550.00

Remittance for the requisite amount may please be made by Bankdraft / Postal Orders drawn in favour of Director, USI of India, New Delhi-110011

Additions to the USI Library for the Quarter - Ending March 1993

Afghanistan

1. Isby, David C. War in Distant Country : Afghanistan :
Invasion and Resistance 1989

Arms Control

2. Andreas Furst, Volker Europe and Naval Arms Control in the
Heise and Steven Miller Gorbachev Era 1992

Biography

3. Cunningham, Noble E Jr. In Pursuit of Reason :
The Life of Thomas Jefferson 1987

Economics

4. Osborne, David & Reinventing Government:
Gaebler, Ted How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is
Transforming the Public Sector 1992
5. Galbraith, John Kenneth Economics in Perspective :
A Critical History 1987
6. Kumaresh India : 1992; Observer Statistical
Chakrovorty ed. Hand Book 1992

Gulf War

7. Billiere, General Storm Command : A Personal
Sir Peter de la Account of the Gulf War 1992
8. Hiro, Dilip Desert Shield to Desert Storm,
the Second Gulf War 1992
9. K R Singh, ed. Post War Gulf : Implications for India 1993

History - India

10. Taylor, PJO A Star Shall Fall India 1857 1993

History - U.S.A.

- | | | | |
|-----|-------------------------------------|--|------|
| 11. | Nyc, Joseph S Jr, | Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power | 1990 |
| 12. | Burger, Warren E | Delivery of Justice : Proposals for Changes to Improve the Administration of Justice | |
| 13. | Daniels, Roger | Coming to America : A History of Immigration and Ethnicity in American Life | 1990 |
| 14. | Hess, Stephen | Live From Capital Hill : Studies of Congress and Media | 1991 |
| 15. | Burns, James McGregor | The Vineyard of Liberty | 1982 |
| 16. | Sowell, Thomas | Ethnic America: A History | 1981 |
| 17. | Alderman, Ellen & Kennedy, Caroline | In our Defense : The Bill of Right in Action | 1991 |

History - Nepal

- | | | | |
|-----|------------------|--------------|--|
| 18. | Shaha, Rishikesh | Modern Nepal | |
|-----|------------------|--------------|--|

Indian - Army

- | | | | |
|-----|--------------------|--|------|
| 19. | Gaylor, John | Sons of John Company: The Indian and Pakistan Armies 1903 - 91 | 1993 |
| 20. | Menezes, SL Lt Gen | Fidelity & Honour : The Indian Army from the Seventeenth to the Twenty - First Century | 1993 |

Indian Foreign Policy

- | | | | |
|-----|---------------|---|------|
| 21. | R S Yadav ed. | India's Foreign Policy Towards 2000 AD | 1993 |
| 22. | Ahmed, Imtiaz | States and Foreign Policy: India's Role in South Asia | 1993 |

Military - History

23. Wood, Derek **Attack Warning Red :
The Royal Observer Corps and the
Defence of Britain 1925 to 1992** 1976

Nuclear Non Proliferation

24. Kapur, KD **Nuclear Non-Proliferation Diplomacy :
Nuclear Power Programmes in the
Third World** 1993

Nuclear Weapons

25. Martin, Laurence **The Changing Face of
Nuclear Warfare** 1983

Pakistan - Politics and Government

26. Charles H Kennedy ed. **Pakistan : 1992** 1993

Politics

27. Mehta, VR **Foundation of Indian Political Thought**

Pollution

28. Silver, Cheryl Simon
and De Fries, Ruth S. **One Earth : One Future** 1991

Warfare

29. Sardeshpande, S.C. **War & Soldiering** 1992

Terrorism

30. Mohindra, S **Terrorist Games Nations Play** 1993

USA - Foreign Policy

31. Denny, Brewster C. **Seeing American Foreign
Policy Whole** 1985

Weapons System

32. Chant, Christopher **A Compendium of Armaments
and Military Hardware** 1987

JOIN USI Correspondence Courses And Plan Your Career

Courses run by the USI

Courses	Dates		Fees*	
	Course commen- cement	Exa- mina- tion	All subjects (Rs.)	Each subject (Rs.)
1. DSSC Entrance Examination (Army)	Nov	Sep	700	160
2. DSSC Entrance Examination (Navy)	Jan	Jul	—	225
3. DSSC Entrance Examination (Air)	Jan	Jul	375	200
4. TSC Entrance Examination	Nov	Sep	400	160
5. Promotion Examination Part D	Jun	Jan	550	130
6. Promotion Examination Part B	Sep	Apr	350	110

*Membership of the USI is compulsory for all Courses. The fees given above do not include membership fees which are as follows :-

Membership Fees

	<i>Life</i> (Rs.)	<i>Ordinary</i> (Rs.)
Entrance	100	100
Subscription	900	100(annual - 1 Apr to 31 Mar)

Bank Drafts/Postal Orders and Local Cheques ONLY will be accepted.

For further details write to the Chief Instructor;

UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION OF INDIA
Kashmir House, Rajaji Marg, New Delhi - 110 011 (Tele 3015828)

USI
(Estd. 1870)
OUR ACTIVITIES

Library Service

One of the oldest and finest military libraries in India, today it has over 50,000 books, and journals on its shelves, including books published in the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries, on an astonishing variety of subjects. While the principal emphasis is on strategy and defence, there are a large number of works on different facets of Indian life, as well as on other countries. It is a store house of rare books and manuscripts for scholars and research workers devoted to political and military study.

Correspondence Courses

The introduction of Correspondence Courses for promotion and Defence Service Staff College examinations some years ago found ready response and today the Institution has 1,500 members who participate in the Training Courses annually. Material is despatched to them regularly wherever they may be.

The students have undoubtedly profited by these courses, as evidenced by the success achieved by them in these Examinations. Popularity apart, the courses contribute substantially to the revenue of the USI.

USI Journal

Oldest Defence Journal in India, it contains proceedings of lectures and discussions, prize essays, original articles, book reviews, etc.

It is published quarterly in April, July, October and January each year (the first issue being Jan-Mar each year). The Journal is supplied free to members. It provides a forum for the most junior officer to express his opinions relating to his profession.

Gold Medal Essay Competitions

The gold medal essay competition is held every year. The subject for essay is announced during the month of March each year. On the occasion of the Centenary, an additional Gold Medal Essay Competition has been instituted for Junior Officers of not more than ten year's service.

Lectures and Discussions

A series of lectures by outstanding experts on service, international affairs and topics of general interest to the Services are organised for the benefit of Local Members in Delhi.

Mac Gregor Medal

This medal is awarded every year to officers for any valuable reconnaissance they may have undertaken.

Rules of Membership

1. All officers of the Defence Services and all Central Services Gazetted officers Class I (including Retired), Cadets from NDA, other Services' Academies and Midshipmen shall be entitled to become members on payment of the entrance fee and subscription.
2. Life Members of the Institution shall be admitted on payment of Rs. 1000/- which sum includes entrance fee.
3. Ordinary Members of the Institution shall be admitted on payment of an entrance fee of Rs. 100/- on joining and an annual subscription of Rs. 100/- to be paid in advance.
4. The period of subscription commences on 1 April each year and shall be operative till 31 March of the following year.

For further particulars, please write to Director, USI of India, Kashmir House, Rajaji Marg, New Delhi - 110011.